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[T]he overriding interest must be that of the victims, and of the international community
as a whole.... We have before us an opportunity to take a monumental step in the name
of human rights and the rule of law [and] to create an institution that can save lives and
serve as a bulwark against evil. We who have witnessed, time and again in this century,
the worst crimes against humanity, have an opportunity to bequeath to the next century a
powerful instrument of justice. So let us rise to this challenge. Let us give succeeding
generations this gift of hope. They will not forgive us if we fail.
- United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annani
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be
frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter, the rain may
enter, but the King of England cannot enter-all his force dares not cross the threshold of
the ruined tenement!
- William Pitt (1763)2
I. INTRODUCTION
Late in the evening of Friday, July 17, 1998, at a United Nations facility
in Rome, Italy, after five weeks of indefatigable, strained negotiations, 120
nations endorsed a treaty to establish a permanent International Criminal
Court (ICC) to sit in the Hague, Netherlands with jurisdiction to try
perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
aggression. 3 The Court will be established after sixty states have adhered to
the Rome Statute,4 and will function fully after the Assembly of States Parties
I. UN Secretary-General Declares Overriding Interest of International Criminal Court
Conference Must Be That of Victims and World Community as a Whole, U.N. Doc. L/ROM/6.rI (June
15, 1998), http:ll/vww.un.org/ice/pressrellrom6rl.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2001) [hereinafter UN
Secretary-General Declares]; see also Summary Record of the 1st Plenary Meeting, United Nations
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court,
11-12, U.N. Doc. AIConf.183/SR.I (1998).
2. HANSARD, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND (1813), vol. 15, col. 1307, cited in
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958). Though the English Parliamentarian Pitt decried the
Crown's uninvited entry into the tattered homes of the poor, his words apply equally to rights of alleged
perpetrators of barbaric crimes.
3. The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute], was concluded at the United Nations Diplomatic Conference
of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court [hereinafter Rome
Conference], which was held in Rome from June 15-July 17, 1998. Unless otherwise specified, in this
Article "ICC" refers to the International Criminal Court as an international organization, and "Court"
refers to the judicial organ of the ICC functioning in its judicial capacity.
4. Id., art. 126(1). The Rome Statute shall enter into force sixty days following the sixtieth
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adopts collateral documents, including the ICC Rules of Procedure and
Evidence and the ICC Elements of Crimes, finalized drafts of which were
approved at the conclusion of the fifth session of the Preparatory Commission
for the Establishment of an International Criminal Court.
Though the Court will have jurisdiction to prosecute individuals charged
with a limited number of serious international crimes and will have no
jurisdiction to prosecute individuals for "ordinary" international human rights
law violations, 6 the Rome Statute expressly obligates the ICC to ensure
extensive human rights safeguards for individuals before, during, and after
trial.7 All aspects of all ICC proceedings, including every action taken by all
ICC organs8 and divisions,9 and involving all ICC substantive and procedural
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. As of May 2001, thirty-two States had adhered to the
Rome Statute either by ratification or accession: Andorra, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Belize,
Botswana, Canada, Croatia, Dominica, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Iceland, Italy,
Lesotho, Luxembourg, Mali, Marshall Islands, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, San Marino, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Tajikistan, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. For a list of all
States that participated in the Rome Conference, and the status of signatures, ratifications and
accessions, see infra note 372.
5. A Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court [hereinafter Preparatory
Commission] was called upon to prepare proposals for practical arrangements for "the establishment and
coming into operation of the Court, including [preparing] draft texts of" the following documents related
to the Court: the Rules of Procedure and Evidence; the Elements of Crimes; and the Rules of Procedure
of the Assembly of States Parties. Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Annex I, Res. F, U.N. Doe.
A/Conf 183/10 (1998) [hereinafter Final Act]. A finalized draft Rules of Procedure and Evidence was
approved by the Preparatory Commission on June 30, 2000, and published on July 12, 2000. Report of
the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court-Addendum: Finalized Draft Text of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doe. PCNICC/2000/l/Add.1 (2000) [hereinafter Draft Rules
of Procedure]. A finalized draft Elements of Crimes was approved on June 30, 2000, and published on
July 6, 2000. Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court-Addendum:
Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doe. PCNICC/2000/l/Add.2 (2000) [hereinafter
Draft Elements of Crimes]. The Assembly of States Parties is not obligated to adopt these particular
finalized drafts but may "[c]onsider and adopt, as appropriate, recommendations of the Preparatory
Commission." Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 112(2)(a). The Preparatory Commission "shall remain in
existence until the conclusion of the first meeting of the Assembly of States Parties." Final Act, supra,
Res. F, para. 8 (emphasis in original).
In this Article, the term "collateral" or "ancillary" instruments or documents includes those listed
in the Final Act, any other binding or non-binding instruments promulgated in accordance with the
Rome Statute, and/or the Rome Statute itself. "States" or "States Parties" will refer to parties to the
Rome Statute, unless otherwise indicated.
6. Rome Statute, supra note 3, article 5(1) provides that "[t]he jurisdiction of the Court shall
be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole." "Ordinary"
human rights violations were not considered to constitute serious crimes. For example, a Rome
Conference Singaporean Delegate declared that "[r]ealism dictated that the aim should not be to
establish a court of human rights of the kind that existed in Europe or the Americas... but, rather, to
give tangible recognition to the fact that some acts were so universally abhorred that their perpetrators
should not escape punishment." Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 4th Plenary Meeting,
5, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/SR.4 (1998); see also Darryl Robinson, Defining "Crimes Against Humanity"
at the Rome Conference, 93 AM. J. INT'L. L. 43, 53 (1999) ("All delegations agreed that the [C]ourt's
jurisdiction relates to serious violations of international criminal law, not international human rights
law.").
7. See generally Kenneth S. Gallant, Individual Human Rights in a New International
Organization: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in 3 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 693 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed., 1999) (analyzing human rights generally under the Rome
Statute).
8. There will be four ICC organs: (1) the Presidency; (2) an Appeals Division, Trial Division
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law, must be "consistent with internationally recognized human rights," 10 and
"be without any adverse distinction" on a broad range of discriminatory
grounds.' These far-reaching human rights promises serve multiple purposes,
not the least of which is to render the ICC a model for States Parties
domestically.1 2 Though these human rights pledges are grand, the Rome
Statute falls short by failing to offer full human rights coverage to all persons
affected by ICC prosecutions.
This Article argues that although the Rome Statute drafters13 excised
express reference to the search and seizure right to privacy from the ICC
treaty and collateral instruments, the right survives, and remains implicit
therein. The search and seizure right to privacy is an "internationally
recognized human right" under the Rome Statute's article 21(3). It falls within
the Court's enumerated sources of applicable law. Though arrests of persons
and other detentions are seizures, and therefore implicate privacy interests,
those privacy interests will not be analyzed in this Article. This Article
primarily focuses on searches and seizures related to places and things,
including searches of persons.
To comply fully with its human rights mandate, the Court must respect
the Rome Statute's remedy of excluding tainted evidence 14 in order to ensure
and a Pre-Trial Division; (3) the Office of the Prosecutor, and (4) the Registry. Rome Statute, supra note
3, art. 34.
9. This includes the Assembly of States Parties, which is a quasi-legislative body established
by the Rome Statute. Id., art. 112(1). Each State Party shall have one representative in the Assembly of
State Parties. Id. Non-party States that have signed either the Rome Statute or the Final Act may be
observers in the Assembly of States Parties. Id.
10. Id., art. 21(3).
11. Id.
12. It is anticipated that the ICC will serve as "a model for the domestic administration of
justice" and that the ICC will impact domestic law. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Pre-Trial
Rights in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, in 2 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT BRIEFING SERIES,
No. 3 (1999), at vww.lchr.org/iccpapv2n3.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2001) [hereinafter LCHR Briefing
Paper on Pre-Trial Rights] ("States parties ... that currently do not provide for any or some of the
specified rights of suspects will be obliged to bring domestic law into conformity with the [Rome]
Statute in order to implement Article 55.").
13. The term "drafters" in this Article refers to Rome Conference delegates who negotiated
the substantive terms of the Rome Statute and its collateral documents. The technical drafting of the
Rome Statute was performed by twenty-five delegates seated on the Committee of the Whole Drafting
Committee, chaired by Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni. After the delegates, via the Committee of the
Whole, agreed to substantive provisions, those provisions were transferred to the Drafting Committee
for technical drafting. The Drafting Committee had no competence to alter the substantive meaning of
any provision referred to it for drafting. See Report ofthe Preparatory Committee on the Establishment
of an International Criminal Court, Draft Rules of Procedure for the United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf.183/2/Add.2 (1998), rule 49(2) (stating that the Drafting Committee "shall, without reopening
substantive discussion on any matter, coordinate and refine the drafting of all texts referred to it, without
altering their substance"). For a general discussion on the distinction between Rome Statute "drafters"
and "framers," see Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court: An
Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381 (2000) (discussing constitutional implications of distinction); cf.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment ofan International Criminal
Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 443, 452 n.36 (1999) (noting that Rule 49 "was relaxed during the third
and fourth weeks [of the Rome Conference] when the working groups, eager to move on at a faster pace,
became more reliant on the Drafting Committee to undertake more substantive drafting.").
14. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 69(7).
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that full human rights are afforded to all persons, including persons charged
with the most heinous crimes. Through ensuring human rights to suspects and
accused persons, the ICC can set an example to the world that the human
rights of all-including suspects and the accused-are indeed sacred. As will
be argued throughout this Article, ensuring human rights for all persons is
fully consistent with the ideals promoted by the Rome Statute and is not likely
to compromise justice, victims' rights, or any other Rome Statute goal.
Part II of this Article begins by examining the Rome Statute's apparent
silence on critical human rights coverage and attempts to define the search and
seizure right to privacy. It also explores the significance of the Rome Statute's
omission of an express search and seizure privacy right and identifies
problems caused by this absence. Part III briefly discusses twentieth-century
efforts to establish an international criminal court and sets the contextual
backdrop in which human rights provisions were incorporated into early drafts
of the Rome Statute. Part IV examines the general human rights provisions
contained in the ICC collateral instruments and introduces the Rome Statute,
article 21(3) mandate that all ICC law be consistent with "internationally
recognized human rights" and be without "adverse distinction" based on broad
non-discrimination grounds. Part IV also discusses the international
cooperation and judicial assistance provisions of the Rome Statute,"5 which
purport to provide for search and seizure privacy rights. Part V introduces the
Vienna Convention's16 approaches to treaty interpretation, because they will
be employed to help identify the existence and scope of the search and seizure
privacy right in the Rome Statute. Part VI identifies and examines the Rome
Statute's seven sources of applicable law, 17 which the Court is to apply when
resolving legal issues, including issues arising under international law of all
varieties, including international criminal law and procedure, international
humanitarian law, and international human rights law. This Part explores, for
example, whether the right to privacy in the context of searches and seizures
has risen to the level of customary international law and whether the right
constitutes a general principle of law. Part VII concludes that although the
drafters excised express reference to the search and seizure right to privacy
from the treaty, the right survives, and remains implicit therein. This Part also
concludes that the analytical framework developed in this Article can be used
to ascertain the existence and scope of other rights that are expressly omitted
from the Rome Statute.
15. International cooperation and judicial assistance provisions are contained in the Rome
Statute, supra note 3, Part IX.
16. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
Vienna Convention].
17. The sources of applicable law are contained in Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 21.
2001] The ICC and the Search and Seizure Right to Privacy
II. GENERAL BACKGROUND
A. Human Rights Coverage-Broken Promises
Despite its extensive express commitment to human rights, the Rome
Statute and other collateral instruments, at first glance, appear to be silent on
certain critical human rights.' 8 Those instruments fail to provide expressly for
the right to privacy generallylg--and in particular in the context of searches
and seizures. 20 They also fail expressly to cover various other trial and pre-
trial rights. 21 The absence of the express search and seizure right to privacy is
18. See, e.g., Christopher L. Blakesley, Commentary on Parts 5 and 6 of the Zutphen
Intersessional Draft: Investigation, Prosecution & Trial, in OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONSOLIDATED ICC
TEXT BEFORE THE FINAL SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE (Leila Sadat Wexler ed., 1998)
[hereinafter Blakesley, Commentary] (arguing that searches and seizures involving blood, body tissues,
stomach pumps, and wire-taps need to be addressed in the Rome Statute); LCHR Briefing Paper on Pre-
Trial Rights, supra note 12 ("[lt is also clear that other internationally guaranteed pre-trial rights are
missing from the text. [Critical rights] are, likewise, missing from the draft Rules of Procedure and
Evidence submitted to the Preparatory Commission."); Gallant, supra note 7 (arguing that the Rome
Statute lacks privacy and other rights); Kenneth S. Gallant, The Role and Powers of Defense Counsel in
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 34 INT'L LAW. 21, 21 (2000) (noting that the
Court's procedure is "strongly influenced by rights-based thinking... concerning individual protections
... that comes from modem national constitutionalism and international human rights standards" but
that ICC mechanisms for defense were lacking) (footnote omitted); see also Christopher L. Blakesley,
Panel Discussion, Association of American Law Schools Panel on the International Criminal Court, 36
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 223, 236-37 (1999) [hereinafter Blakesley, AALS Panel Discussion] (identifying
defense weaknesses under the Rome Statute, and contending that the treaty elaborates some defendants'
rights, "but actually often does so only by negative implication," and that the Rome Statute's
"platitudinous statements" regarding rights are "often deficient and vague").
19. Though the general right to privacy covers areas much broader than search and seizure
(for example, certain sexuality and procreation rights), this Article uses "right to privacy" and "privacy
rights" to refer narrowly to the right to privacy in the context of searches and seizures, particularly in
instances in which evidence is sought or acquired for use in ICC proceedings. See infra Section II.B.
This Article does not focus on privacy rights related to seizures of persons.
20. The sole express reference to privacy rights of suspects or the accused in the ICC
collateral documents is in Draft Rules of Procedure, rule 73, supra note 5, at 37, which permit the Court
to deem privileged certain communications between a person and their legal counsel, clergy, physician,
or other professionals. Though rule 73 does not expressly address search and seizure privacy rights, it
does demonstrate that the Draft Rules of Procedure are an appropriate instrument in which to
incorporate the right, given the absence of the express right from the Rome Statute.
Delegations advocated elaboration of various provisions in a collateral treaty instrument. For
example, the Holy See delegate suggested that "more specific language should be developed to protect
such fundamental rights as... admissibility of evidence" in the Rules of Procedure. Committee of the
Whole, Summary Record of the 33d Meeting, 39, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/C.1/SR.33 (1998). Likewise,
the express search and seizure right to privacy could have been shifted to the Draft Rules of Procedure.
Other provisions that had been advocated for inclusion in the Rome Statute were relegated to a
collateral treaty instrument. For example, the Syrian Arab Republic delegation proposed that the Rome
Statute's article 69 (concerning evidence admissibility) contain the following provision: "The Court
shall respect and observe the obligations relating to the maintenance of confidentiality, showing due
regard for national laws and customary practices such as the physician-patient, lawyer-client and
confessor-penitent relationship, and shall respect and observe the confidentiality of private life."
Proposal on Article 69, Paragraph 5, Submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
183/C.IIWGPM/L.22 (1998). The confidentiality point was relegated to the Rules of Procedure. Rome
Statute, supra note 3, art. 69(5) ("The Court shall respect and observe privileges on confidentiality as
provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence."); see also Proposal Submitted by the Holy Sea
[sic], U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/11 (1998) (calling for privileges).
21. Rights that are arguably not expressly provided for include those provided for an accused
at trial, but not expressly in place for all persons detained under ICC authority either by the Court or by
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conspicuous, given that the right is well established in international law and is
incorporated into a wealth of domestic and international human rights legal
instruments and jurisprudence. This Article argues, for example, that the
search and seizure right to privacy has become a part of the corpus of general
international law, as it has risen to a customary international law norm and
perhaps to the level of a general principle of law.22 The search and seizure
right to privacy is incorporated into the constitutions or other domestic laws of
virtually every nation that participated in the Rome Conference and that voted
for, signed, and ratified the Rome Statute.23 It is provided for in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),z4 which applies to all nations that
participated in the Rome Conference, and in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which has been ratified by most nations.25
The right is contained in the most widely ratified international human rights
treaty-the Convention on the Rights of the Child-which has been adhered26
to by 191 states. The right is also incorporated into the jurisprudence of the
U.N. ad hoc criminal tribunals.27 Significantly, although the right was
expressly incorporated into early drafts of the Rome Statute, it was deleted
from the Rome Statute for reasons which will be discussed below.
28
national authorities, for persons summoned to appear pursuant to Rome Statute, art. 5S(7), or for persons
provisionally arrested. According to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, they include the right to
the presumption of innocence (not only at trial, but also pre-trial); the provision in full equality of rights
under the Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 55 (at all stages, not just during trial); prompt notice of
reasons for arrest and of charges at the time of arrest (rather than prompt notice only upon questioning);
similar rights related to the timing of notification of the right to counsel and to free legal assistance;
access to counsel upon arrest; prompt access to the Court for all detainees; the right to challenge the
lawfulness of detention; the right to access to and communication with the outside world; and rights
related to specific time periods for trial within a reasonable time or release. LCHR Briefing Paper on
Pre-Trial Rights, supra note 12. However, simply because rights are mentioned in Rome Statute, supra
note 3, Part 6 (Trial) does not indicate that the Part 6 rights do not apply to other persons, who are not
actually on trial, such as those under investigation. For example, Rome Statute, article 66, which appears
in Part 6, provides generally that "[e]veryone shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty before the
Court in accordance with the applicable law." This provision could in theory be read broadly to include
all persons, or it could be read narrowly to apply only to the accused at trial.
22. See discussion infra Subsection VI.C.5.b.
23 See discussion infra Subsection VI.C.5.c.
24. G.A. Res. 217A (Ill), art. 12, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR] ("No one shall
be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence."). See
discussion infra Subsection VI.C.5.
25. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 17, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR] ("No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence."). See discussion
infra Subsection VI.C.5.c. The ICCPR has been adhered to by 147 of the approximately 190 nations
eligible to adhere to that treaty. See infra note 315; see also http://vww.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last
visited Apr. 21, 2001, updated Mar. 28, 2001) (listing U.N. human rights treaty ratifications).
26. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 144S, U.N. Doc. A/44/25
(1989) (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990), art. 16 [hereinafter Children's Convention] ("No child shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence.
... '). See discussion infra Subsection VI.C.5.
27. See discussion infra Subsection VI.C.5.
28. See discussion infra Section IV.B.
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B. The Search and Seizure Right to Privacy
Before examining the search and seizure right to privacy, it is necessary
to understand the general "right to privacy." The "right to privacy" defies easy
definition.29 Generally, the right to privacy is based on notions of autonomy in
decision-making about one's own self, actions, relations, and existence. The
right to privacy concerns the degree to which a person is or is not "left alone,"
a person is mandated to or restricted from existing or interacting with or
without others, or a person's identity, integrity (bodily, territorial,
psychological, or other), autonomy, intimacy, sexuality, or emotions are
interfered with against their desires.30 Though some would argue that notions
of privacy may be determined within the context of particular societies at
particular points in time, and that the scope of privacy necessarily changes
with societies' norms, values, and expectations, any such shifts would not
negate the existence of the right to privacy.
The right to privacy in the context of searches and seizures, as developed
in domestic and international arenas, in its simplest form, provides that all
persons shall be free from unreasonable, arbitrary, or unlawful searches or
seizures of their persons or effects. Common characteristics of the various
definitions of the search and seizure privacy right include the following: a
respect for the sanctity and inviolability of the home; some permissible
limitations on the right; recognition that any interference with the right must
be reasonable and limited to the scope necessary to satisfy a legal purpose;
rejection of arbitrary and unlawful interference with privacy and unfettered
discretion to search or seize; respect for human dignity, as privacy invasions
can be degrading and can undermine public trust; effective external
supervision of law enforcement authorities; balancing of law enforcement
needs against the right to privacy; judicially independent authorization of
searches and seizures; and legally enforceable safeguards regulating the use of
police powers.
32
In the context of the ICC, privacy interests will be implicated when
arguably unreasonable, arbitrary, or unlawful searches occur, irrespective of
29. E.g., J.B. YouNG, PRIVACY 2 (J. B. Young ed., 1978) ("[P]rivacy, like an elephant, is
perhaps more readily recognized than described."); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Autonomy, Community, and
Traditions ofLiberty: The Contrast of British and American Privacy Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1398, 1401.
30. See generally Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REv. 737 (1989)
(discussing the importance of privacy to human life); MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMENTARY 287-99 (1993) (discussing the right to privacy); Global
Internet Liberty Campaign, Privacy and Human Rights: An International Survey of Privacy Laws and
Practice, available at http:/ivww.gilc.orglprivacy/survey/intro.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2001)
(discussing various countries' privacy laws); Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REv. 193 (1890) (discussing the need for privacy rights).
31. See Krotoszynski, supra note 29, at 1401-02 (referring to privacy as "a realm of individual
autonomy in recognized and accepted social contexts" that is "defined in relation to a particular society
at a particular point in time").
32. See generally discussion infra Subsections VI.C.5-6 (customary international law and
general principle of law discussion). The search and seizure privacy right is not only found within
Anglo-American jurisprudence, but also is found in the law and practice of jurisdictions in all major
legal systems of the world. See id.
2001]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 26:323
whether they result in the seizure of incriminating evidence that the prosecutor
seeks to introduce at trial. The search and seizure privacy right is a due
process right, as the introduction of "tainted" evidence can act to deny a fair
trial to an accused person. All persons, whether innocent or guilty, and
irrespective of the nature or seriousness of the crime charged, are entitled to
search and seizure privacy rights. The right should be safeguarded regardless
of the gravity of the crime in question.
C. Absence of an Express Search and Seizure Right to Privacy-So What?
Should the international community be concerned about the privacy
interests of alleged perpetrators of heinous crimes such as genocide, war
crimes, or crimes against humanity? Should U.N. troops, national police,
governmental agents, or civilian vigilantes be prohibited from ignoring the
privacy interests of suspects or accused persons in the name of promoting
justice? After all, some would argue, the crimes are unspeakable, and the
perpetrators despised and deserving of the most severe punishment. This
Article presumes that the answer to these questions is yes.
The omission of the express right to privacy from the Rome Statute and
its ancillary instruments is of concern because suspects or accused persons3
3
are potentially subject to conviction based on evidence obtained through
unlawful, arbitrary or unreasonable searches and seizures with no express
remedy, in the perceived greater interest of promoting justice and eradicating
impunity for heinous crimes.34 The failure to incorporate expressly the right in
33. The drafters of the Rome Statute rejected use of the term "suspect" and sought to replace
it with the awkward phrase "person in respect of whom there are grounds to believe that he or she has
committed a crime," which the framers believed was "a formulation which would be clearer for the
various legal systems which would have to interpret the [Rome] Statute." Committee of the Whole,
Summary Record of the 17th Meeting, 4, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/C.l/SR.17 (1998). This Article will
use the term "suspect" in lieu of the more awkward phrase, and will use the term "accused" to refer to a
person who has been charged with a crime.
34. This balancing of interests has been incorporated into the jurisprudence of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which were established to try persons for perpetrating international crimes
in the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively. The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia can be found at S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/827/Annex (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute], and the Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda at S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter
ICTR Statute]. The ICTY has explained that because of the gravity of crimes charged, evidentiary rules
in international criminal tribunals are traditionally applied more laxly than in domestic fora and are
skewed to disfavor the accused. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, 7 CpiM. L.F. 1, 139
(1996). The ICTY discusses the "elastic rules of evidence permissible" before such international
criminal tribunals. Id., 28 (An "example of the more elastic rules of evidence permissible before those
courts, which have tried war criminals, is found in the greater frequency with which hearsay evidence is
admitted, when compared to proceedings before most Courts dealing with offences purely under
national law.") (citation omitted).
The balancing of interests in the search and seizure privacy right context was also applied in the
high profile Scottish "Lockerbie Bombing Trial," in which one of two defendants was convicted on
charges related to the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. See Her Majesty's
Advocate v. al-Megrahi, J.C. Case No. 1475/99 (2001). One of the defendants, Al Amin Khalifa Fhimah
(Mr. Fimah), had set up a travel firm in Malta with another businessman named Vincent Vassallo. In
1991, Scottish and Maltese police and a U.S. agent from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
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these documents is of particular concern, given the developing mindset that
though human rights for suspects and accused persons may be important,
suspension of the right is permitted in the interests of society, the victims, law
enforcement and prosecutorial needs, and politics. Furthermore, increased
deviation from enforcement is likely, as authorities have renewed their fervor
to apprehend suspects and hail them before international tribunals, such as the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).3 5
The international community should be concerned because the rights of
society as a whole, and the rights of law abiders, are threatened when the
system impinges on the rights of suspects and accused persons, who may
indeed be law abiders. 36 The search and seizure privacy right is indeed a right,
and as such, it is to be enjoyed equally by all persons. This right guards not
only the privacy of ordinary, law-abiding citizens but also the privacy of
criminals or suspected criminals, even those suspected of genocide, crimes
against humanity, or war crimes. As the Constitutional Court of South Africa
noted in speaking about the new South African constitution:
[T]he Constitution is not a set of high-minded values designed to protect criminals from
their just desserts; but is in fact a shield which protects all citizens from official abuse.
They must understand that for the Courts to tolerate the invasion of the rig ts of even the
most heinous criminal would diminish [the citizens'] constitutional rights.
Respecting the human rights of alleged criminals will not hinder the fight
against impunity. First, even if the Court applies the exclusionary rule
visited the travel agency. At the agency that day, Mr. Vassallo allegedly consented to a search that led to
the seizure of Mr. Fhimah's diary from Fhimah's agency desk. The diary contained evidence that could
be construed as implicating Mr. Fhimah on the charges for which he was tried. In fact, the "principal
piece of evidence against [Mr. Fhimah came] from two entries in [the seized] diary." Id., 84. Mr.
Fhimah, in defense, sought to have the diary excluded as evidence against him at trial, on the grounds
that the diary was seized pursuant to an unlawful search.
The Scottish court ruled that although Maltese law had probably been violated in the warrantless
search and seizure, the evidence could nevertheless be admitted against Mr. Fhimah. The court noted
that "[I]n all these circumstances it appears to us that such irregnlarity as occurred can properly be
regarded as excusable. It is further significant that this is of course a murder case.., and in such a case
the public interest in the prosecution of a criminal has to be given due weight." Fhimas's Diary
Admissable [sic], Rules Court, REUTERS, Oct. 6, 2001 (quoting Lord Sutherland, presiding judge), at
http:IAvwv.geocities.comICapitolHill/52601veek23.html (last visited May 7, 2001); Donald G. McNeil,
Jr., Defendant's Diary Is Admitted as Evidence in Lockerbie Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6,2000, at A9.
35. See Holger Jensen, War Crime Laws Being Prosecuted Too Slowly, Too Selectively, in
SCRIPPS HOWvARD N. SERV., Apr. 5, 2000 (raising questions about the work of the ICTY); James
Kitfield, Humanity's Court, THE NAT'L J., May 13, 2000, at 1508 (discussing the work of the ICTY);
Colin McMahon, Serbs Leaving. NATO Ready To Enter Kosovo-Security Council Approves Peace
Pact-Clinton: No Aid Until Milosevic Out, CHI. TRIB., June 11, 1999, at 1 (discussing British Special
Air Service "SAS" troops successfully detaining a dozen suspects); Tim Ripley, War Crimes Tribunal
To Issue More Indictments, in JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REv., June 1, 2000, vol. 12, No. 6 (focusing on
recent indictments handed down by the ICTY); Chuck Sudetic, The Reluctant Gendarme-Why is
France protecting indicted war criminals in the sector of Bosnia it controls?, ATLANTIC MoNTHLY, Apr.
1, 2000, at 91 (criticizing the failure of France to arrest indicted war criminals residing in the French
patrolled sector of Bosnia-Herzegovina).
36. The Rome Statute provides: "Everyone shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty
before the Court in accordance with the applicable law." Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 66(1). Thus,
suspects and the accused are deemed to be law abiders until convicted.
37. S.v. Nombewu, 1996(12) BCLR 1635, 1661(E)(SA).
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liberally and suppresses large quantities of improperly seized evidence, it is
unlikely that prosecutorial or societal interests would be compromised by, for
example, the dismissal of prosecutions. Even if particular evidence were
suppressed, it is likely that overwhelming other evidence will exist to support
a conviction.
Second, affording suspects and accused persons full rights is consistent
with eradicating impunity and with full human rights for all, and will
ultimately impact society positively. Respecting rights of suspects and the
accused will educate officials and the public about the sanctity of human
rights, and will encourage human rights compliance. Human rights education
at the international level will likely trickle down to the grassroots. As
governments and citizens become more aware of the need to enforce these
rights, fewer human rights violations will occur.
D. Privacy Right Breaches
1. The General Problem
The omission of express search and seizure privacy rights from the
Rome Statute and its collateral instruments will undoubtedly present the Court
in its early days with many difficult issues. Are prohibitions against unlawful,
unreasonable, and arbitrary searches and seizures implicitly incorporated into
the Rome Statute and its collateral instruments? If so, what is the scope of
such coverage? Do lawful searches and seizures require prior judicial
authorization? If so, what level of cause or justification is sufficient to support
such authorization? Does the right apply only when a search or seizure is
conducted by an arm of the ICC, or does it apply when conducted by a state
acting on its own volition or acting at the behest of the Court (particularly if
domestic privacy law does not accord with international law)?3" Is the search
38. Such questions are called to mind by the recent globally publicized police action involving
the taking into custody of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, the search of his housing
compound, and the seizure of possibly incriminating items from his home. In March 2001, local Serbian
police arrived at Milosevic's Belgrade compound to execute a Serbian warrant for his arrest on charges
of abuse of power, financial misdealings, and corruption. Following a lengthy confrontation at his
cordoned-off home, protracted negotiations over the terms of his surrender to authorities, and a police
assault on the compound, he was taken into custody. See Steven Erlanger, Serb Authorities Arrest
Milosevic to End Standoff, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2001, at Al; see also Alexandra Niksic, Milosevic To Be
Grilled, Judge To Decide on His Detention, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 1, 2001 (quoting Milosevic's
lawyer, Toma Fila, who contended that "the former president 'was not arrested' but had voluntarily
surrendered to justice officials" and quoting Ivica Dacic, who contended that Milosevic had only
"answered a summons to take part in the investigative procedure").
The police searched Milosevic's house and allegedly uncovered numerous items, including
machine guns, automatic rifles, pistols, two crates of hand grenades, a rocket-propelled grenade
launcher, ammunition, and "plans containing details for an uprising in April." Yugoslav Ex-President
Milosevic Arrested by Serbian Authorities, Apr. 1, 2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Facts on File (quoting
"an interior ministry source"); Stefan Racin, Arms, Coup Plans Found in Milosevic Villa, UPI, Apr. 1,
2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
Although a principal issue immediately raised was the seizure of Milosevic's person so that he
could stand trial in Belgrade on corruption charges, issues related to the search and seizure right to
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and seizure privacy right standard applied uniformly, irrespective of who or
what entity conducts the search and seizure, and under what circumstances? If
evidence is seized by a state and sought to be used in an ICC prosecution,
does it matter if the evidence would ordinarily be admissible in the national
court but not ordinarily admissible in an ICC proceeding? Does it apply when
the search or seizure is conducted by an inter-governmental security
organization, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)? Does
the search and seizure privacy right apply when authorities seek to inspect
private facilities to verify weapons destruction, irrespective of whether the
search was conducted in compliance with the provisions of a relevant arms
reduction treaty, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention?39 Does it apply
when the search or seizure is conducted by private vigilantes, and the
prosecutor seeks to use the seized evidence at trial? If either of two states
and/or the Court has jurisdiction over a situation, and the search and seizure
privacy safeguards vary among the jurisdictions, will authorities forum shop
and push for the trial to be held in the jurisdiction with the most pro-
prosecution search and seizure privacy laws? Does the right cover only targets
of investigations against whom incriminating evidence is obtained in violation
of the right, or does it cover non-targets whose personal rights might not have
been violated by the incursion but who are implicated by the seized evidence?
Does it apply to innocent parties victimized by violative searches and seizures,
who may never be charged with a crime? Finally, if the search and seizure
privacy right has been breached and evidence obtained, will that evidence be
suppressed under the "mandatory" exclusion provision of the Rome Statute,
article 69(7)?40
In a world where notions of privacy may be regularly challenged by
advances in science and technology and shifts in societal and individual
privacy might also be presented. For example, though the Yugoslav government agents had a local arrest
warrant for Milosevic, did they have, or indeed did they need under local law, a warrant to seize any
evidence found within his home? Could any incriminating evidence found within his home during the
arrest be used against Milosevic in his domestic trial in Serbia? Could that evidence be transferred for
use in his prosecution by the ICTY, that had already issued an international arrest warrant for him and
that might seek to try him, using that evidence, for international crimes?
39. The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800 (entered into force Apr. 29,
1997) [hereinafter CWC]. The CWC, which is designed to eradicate certain weapons of mass destruction
and assure their continued absence, has in place a comprehensive regulatory regime which includes
inspecting private and governmental sites in the territories of parties to the treaty. See BARRY KELLMAN
& EDWARD A. TANZMAN, MANUAL FOR NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS
CONVENTION i, 102 (1998). Arguably the CWC curtails search and seizure privacy rights in the parties'
domestic jurisdictions. However, the CWC does not undermine the existence of the search and seizure
privacy right, and the CWC inspection and verification provisions should be construed as being in
accord with the right. See id. at 102 ("The CWC is the first multilateral weapons control agreement that
requires widescale inspection of privately-owned sites and thus is the first agreement demanding that
attention be paid to the legal rights of those sites' owners and personnel.") The CWC regime seeks to
harmonize chemical weapons inspections with privacy and other rights of citizens. Id. at 109 ("CWC
inspections at chemical facilities introduce an additional level of government instrusion... which could
impinge on rights of privacy. The right to privacy is universally acknowledged. Virtually every nation's
laws explicitly protect the right to privacy by constitutional expression, through statutory provisions, or
judge-made law."). See generally id. at 102-30 (discussing this topic in greater depth).
40. For a discussion of the Rome Statute, article 69(7) exclusionary rule, see infra Part II.B.3.
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expectations regarding privacy interests, search and seizure privacy issues,
such as those above, will pose particular challenges to the Court. Countless
first-impression search and seizure privacy issues will arise. For example, an
ICC suspect might be apprehended by a State party, which, without prior
judicial authorization, extracts a DNA sample from the suspect (for example,
to prove that the suspect was the father of a child bom as the result of a forced
pregnancy),41 in a manner that might or might not be consistent with that
State's own laws or with international human rights law, such as that
contained in the ICCPR. Another possibility is that an organization such as
NATO might engage in satellite imaging to discover incriminating data, or,
electronic mail messages, satellite telephone or other high tech
communications42 might be intercepted and introduced against the accused at
trial. Or, a country such as the United States might gather incriminating
evidence using reconnaissance plane flights, like those that it routinely flies
along the coast of China.43 In these scenarios, we ask whether the search and
seizure right to privacy would prevent accused persons from having this
arguably unlawfully acquired evidence used against them at trial, or whether
another remedy short of exclusion might be afforded.
2. The Problem Illustrated
Issues related to breach of the search and seizure privacy right can arise
in a number of factual situations in prospective ICC proceedings involving a
range of individuals, from rights violators,44 to victims,45 to innocent third
parties.
41. Crimes against humanity and war crimes prohibit forced pregnancy, which is defined as
the "unlawful confinement, of a women forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic
composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of international law." Rome
Statute, supra note 3, arts. 7(2)(f), 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi). See also Blakesley, Commentary, supra
note 18, at 88-89 (arguing that searches and seizures involving blood, body tissues, stomach pumps, and
wire-taps need to be addressed in the Rome Statute); Blakesley, AALSPanel Discussion, supra note 18.
42. Domestic courts and legislative bodies routinely are finding that individuals' expectations
of privacy are diminishing, which arguably justifies greater intrusion by the government into what had
been considered private. For example, the United States government has conducted surveillance using
"Carnivore," a program that can monitor all e-mail on a network of an internet service provider. See,
e.g., Johnny Gilman, Carnivore: The Uneasy Relationship Between the Fourth Amendment and
Electronic Surveillance ofInternet Communications, 9 CoM. L. CONSPEcTUS 111 (2001) (arguing that
Carnivore threatens to exceed the bounds of permissible surveillance of private internet
communication). Whereas strict and specific rules govern telephone wiretaps and other more traditional
means of electronic surveillance, there are no clear guidelines regarding interet surveillance. See David
Stout, Technology Briefing: Software; Pledge on Software Review, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 10, 2000, at C4.
But see United States Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 227 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (striking down government
order that broadly expanded the ability of law enforcement agents to monitor cell phone conversations
of criminal suspects).
43. See, e.g., Michael R. Gordon, Collision with China: Military Analysis-"A Dangerous
Game", N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2001, at Al (describing U.S. military planes running reconnaissance
operations to monitor radar signals, electronic communications and the activities of Chinese shore-based
units and ships); Thom Shanker, US. Resumes Its Spy Flights Close to China, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2001,
at Al (describing the resumption of U.S. spy plane flights after the crash between a U.S. and a Chinese
plane).
44. Individuals and entities who might potentially impinge upon privacy in the context of
searches and seizures related to ICC prosecutions could, theoretically, include: (1) a national police or
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In a "typical" scenario that might arise in the ICC framework, the ICC
prosecutor may suspect that "Mr. A," currently living in a Vienna apartment,
had command responsibility of the armed forces of a neighboring country, and
being in that position, was responsible for crimes against humanity. 6 Pursuant
to the Rome Statute and Rules of Procedure, the ICC Prosecutor requests that
Austrian authorities search Mr. A's apartment and seize evidence. Austrian
authorities issue a search warrant, and local. government agents search the
apartment in a manner inconsistent with Austrian law. The authorities seize
incriminating documents which the Prosecutor seeks to introduce at trial. Mr.
A objects, pursuant to Rome Statute, article 69(7), and moves for exclusion of
the documentary evidence on grounds that the search violated Mr. A's
"internationally recognized human right" to privacy because the search and
seizure violated Austrian law, the Rome Statute, and/or international human
rights law. The prosecution concedes that Austrian law was violated, but
argues that the evidence should be admitted as the breach was not severe and
did not affect the reliability of the evidence; that the Court is not empowered
to rule on the validity vel non of Austrian law; and that there is no search and
seizure privacy "internationally recognized human right" under the Rome
Statute.
3. Exclusion of Evidence: A Remedy for Privacy Breaches
Full enforcement of the Rome Statute search and seizure privacy right
depends to some degree on article 69(7) of the treaty, which provides for a
two-part "mandatory" exclusionary rule.47 If either prong of that exclusionary
other governmental authority; (2) a law enforcement arm of the ICC (including the Prosecutor or a judge
who may request a warrant); (3) civilians; (4) an inter-governmental organization (such as NATO); or
(5) a combination of the above.
45. The broad range of search and seizure victims might include: (1) suspects pre-charge; (2)
suspects post-charge (accused); (3) suspects or others who are never charged: (4) non-suspects who
become suspects, who may be charged only after evidence incriminating them was obtained through an
unlawful search; or (5) non-suspect, third party bona fides who suffer property or other harm resulting
from a privacy invasion. Though the list of prospective victims is lengthy, this Article focuses only on
the accused implicated by evidence obtained through a questionable search and seizure.
46. This hypothetical draws upon the facts of Prosecutor v. Mucic, Case No. IT-96-21,
Decision on the Tendering of Prosecution Exhibits 104-108 (Trial Chamber, Nov. 16, 1998; Feb. 9,
1998), that was prosecuted in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Search and
seizure privacy rights issues were also raised in the International Criminal Tribunal case of Prosecutor v.
Bicaniumpaka, Case Nos. ICTR-99-49-DP, ICTR-99-50-I (1999) (relevance of search and seizure
privacy right when Cameroonian officials seized documents from arrested Rwandan official). See
discussion infra at Subsection VI.C.5 (discussing ICTY and ICTR exclusionary rule cases); see also
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (1996), Decision on the Preliminary Motion Submitted
by the Defence on the Form of the Indictment and Exclusion of Evidence (issue raised of "exclusion of
evidence obtained from the Accused or having belonged to him"). This Article offers a framework for
the Court to use in analyzing issues such as those currently before the ICTY and the ICTR.
47. Rome Statute, supra note 3, article 69(7) provides:
Evidence obtained by means of a violation of this Statute or internationally recognized
human rights shall not be admissible if:
(a) The violation casts substantial doubt on the reliability of the evidence; or
(b) The admission of the evidence would be antithetical to and would seriously
damage the integrity of the proceedings.
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rule is satisfied, evidence acquired through violations of the privacy right, as
an "internationally recognized human right," may be excluded from use
against the accused at trial.48 If the prosecutor seeks to use at trial evidence
obtained during a questionable search or seizure, the accused may petition the
Court, which has broad power over the nature and scope of evidence admitted
at trial,49 to exclude the evidence or grant another appropriate remedy.
The ICC's exclusionary rule is not sui generis, but in effect mimics
similar rules that exist throughout many domestic and international legal
systems. For example, exclusionary rules are expressly incorporated into
various national Constitutions50 and appear elsewhere within the general and
criminal laws of other countries.5 1 International tribunals, such as the
48. Despite the article 69(7) exclusionary rule, tainted evidence might still be admitted against
the accused, as the article 69(7) exclusionary rule is inherently precatory. The term "internationally
recognized human rights" is not defined in the Rome Statute, and the search and seizure right to privacy
is not expressly categorized as an "internationally recognized human right." See Rome Statute, supra
note 3, art. 69(7). For an analysis of Rome Statute, supra note 3, article 69(7), see Gallant, supra note 7,
at 718-20. This Article will not comprehensively discuss the Rome Statute article 69(7) exclusionary
rule.
49. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 69; Draft Rules of Procedure, supra note 5, at Rule 63.
50. Examples of constitutions that contain express exclusionary rules for evidence obtained in
violation of rights include the South African Constitution, which in section 35(5) provides that
"[elvidence obtained in a manner that violates any right in the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the
admission of that evidence would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration
of justice." See S. v. Naidoo, 1998 (1) BCLR 46 (SA) (applying South African Constitution, § 35(5)
exclusionary rule); see also S. v. Nombewu, 1996 (12) BCLR 1635, 1661 (SA) (finding that the
presence or absence of prejudice to the accused, and the nature and degree thereof, impacted on the
question of whether to exclude evidence in the interests of ensuring a fair trial); S. v. Shongwe and
Others, 1998 (9) BCLR 1170(T) (finding that exclusion not absolute). The Constitution of Paraguay,
article 36 provides "Evidence obtained in violation of the [provisions related to inviolability of personal
documents and privacy correspondence] is not admissible in court." PARA. CONST. tit. II, ch. II, art. 36.
The Constitution of Peru provides that "Private documents obtained in violation of [the provision related
to inviolability of communications and private documents] have no legal effect." PERU CONST. tit. I, ch.
I, art. 2(g).
51. For Australia's exclusionary rule, see Ridgeway v. R. 129 A.L.R. 41 (1995) (discussing
exclusion of evidence illegally procured, and determining whether the exclusion would undermine
judicial integrity) and Bunning v. Cross, 141 C.L.R. 54 (1978) (discussing exercising discretion to
exclude evidence because of the circumstances or manner in which it was obtained or came into
existence). For the exclusionary rule in Trinidad and Tobago, see Mohanmned v. State, Privy Council,
[1999] 2 AC 111, [1999] 2 WLR 552 (finding that constitutional rights violation is cogent factor in favor
of exclusion). For a discussion of the Scottish exclusionary rule, see Her Majesty's Advocate v. al-
Megrahi, J.C. Case No. 1475/99 (2001) (balancing interests when deciding whether to exclude evidence,
and considering the gravity of the offense). In Hong Kong, the exclusionary rule is discussed in R v. Yu
Yen-kin, 4 HKPLR 75, 81-104, 104 (1993) (discussing exclusionary rule but ruling that admission of
evidence in the instant case "would not be unfair or unjust"). For a discussion of the exclusionary rule in
Japan, see Kuk Cho, The Japanese "Prosecutorial Justice" and its Limited Exchsionary Rule, 12
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 39, 62 (1998) (noting that the exclusionary rule in Japan was accepted in 1978 in
the case of Japan v. Hashimoto). All illegally obtained evidence is not excluded in some jurisdictions.
For example, one commentator has noted that "the great bulk of the American exclusionary rules in the
search and seizure area ... has been rejected in the Italian model," and that "[e]vidence obtained by way
of an illegal search or as a by-product of an illegal interception [is] admissible in the Italian court."
Elisabetta Grande, Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and Resistance, 48 AM. J. CoMP. L. 227, 249
(2000) (also noting that extrinsic exclusionary rules, that make evidence inadmissible for reasons
extraneous to truth-finding considerations, are present in the Italian system, and include testimonial
privileges and rules excluding documents illegally seized or excluding illegally performed interceptions
of otherwise private communications).
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International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)52 and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR),3 have exclusionary
provisions built into their rules.
The Rome Statute exclusionary rule,54 like the exclusionary rules found
in the other legal systems, helps ensure that the privacy interests of suspects
are upheld, as the Court balances competing victims interests' versus
suspects' and accused persons' interests, discourages human rights violations
in evidence-gathering, maintains the Court's integrity and legitimacy, and
furthers the Court's goals of educating the global population on criminal
justice issues55 and setting an example for States to follow in their national
criminal justice systems. If the Court follows the jurisprudence of the ad hoc
international criminal tribunals and applies the exclusionary rule in a relaxed
manner,56 the rights of accused persons may be compromised, despite article
69(2)'s mandatory language, and even though the rule does not authorize the
Court to consider the nature or severity of the human rights violation, only
that the two-part test be met.
57
E. Summary Conclusion
Though express reference to the right to privacy in the search and
seizure context was excised from the Rome Statute during the final days of the
Rome Conference, the right remains implicit within the treaty. The right is an
"internationally recognized human right" because it falls within the sources of
applicable law contained in Rome Statute, article 21. Thus, pursuant to article
21(3), the Court must enforce it in all of the Court's operations and
proceedings. 58 All law applied and interpreted by the Court must be consistent
52. The ICTY exclusionary rule provides: "No evidence shall be admissible if obtained by
methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability or if its admission is antithetical to, and would
seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings." Rules of Procedure and Evidence as Amended 30
January 1995, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia since 1991, 5th
Sess., U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.3/Corr.1 (1995).
53. The ICTR Rules contain an exclusionary rule identical to that contained in the ICTY
Rules. Rules ofProcedure and Evidence as Amended, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, rule
95, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/REV.1 (1995).
54. The exclusionary rule is not the only remedy theoretically available to accused persons
who are victims of unlawful searches and seizures. Remedies in some jurisdictions could include civil
tort remedies against the offending governmental agents or private individuals; criminal prosecution of
the offending government agent or private individual; governmental sanctions of offending
governmental agents; and internal discipline within police departments for offending officers. A
discussion of remedies, other than exclusion, that the Court might provide under the Rome Statute is
beyond the scope of this Article.
55. The Court can be a global educator. As the Court functions, in accordance with the Rome
Statute and consistently with "internationally recognized human rights," the Court educates the global
citizenry on what constitutes internationally accepted behavior not only of individuals, but also of
governments, who will learn international fair trial and criminal investigation standards.
56. E.g., Prosecutor v. Mucic, Case No. IT-96-21, Decision on the Tendering of Prosecution
Exhibits 104-108 (Trial Chamber, Nov. 16, 1998; Feb. 9, 1998).
57. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 69(7).
58. A comprehensive discussion of derogation from compliance with rights under the ICC is
beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion on the impermissibility of derogation from rights in
international law, see Sara Stapleton, Ensuring a Fair Trial in the International Criminal Court:
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with the search and seizure privacy right. However, the mere existence of the
search and seizure right to privacy does not adequately ensure the realization
of the right of a suspect or of an accused person. The Court must fully enforce
the right, just as it is required to enforce all other internationally recognized
human rights, irrespective of whether the particular right in question is
expressly mentioned in the Rome Statute or its collateral instruments.
Though the Court will likely find that the Rome Statute incorporates the
search and seizure right to privacy, the scope of coverage remains uncertain,
and must be developed by the Court, taking into account various factors,
possibly including shiffing privacy expectations. When the Court faces a
human rights challenge in areas where the Rome Statute might be silent, such
as environmental rights, sexuality rights, gender rights, and bona fide third
party rights, along with other apparently missing fair trial rights, the Court
will likely undertake the analysis proposed in this Article.59 The determination
of the search and seizure right to privacy in the ICC framework may pave the
way for challengers to prevail on claims that other human rights not expressly
included are implicit therein and must be enforced. This article proposes a
framework for the Court to apply as it explores the expansive human rights
coverage of the Rome Statute.
III. THE ROME STATUTE
A. The Rome Statute: Pre-Rome Conference
Adoption of the Rome Statute was the culmination of almost a century
of governmental, non-governmental organization (NGO), inter-governmental
organization (IGO), and individual perseverance to establish a permanent
international criminal tribunal to wrest away the power of systemic impunity
and bring to justice perpetrators of the most heinous international crimes.
Although the early efforts of the League of Nations, the United Nations, and
others failed to create a permanent criminal tribunal, the Rome Statute
Statutory Interpretation and the Impermissibility of Derogation, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 535
(1999) (arguing that derogation is not permitted under the Rome Statute and criticizing derogation from
fair trial norms).
59. The purportedly "missing" rights might become issues in ICC prosecutions in various
ways. For example, the issue of sexual orientation might arise if the Court seeks to prosecute a person
who allegedly perpetrated crimes against humanity by persecuting persons because of their sexual
orientation. The accused might argue that because sexual minorities are not an "identifiable group or
collectivity" under the Rome Statute's article 7(1)(h) or under that article's corresponding Elements of
Crimes, the prosecution must fail. The Court, if faced with such an argument, would likely analyze
whether sexual minorities would be deemed an "identifiable group or collectivity" under article 7(1)(h),
and would also likely consider that question bearing in mind that article 7(1)(h) must be applied and
interpreted, pursuant to article 21(3), in a manner that "must be consistent with internationally
recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on" various factors. Rome
Statute, supra note 3, arts. 7(l)(h), 21(3). As the right to be free from discrimination based on sexual
orientation is a norm of customary international law, see discussion infra note 292, and because
customary international law falls within the sources of law to be applied by the Court, see discussion
hfra Subsection VI.C.5, it is likely that the Court would sustain a crimes against humanity prosecution
rooted in persecution based on sexual orientation.
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borrows wisdom from the preparatory studies, reports, draft conventions and
other preparatory work of those bodies.
60
On December 9, 1948, just one day before the promulgation of the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), the U.N. General Assembly
adopted a resolution recognizing the increasing need for an international
criminal tribunal, 61 and a process began leading to the 1951 and 1953 drafts
62
of a statute for an international court with permanent criminal jurisdiction. 6
3
No tribunal was created to prosecute genocide or apartheid, though
conventions on each subject called for such a tribunal.64 However, in 1981,
Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, under commission by the U.N. ad hoc
Committee for Southern Africa, published a draft statute to prosecute
individuals for the crime of apartheid.65 In 1989, Trinidad and Tobago, in the
context of meetings related to drug trafficking, led a renewed U.N. effort for
the creation of an international criminal court, 66 Joined by Professor Bassiouni
who prepared yet another draft statute, 67 which was followed by various
60. For excellent, comprehensive summaries of the failed attempts to establish a tribunal with
international criminal jurisdiction, see THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 3-19 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1998); see also I VIRGINIA MORRIS &
MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 11-15 (1995); Michael Scharf, The Jury is Still Out on the Need for an
International Criminal Court, I DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'LL. 135, 139-40 (1991); Leila Sadat Wexler, The
Proposed Permanent International Criminal Court: An Appraisal, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 665, 669-83
(1996).
61. G.A. Res. 260B(II), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., pt. I, at 177, (1948).
62. U.N. Doe AIAC.4814, Sept. 5, 1951, reprinted in 46 AM. J. INT'L L. (Supp. 1951)
[hereinafter 1951 ILC Draft Statute]. The 1951 ILC Draft Statute revision was appended to Report of the
1953 Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 23,
U.N. Doe. A/2645 (1954), reprinted in 2 B.B. Ferencz, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT-A STEP
TOWARD WORLD PEACE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND ANALYSIS, (2 vols.) (1980), Doc. 35
[hereinafter 1953 ILC Draft Statute). Neither of these drafts was acted upon further. See also G.A. Res.
260 B(II) of Dec. 9, 1948, Official Records, 3d Sess., Pt. I, Resolutions, at 177 (resolution calling on
the International Law Commission to study the desirability and possibility of establishing a tribunal with
international criminal jurisdiction).
63. See generally Quincy Wright, Proposal for an International Criminal Court, 46 AM. J.
INT'L L. 60 (1952) (discussing historical interest in creating a permanent tribunal with international
criminal jurisdiction, and discussing a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court prepared by the
U.N. General Assembly-appointed Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. Doe.
A/AC.484 (1951)). For a general overview of early efforts to explore the creation of a permanent
international criminal tribunal, see Yuen-li Liang, Notes on Legal Questions Concerning the United
Nations, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 73 (1952).
64. E.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entry into force Jan. 12, 1951); International Convention on the Suppression
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on Nov. 30, 1973,
U.N. General Assembly Document A/RES/3068 (XXVIII) (1973).
65. Draft Convention on the Establishment of an International Penal Tribunal for the
Supression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid and Other International Crimes, (Jan. 19, 1980),
U.N. Doc. E/CN.411426 (1980), reprinted in 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, at 547 (1987) [hereinafter 1981
Bassiouni Draft]. For further insight into the 1981 Bassiouni Draft Statute and other draft statutes, see
generally 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 60, at 13, n.72.
66. U.N. Doe. AICN.4/SER.A/1990, at 39 (1989). As a result, the General Assembly
requested the International Law Commission to prepare a report that focused on the creation of such an
international court. G.A. Res. 44/39, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 1, U.N. Doe A/44/39
(1989).
67. Professor Bassiouni led a committee of experts in preparing a draft statute for an
international criminal court with jurisdiction over all international crimes. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Draft
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International Law Commission (ILC) drafts developed during the early 1990s.
A series of U.N. preparatory meetings was held leading up to the 1998 Rome
Conference, for which a Consolidated Final Draft Statute was generated to be
used as the principal negotiation instrument.
68
B. The Rome Conference
The official work of the five-week Rome Conference was organized into
three primary, formal committees: the Committee of the Whole, the Working
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal, reprinted in 15 NOVA L. REV. 373, 385-432 (1991)
[hereinafter 1990 Bassiouni Draft Statute] (as revised and approved by an international committee of
experts). The 1990 Bassiouni Draft Statute was routed through official United Nations channels, as were
the recommendations related to a drug trafficking Court, and a recommendation was made that the ILC
assume and continue work related to a permanent international criminal Court with broad jurisdiction.
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, G.A. Res. 43/164, U.N. GAOR, 43d
Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 280, U.N. Doc A/43/49 (1988).
68. The ILC prepared reports to the General Assembly in 1990 and 1992, and prepared a 1993
text which it modified in 1994. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-
Sixth Session, Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10,
at 43-161, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 ILC Draft Statute]. The 1994 ILC Draft was
submitted to the General Assembly, which established the 1995 Ad Hoc Committee for the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, which met twice during 1995. The General Assembly
then established the 1996 Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal
Court ("1996 Prep Comm"), which sought to fulfill its mandate to prepare a "consolidated text" of a
statute before the 1998 Rome Conference. Though the 1996 Prep Comm did not prepare a consolidated
text, it prepared, in two volumes, a report with a compilation of various proposals. Each of the two
volumes carries the same U.N. Document symbol. See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Volume I (Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee
During March-April and August 1996), G.A., 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, A/51/22 (1996) [hereinafter
Report of the Preparatory Committee], reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, supra note 60, at 385-439; Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Volume II (Compilation of Proposals), G.A., 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22,
A/51/22 (1996) [hereinafter Report of the Preparatory Committee-Proposals], reprinted in THE
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 60, at 441-616.
A 1997-1998 Prep Comm, which met for several sessions during this period, was convened to
carry on with the work. Various "inter-sessional meetings" were held between the scheduled Prep
Comm sessions. One such meeting was the January 1998 informal meeting held in Zutphen, The
Netherlands, which resulted in the "Zutphen Draft Statute." Draft Report of the Inter-Sessional Meeting
From 19 to 30 January 1998 in Zutphen, The Netherlands, U.N. Doc A/AC.249/1998/L.13 (1998)
[hereinafter Zutphen Draft Statute], reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, supra at 221-311. In the Spring of 1998, at the final Prep Comm session before the Rome
Conference, the 1997-1998 Prep Comm produced a comprehensive consolidated draft that was used as
the official basis for negotiations at the Rome Conference (the "Consolidated Final Draft Statute").
Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Draft
Statute & Draft Final Act, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/2/Add.1 (1998) [hereinafter Consolidated Final Draft
Statute].
The Consolidated Final Draft Statute was completed as scheduled by April 3, 1998,
approximately two and one-half months before the Rome Conference began. See Bassiouni, supra note
13, at 444 n.6 (citing G.A. Res. 50/46, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/46 (1995)). That draft was
comprehensive and detailed, but it has been described as "essentially a cumbersome accumulation of
alternative governmental proposals requiring additional technical work and more extensive negotiations,
particularly with regard to fundamental issues." Bassiouni, supra note 13, at 444. The nature of the
Consolidated Final Draft, coupled with other technical glitches, not only helps to explain some of the
difficulties that plagued the Rome Conference negotiations, id. at 444, but also may help explain
inconsistencies in language, terms, and concepts incorporated into the Rome Statute and collateral
instruments.
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Group, and the Drafting Committee. 69 In addition, various sub-working
groups, informals, and "informal informals," along with the formal meetings,
generated multitudinous written proposals for language to be incorporated into
the Rome Statute.70 Principal draft texts that contributed greatly to the Rome
Statute negotiation at Rome include the following: (1) the 1951 and 1953 ILC
Draft Statutes; (2) the 1981 Bassiouni Draft; (3) the 1994 ILC Draft; (4) the
Zutphen Draft; (5) the Consolidated Final Draft Statute; and (6) various Rome
Conference Bureau Proposals. 71 Furthermore, numerous formal and informal
draft proposals submitted by the national delegations and NGOs were critical
69. See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, Draft Rules of Procedure, U.N. Doe. A/Conf.183/2/Add.2 (1998). Generally, a
proposed treaty provision was presented in the Committee of the Whole, and then referred to a Working
Group which would send the provision back to the Committee of the Whole after agreement was
reached. The Committee of the Whole would then debate the provision, and either send the provision to
the Drafting Committee, or send it back to a Working Group for further consideration. "Informal" and
"informal informal" groups hashed out finer details, then funneled their work back to the Committee of
the Whole for approval, and then to the Drafting Committee. See generally Bassiouni, supra note 13, at
449-54 (describing and critiquing the Rome Conference drafting and negotiating process). See Draft
Report of the Committee of the Whole, 9, U.N. Doe. A/Conf.183/C.1/L.92 (1998) (describing how
Working Groups for various Rome Statute articles were established by the Committee of the Whole "to
expedite the work").
70. See generally Fanny Benedetti & John L. Washburn, Drafting the International Criminal
Court Treaty: Two Years to Rome and an Afterivord on the Rome Diplomatic Conference, in 5 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 1, 28-29 (1999) (discussing utilization of "routine" informal meetings during the Rome
Conference, which had "turned into a marathon").
During the Rome Conference, countless proposals and counter-proposals were circulated around
the U.N. building each day, as diplomatic delegations, NGOs, and the Rome Conference Bureau sought
to resolve differences and reach agreement on the most profound and controversial to the seemingly
most innocuous and mundane Rome Statute provisions. Many such proposals were issued as official
U.N. Rome Conference documents, while many were merely circulated but not assigned U.N. document
symbols. Thus, some negotiation history is compiled in non-U.N. documents, or rests in the minds and
unofficial writings of delegates and others who observed and participated in the negotiating process. For
excellent unofficial chronologies and analyses of the negotiation process by participants, as well as
general descriptions and critiques of the Rome Statute, see Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, 93 Am. J. INT'L L. 22 (1999); Bassiouni, supra note 13; Benedetti &
Washburn, supra; Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an International
Criminal Court. The Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 2, 5 (1999); Sadat & Carden, supra note
13.
The divergent backgrounds and relative levels of expertise and experience of Rome Conference
delegates contributed to internal inconsistencies in the Rome Statute and its collateral instruments, and
contributed to the lack of clarity on various treaty terms, see generally Bassiouni, supra note 13,
possibly including such important terms as "internationally recognized human rights." A major issue at
Rome concerned the conflict between common law and civil law concepts related to areas such as
criminal law and procedure. The drafters followed no consistent legal methodology to determine how
best to meld together common law and civil law concepts in the context of comparative criminal law,
resulting in awkward and undesireable accommodations of divergent perspectives. See, e.g., id. at 454
(noting lack of methodological explanations for placement of Rome Statute provisions). Apropos is
Professor Bassiouni's analogy of a "biological mule" versus a "diplomatic mule," with the former being
produced by breeding a horse and a donkey, and the latter being produced by cutting each animal in half
and then gluing the different halves to one another.
71. In efforts to facilitate agreement, particularly in the face of obstinate delegations on
critical points, the Rome Conference Bureau published during the conference "discussion papers" that
reflected the Bureau's view of appropriate compromises. While some delegates may have appreciated
the discussion papers in the light in which they may have been intended, other delegates viewed them as
attempts by the Bureau to hijack the negotiations in the interests of concluding the treaty by midnight,
July 17, 199S, which was the deadline for adopting the treaty, after which a new Diplomatic Conference
of Plenipotentiaries would need to be called. E.g., U.N. Doe. A/Conf.183/L.53 (1998).
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to the negotiated outcome of the Rome Statute, as they were instrumental in
informing opinions directly and indirectly in the Rome Conference principal
bodies.72
IV. THE ROME STATUTE & HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Rome Statute: Basic Human Rights Provisions
Though promoting and safeguarding the rights of suspects or accused
persons'may not be an expressly stated purpose or object of the Rome Statute,
it is essential to the ICC's legitimacy73 that the human rights of all persons
affected by the ICC be enforced. 74 While it was not always clear which human
rights would be enforced, or the scope of those rights, or what would
constitute a rights violation, it remained clear throughout the negotiations that
the rights of suspects and accused persons would be considered.75
Accordingly, the Rome Statute provides for a panoply of individual
rights. In inter-related, yet scattered provisions, the Rome Statute outlines
72. For example, following the last 1997-1998 Prep Comm session, a group of experts was
convened at DePaul University College of Law to consider the Consolidated Final Draft Statute. Under
the auspices of DePaul's International Criminal Justice and Weapons Control Center and the
International Law Association Committee (American Branch) on a Permanent International Criminal
Court, the expert group prepared a model draft statute for the ICC ("1998 DePaul Expert's Draft") with
a view to facilitating the work of the Rome Conference. The 1998 DePaul Expert's Draft is entitled
Model Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court Based on the Preparatory Committee's Text to
the Diplomatic Conference, Rome, June 15 - July 17 1998 [hereinafter DePaul Model Draft Statute], and
is published in ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL, 13TER NOUVELLES EtTUDES P-NALES)
(Leila Sadat Wexler & M. CherifBassiouni eds., 1998). The 1998 DePaul Expert's Draft, which was not
issued as an official United Nations document, was intended to offer a "clean" text to be used by
negotiators at Rome, who otherwise used the Consolidated Final Draft Statute, which contained more
than 1000 "bracketed" words and phrases and was difficult to read. The 1998 DePaul Expert's Draft,
which eliminated most of the brackets, relied on the previous work of the DePaul group, "as further
illuminated by the Preparatory Committee's work and the work of NGOs interested in the progress
being made on the Court." Id. at vii (Foreword and Explanatory Note by Leila Sadat Wexler).
73. E.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUSTICE IN THE BALANCE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN
INDEPENDENT AND EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (1998), at http:/Avwwv.hnv.org/
reports98/ice (last visited Apr. 20, 2001).
It will be essential to the ICC's credibility and legitimacy that the Court observe the
highest standards of international human rights law. This affects many aspects of the
[Rome Statute], including the need for unequivocal respect for the rights of the accused
and the duty of the Court to exercise its functions without adverse discrimination on the
basis of gender, race or other grounds....
Id., art. 20(3).
74. For example, the 1995 Ad Hoe Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court noted the need for human rights safeguards in the Court's statute: "It was generally
recognized that Part 4 (Investigation and prosecution) should be carefully reviewed to ensure, inter alia,
a proper balance between two concerns, namely effectiveness of the prosecution and respect for the
rights of the suspect or the accused." Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, G.A., 50th Sess., Supp. No. 22, 696 132, U.N. Doe. A150/22 (1995),
reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 60 [hereinafter 1995 Ad
Hoc Committee Report], at 617-56.
75. All of the principal drafts relied upon throughout the entire Rome Statute negotiation and
drafting process contained various iterations of multiple rights, with final agreement not being reached
until the Rome Conference itself. See generally 1994 Draft ILC Statute, supra note 68 passim; Zutphen
Daft Statute, supra note 68. Rights of suspects, the accused, and other persons were provided for in all
drafts.
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human rights for suspects and others during an investigation,76 subjects under
investigation, 77 arrestees or persons who appear in response to a summons,78
persons who are to be questioned by the Prosecutor, or by national authorities
at the request of the Court,79 and accused persons. 80 It also enumerates rights
76. At least three overlapping categories of persons exist on the alleged perpetrator side of the
equation: (1) suspects, for whom a reasonable belief has been formed have committed a crime; (2) the
accused, who have been charged with a crime; and (3) persons during an investigation, who may never
become suspects or accused. Rights of persons during an investigation and rights of persons accused of
committing crimes are provided for primarily in Rome Statute, articles 55 and 67. A person may be
under investigation without the Prosecutor having formed the reasonable belief that the person has
committed a crime (and thus elevating that person into a "suspect" when he or she would not otherwise
be regarded as one). After being charged with a crime, a person becomes an accused, and arguably
acquires additional rights. An accused might also be subject to further investigation, in which case
protections for suspects and persons under investigation would continue to apply. Rome Statute, supra
note 3, arts. 55, 67.
77. Article 55 provides for the right against compelled self-incrimination and the right to be
free from being compelled to contest guilt, Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 55(l)(a); freedom from any
form of coercion, duress, or threat or torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, id., art. 55 (1)(b); freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention, id., art. 55(1)(d); and, "if
questioned in a language other than a language the person fully understands and speaks," the person has
the right to "have, free of any cost, the assistance of a competent interpreter and such translations as are
necessary to meet the requirements of fairness," id., art. 55(I)(c). It is unclear whether the qualifier "as
are necessary to meet the requirements of fairness" applies only to "translations" or to both
"translations" and "the assistance of a competent interpreter," as the syntax of article 55(1)(c) is
arguably ambiguous.
Article 55 also provides that "where there are grounds to believe that a person has committed a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court," and where "that person is about to be questioned either by
the Prosecutor, or by national authorities pursuant to a request made under Part 9 [of the Rome Statute],"
then "that person shall also have the following rights of which he or she shall be informed prior to being
questioned." Id., art. 55(2)(a). The section goes on to list the following rights: the right to be informed
before questioning "that there are grounds to believe" that he or she has committed a crime within the
Court's jurisdiction, id., art. 55(2)(a); the right to remain silent, "without such silence being a
consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence," id., art. 55(2)(b); the right "[t]o have legal
assistance of the person's choosing, or, if the person does not have legal assistance, to have legal
assistance assigned to him or her, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and without
payment by the person in any such case if the person does not have sufficient means to pay for it," id.,
art. 55(2)(c). It is unclear whether the qualifying language "in any case where the interests ofjustice so
require" applies to both: (a) the right "[t]o have legal assistance of the person's choosing"; and (b) the
right "to have legal assistance assigned to him or her." Furthermore, the Rome Statute provides for the
right "[t]o be questioned in the presence of counsel unless the person has voluntarily waived his or her
right to counsel." Id., art. 55(2)(d).
78. E.g., Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 57(3)(c) (privacy provision); Id., art. 58 (provisions
related to arrests, and arrest warrants, summonses to appear); Draft Rules of Procedure, rules 173-75;
see also Rome Statute, art. 59(3) (right in custodial state to apply for interim release pending surrender).
Article 55(l)(d) also contains privacy rights related to seizure of persons, in providing for the right not
to be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention, and the right to be free from deprivation of liberty except
in accordance with procedures established in the Rome Statute. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art.
55(l)(d).
79. Id., art. 55(2). These guarantees would apply to national authorities if the questioning by
those authorities had been requested by the Court pursuant to Part 9 of the Rome Statute. The guarantees
arguably would not apply if the national authorities independent of any Court request were to question a
person. Id. Thus, a gap in guarantees exists, as it is highly likely that a national authority will question
persons in conjunction with a crime within the Court's jurisdiction, in a manner contrary to the rights
provided in article 55(2), with no recourse if the information acquired by the national authority is
subsequently turned over to the Court or Prosecutor or otherwise used against the person in an ICC
prosecution.
80. Rights of the accused are provided for primarily in Rome Statute, supra note 3, article 67.
"A substantial number of delegations stressed the need to guarantee minimum rights for the accused in
conformity with article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." 1995 Ad Hoc
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for witnesses and victims,8 1 and for a wide range of other individuals 82 at all
stages of ICC fimctions-from early investigation, through trial, through
appeal and revision of sentence, to sentence execution.
A wealth of rights are afforded to persons who have passed through the
initial investigation stage and are accused. These wide-sweeping rights,
primarily contained in article 67,83 mimic rights included in international
Committee Report, supra note 74, 173. The Trial Chamber "shall ensure that a trial is fair and
expeditious and is conducted with full respect for the rights of the accused," Rome Statute, supra note 3,
art. 64(2).
81. Rome Statute, supra note 3, article 68, and the Draft Rules of Procedure, supra note 5,
chap. 4, § III, provide for victims and witnesses. Article 68(1) provides, in relevant part: "The Court
shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and
privacy of victims and witnesseses." The Statute recognizes the attempt to balance rights of the accused
against rights of victims and witness: "The Prosecutor shall take such measures particularly during the
investigation and prosecution of such crimes. These measures shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent
with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial." Id. Prosecutors must respect the rights of
victims and witnesses (arts. 54(l)(b)), as must the Pre-Trial Chamber (art. 57(3)(c)) and the Trial
Chamber (art. 64(2)). Id., arts. 54(1)(b), 57(3)(c), 64(2). A trust fund will be established for victims. See
Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 79; Draft Rules of Procedure, supra note 5, rule 97. Reparations may
also be awarded. Id., art. 75; Draft Rules of Procedure, supra note 3, rules 94-98.
82. The Rome Statute enumerates rights for the following persons: persons convicted by the
Court, Rome Statute, supra note, 3, art. 84; persons previously acquitted or convicted by the Court or by
other tribunals, id., art. 20, "Ne bis in idem"; persons to be or who have been sentenced, id., arts. 76, 81,
84, 108; bona fide third parties and appellants, id., arts. 81, 82, 83; and experts, id., art. 93(2). The Rome
Statute provides for the rights of youth, id., art. 26 (specifically mandating that there shall be no ICC
jurisdiction over persons under the age of 18), and of the acquitted, id., art. 66(3) (implicitly
acknowledging the right where the Court is not "convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt," but not noting other rights of the acquitted, for example a right to recover defense counsel fees).
It also safeguards rights of persons wrongfully convicted by the Court or wrongfully arrested, id., art. 84
(revision of conviction or sentence), id., art. 85 (wrongfully arrested and convicted persons compensated
as "victims").
"Persons" in general are covered by confidentiality requirements (art. 54(3)(f)), and "everyone"
is entitled to the presumption of innocence (art. 66). Id., arts. 54(3)(f), 66. Furthermore, "persons" in
general are covered by "rights" that are categorized in the Rome Statute as "general principles of
criminal law." Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 22-33. These rights include: "Nullum crimen sine lege,"
id., art. 22; "Nulla poena sine lege," id., art. 23); "non-retroactivity ratione personae," id., art. 24;
exclusion of jurisdiction for persons under eighteen, id., art. 26. Furthermore, Rome Statute articles 6, 7
and 8 (and corresponding articles from the Draft Element of Crimes) detail the crimes within the Court's
jurisdiction.
83. These rights include the following: the right "[t]o be informed promptly and in detail of
the nature, cause and content of the charge, in a language which the accused fully understands and
speaks," Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 67(l)(a); the right to have adequate time and facilities to
prepare the defense and "to communicate freely with counsel of the accused's choosing in confidence,"
id., art. 67(1)(b); the right "[t]o be tried without undue delay," Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 67(l)(c);
and the right to be present at trial, id., arts. 63(1), 67(l)(d), subject to article 63(2), providing for
removal of a disruptive accused from the Courtroom.
Additionally, the accused has the following rights: the right "to conduct the defence in person or
through legal assistance of the accused's choosing, to be informed, if the accused does not have legal
assistance, of this right and to have legal assistance assigned by the Court in any case where the interests
of justice so require, and without payment if the accused lacks sufficient means to pay for it," id., art.
67(l)(d); the right "[tjo examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her and to obtain the
attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the same conditions as witnesses
against him or her," id., art. 67(l)(e); the right "to raise defences and to present other evidence
admissible under the [Rome Statute]," id., art. 67(l)(e); the right "[t]o have, free of any cost, the
assistance of a competent interpreter and such translations as are necessary to meet the requirements of
fairness, if any of the proceedings of or documents presented to the Court are not in a language which
the accused fully understands and speaks," Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 67(l)(f). See also Rome
Statute, supra note 3, art. 55 (corresponding provision for rights of persons during an investigation).
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instruments such as the ICCPR.84 The chapeau to these enumerated fair trial
rights, which bills the rights as "minimum guarantees," provides: "In the'
determination of any charge, the accused shall be entitled to a public hearing,
having regard to the provisions of [the Rome Statute], to a fair hearing
conducted impartially, and to the following minimum guarantees, in full
equality. .... " !
Significantly, in some instances, these rights are elaborated more
broadly than in major international human rights instruments, including the
ICCPR, while in other cases they are in the language of the ICCPR.8
6
However, in some respects, the Rome Statute's express human rights
provisions fall short.
87
The overarching umbrella human rights provision is found in Rome
Statute, article 21, which outlines the sources of law to be applied within the
ICC framework. Specifically, Rome Statute, article 21(3) provides: "The
application and interpretation of law pursuant to [article 21] must be
consistent with internationally recognized human rights." 88 The Rome Statute
Included also are the right "[n]ot to be compelled to testify or to confess guilt and to remain
silent, without such silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt or innocence," id., art.
67(l)(g); the right "[t]o make an unsworn oral or written statement in his or her defence," id., art.
67(l)(h); and the right "[n]ot to have imposed on him or her any reversal of the burden of proof or any
onus of rebuttal," Id., art. 67(l)(i). Furthermore, Rome Statute, article 67 provides that the "Prosecutor
shall, as soon as practicable, disclose to the defence evidence in the Prosecutor's possession or control
which he or she believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of
the accused, or which may affect the credibility of prosecution evidence." Id., art. 67(2). The rights of
suspects under article 55 would continue to apply once a suspect (or a person during an investigation)
becomes an accused (is charged with a crime).
84. See generally ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 14(3) (containing fair trial rights).
85. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 67, "Rights of the accused." Some of the rights contained
in article 67 that apply to the accused are repeated from article 55, which pertains to the rights of persons
during an investigation. Id., arts. 55, 67.
86. For example, under the Rome Statute, supra note 3, article 67(g), the accused not only has
the right to remain silent, but also, that silence cannot be used against him or her in the Court's
determination of guilt or innocence.
87. E.g., Blakesley, AALS Panel Discussion, supra note 18 (defense rights lacking);
Blakesley, Commentary, supra note 18, at 88-89 (search and seizure rights lacking); Gallant, supra note
7 (privacy and other rights lacking).
SS. Rome Statute, supra note 3, article 21(3) in its entirety, contains a broad non-
discrimination clause:
The application and interpretation of law pursuant to [article 21] must be consistent with
internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded
on grounds such as gender, as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour,
language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin,
wealth, birth or other status.
The drafters rejected simplified non-discrimination language such as that proposed by Guatemala. See
PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY GUATEMALA, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.lg3/C.1iWGAIJL.4 (1998) (proposing that
the "principle of non-discrimination shall be applied to men, women and children"). Instead, the drafters
adopted a non-discrimination clause that is not unlike those contained in international human rights law
instruments, such as the ICCPR. E.g., ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 26 (containing "or other status"
phraseology). Article 21(3)'s broad, all-inclusive non-discrimination clause reflects a dramatic
compromise struck regarding the term "gender," the definition of which was rigorously negotiated
during the final week of the Rome Conference. The qualifying language following each mention of
"gender" in the Rome Statute was inserted to satisfy delegations who were wary of the term "gender,"
because of the purported non-existence of the term or concept of"gender" in the Arabic language, and to
satisfy Arab delegations, the Holy See and others that stridently objected to including "gender" in the
list, in part because they were concerned that "gender" would include "sexual orientation" (which is
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does not define the term "consistent" or "internationally recognized human
rights."89
The human rights obligations imposed by article 21(3) extend to all law
to be applied and interpreted by the ICC, and to all aspects of the operation of
the Court, including acts of the Prosecutor,9" the judges,91 and the Assembly
of States Parties,92 and, quite probably, to acts of States Parties themselves,
IGOs and others who cooperate with the ICC.93 This law includes the Statute,
the Elements of Crimes, the Rules of Procedure, and other principles and rules
of international law referred to in articles 21 (1) and 21(2). 9
While the greater emphasis during the 1998 Rome Conference
negotiations was the establishment of a Court that would eradicate impunity
for perpetrators of heinous crimes,95 the incorporation of human rights was
also emphasized. Rights under the Rome Statute were the subjects of lengthy
debate. All delegations favored including many rights, though they disagreed
as to which rights to include, with some delegations actively opposing certain
nevertheless incorporated either as part of the article 7, paragraph 3 definition of gender itself, or as an
"other status"). The Rome Statute's article 23(3) has become an "advocate's dream" because of its
expansiveness, despite the hostility of some delegations to the notion of including sexual minorities as a
"protected group."
One commentator, who happened to be the Secretary of the Committee of the Whole, noted that
the drafters' attempts to insert limiting language might have backfired, resulting in expanded rather than
decreased human rights coverage:
While the original intention behind this paragraph may have been to limit the court's
powers in the application and interpretation of the relevant law, it could have the opposite
effect and broaden the competence of the court on these matters. It provides a standard
against which all the law applied by the court should be tested. This is sweeping
language, which, as drafted, could apply to all three categories in article 21. For instance,
if the court decides that certain provisions of the Elements of Crimes or the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence are not compatible with the standards set out in paragraph 3 of
article 21, it would not have to apply them. The provision also lays down special rules of
interpretation for article 21.
Arsanjani, supra note 70, at 29.
89. See discussion infra Subsections VI.C.l.a-b (discussing the phrase "consistent with
internationally recognized human rights").
90. Article 54(1)(c) provides that the Prosecutor must "[f]ully respect the rights of persons
arising under [the Rome] Statute." See also Marcella David, Grotius Repudiated: The American
Objections to the International Criminal Court and the Commitment to International Law, 20 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 337, 366 (1999) (noting that "the [ICC] Prosecutor is required to respect the procedural rights
of persons connected with the investigation").
91. The judges are chiefly charged with applying and interpreting the law. Rome Statute,
supra note 3, article 21(3) directly speaks to judges qua judges to act consistently with internationally
recognized human rights.
92. The Assembly of States Parties is obligated to ensure that its acts in promulgating the
Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure, and other acts, are consistent with internationally
recognized human rights. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 21(3), 51(5), 112(2)(g); see also Gallant,
supra note 7, at 702, n.50 (citing the Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 112(2)(g) for the proposition that
the "Assembly of States Parties may perform other functions 'consistent with this Statute or the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence"').
93. Though article 21(3) arguably may not directly apply to States Parties, IGOs, or others
who might engage in cooperation with the ICC, States Parties and other entities that do cooperate may
be required to comply with norms contained in article 21(3). See Gallant, supra note 7, at 712-13.
94. For a discussion of the other principles and rules of international law to be applied and
interpreted by the Court, see infra Subsection VI.C.5.
95. See discussion infra Section V.A.
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rights.96 Once rights were agreed to, additional controversy surrounded the
substantive breadth of particular rights.97 Notably, the express search and
seizure privacy right was a casualty of Rome Conference deliberations; it was
deleted from the Final Consolidated Draft Statute during a Working Group
session in Rome.
98
B. Search and Seizure Privacy Rights and the Rome Statute
1. Deletion of Search and Seizure Privacy Rights from the Rome
Statute
It might be argued that the conspicuous omission of the express search
and seizure privacy right evidences the drafters' intent to excise the right from
Rome Statute coverage. However, the express search and seizure privacy right
was omitted not because the drafters believed that suspects and accused
persons did not deserve the right, but rather because delegates believed that
the right was or should be incorporated elsewhere in the treaty's collateral
instruments. During the penultimate week of the Rome Conference, the
Working Group on Procedural Matters99 discussed the search and seizure
privacy rights provision, which was incorporated into draft article 67(3) of the
Consolidated Final Draft Statute, along with a due process provision, which
was incorporated into draft article 67(4).10° Though many if not most
96. See, e.g., supra note 88 (regarding battle to include sexual orientation and certain
women's rights in the Rome Statute).
97. For example, the travaux preparatoires evidence disagreements and confusion as to the
scope of the rights to be provided in the Rome Statute. It was noted that "while there was general
agreement that it was essential to ensure that the accused should have a fair trial, some difference of
opinion arose as to the exact meaning of'fair trial'. The concept of 'fair trial' was said to be capable of
as many interpretations as there were criminal procedures in the world." U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183 (1998).
98. See discussion infra Subsection IV.B.1.
99. Official U.N. summaries or verbatim transcripts are not available for the Working Group
on Procedural Matters. However, unofficial notes taken during some of the Working Group sessions are
available and are on file vith the Author.
100. Tabled for discussion at the end of the penultimate week of the Rome Conference were
draft articles 67(3) and 67(4) ofthe Consolidated Final Draft Statute, supra note 68. Draft Article 67(3)
provided:
The right of all persons to be secure in their homes ... papers and effects against entries,
searches and seizures shall not be impaired . . . except upon warrant issued . . . in
accordance with Part 9 or the rules of the Court, for adequate cause and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized, or except on such grounds
and in accordance with such procedures as are established by the Rules of the Court.
Id., art. 67(3).
Draft Article 67(4) provided: "No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any other
criminal penalty be imposed, without due process of law." Id., art. 67(4).
A footnote attached to draft article 67 provided that the search and seizure and the due process
provisions "are of a general nature [and] should perhaps be located in another part of the Statute." Id.
Furthermore, that footnote provided that the due process provision "could be reformulated." Id.
A distinct relationship exists between the search and seizure privacy right and the due process
right, as they are both tied closely to the right to a fair trial. If evidence is seized through a search that
violates the right to privacy, it can be deemed unfair to present that evidence against the accused at trial.
In many instances, furthermore, particularly with respect to prosecutions by international tribunals such
as the ICC, if the remedy is not exclusion there will be no remedy for the privacy invasion. Fair trial or
due process rights, "by virtue of their incorporation into the ICCPR... have been recognized to be of
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delegations who addressed the topic during the Working Group discussions
favored deletion of the pair of search and seizure and due process
provisions,101 it was because it was thought that those rights were covered in
other Parts of the Rome Statute, including in Part IX. 102 Thus, despite urgings
for a strong, express search and seizure privacy provision, 10 3 the search and
seizure privacy right provision was unceremoniously removed from further
consideration.
2. Inclusion of Search and Seizure Rights in Earlier Rome Statute
Drafts
The search and seizure right to privacy text excised from the Rome
Statute had been incorporated into ICC draft statutes as early as 1996, mid-
way through the treaty negotiations. Reviewing the drafting history related to
the deleted provision sheds light on possible justifications for why the text
was deleted during the final days of the Rome Conference.
Neither the 1951 or 1953 ILC Draft Statute, nor the 1981 Bassiouni
Apartheid Draft Statute or 1993 Bassiouni Draft, contained express search and
seizure privacy rights, though early drafts generally elaborated human rights
universal application." Bartram S. Brown, Nationality and Internationality in International
Humanitarian Law, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 347, 360-61 (1998).
101. States that spoke in favor of deleting the provisions included Austria, Canada, Iran, Korea,
and Oman. Notes of July 10, 1998, taken during Working Group on Procedural Matters Session
[hereinafter Working Group Notes] [on file with the Author].
102. Rome Statute, supra note 3, Part IX (Intemational Cooperation and Judicial Assistance)
was identified, along with Parts 5, 6 and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, as containing content that
overlapped with the proposed search and seizure privacy and due process rights. Thus, there was a call
for deleting the search and seizure and due process rights from that draft Article. Working Group Notes,
supra note 101. The pair of provisions was absent from the Working Group on Procedural Matters next
Report to the Committee of the Whole immediately following the Working Group session during which
the provisions were deleted. Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 33rd Meeting, 13 July
1998, 44, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/C.1/SR.33 (1998).
Though it was argued that Part IX contains search and seizure privacy provisions, and thus there
was no need to repeat those provisions in a separate search and seizure provision, arguably neither Part
IX nor any other Part of the Rome Statute (including other collateral treaty documents, such as the Draft
Rules of Procedure) explicitly provides adequate search and seizure privacy right coverage. See
discussion infra Section IV.C (discussing Part IX's failure to provide for privacy search and seizure
rights).
103. During the Rome Conference and during the final 1997-1998 Prep Comm session earlier
that year, negotiators had the benefit of scholarly commentary that called for strong search and seizure
provisions. For example, one commentator stressed the need for the search and seizure article, and
argued that as proposed, the article was too limited and should be expanded. Professor Blakesley
contended:
An article [like the search and seizure article] must be included, and the Pre-Trial
Chamber should be allowed to issue such search/entry warrants. As written, however, this
paragraph is much too limited. Should it not also apply to the "persons" of the accused?
Otherwise, could blood be taken (searched/seized)? Other tissue? A stomach be pumped?
A body cavity searched for evidence? Does it mean that other violations of the autonomy
of the person, even if intrusive could be allowed without judicial approval? In addition,
what about communications intended to be private? Could a "wire-tap" be allowed
without judicial approval? This article leaves open many serious issues that need to be
addressed.
Blakesley, Commentary, supra note 18, at 88-89.
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to be afforded to persons, including the accused. 1°4 Similarly, the 1994 ILC
Draft Statute, 10 5 which was used as a starting point for negotiations at formal
and informal pre-Rome Conference sessions, did not contain a provision
regarding the search and seizure right to privacy in its "rights of the accused"
section, or elsewhere in the draft, though it contained an extensive list of
human rights safeguards. In 1996, various delegations to the 1996 Preparatory
Committee suggested incorporating a search and seizure provision in the 1994
ILC Draft Statute. Australia and The Netherlands submitted a joint proposal to
incorporate into the draft the following language, which is not dissimilar to
the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution:
10 6
The right of all persons to be secure in their homes, papers and effects against entries,
searches and seizures shall not be impaired except upon warrant issued, in accordance
with the rules of the Court, for adequate cause and particularly describing the place to be
searched and things to be seized, or except on such grounds and in accordance with such
procedures as are established by the rules of the Court.
10 7
The Australia and Netherlands proposal was not adopted.
On August 4, 1997, the 1997-1998 Preparatory Committee organized its
work through two groups, one of which was the Working Group on
Procedural Matters. The Working Group on Procedural Matters recommended
numerous criminal procedure modifications to the ILC Draft Statute through
its report (the Fernandez Report), 108 including draft article 41(3), which is a
104. See generally 1951 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 62; 1953 ILC Draft Statute, supra note
62; 9 NOUVELLES ETUDES PENALE 1993, reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, supra note 60, at 759, 771-74) (highlighting in the draft statute's commentary "standards of
fairness which are to be guaranteed in all proceedings before the Organs of the Tribunal and which are
to be reflected in the Procedures and Rules to be promulgated by the said Organs").
105. 1994 ILC Draft Statute, supra note 68.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
107. Report of the Preparatory Committee-Proposals, supra note 68; see identical Japan
proposal, id. at 217. In 1993, the United States submitted a comprehensive proposal regarding the
proposed Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the ICTY. Suggestions Made by the Government of the
United States of America: Rules of Procedure and Evidence for the International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Former Yugoslavia, IT 14, Nov. 17, 1993, reprinted in 2 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra
note 60, at 509-63. That proposal contained a section concerning the right to privacy. It provided:
Relevant evidence seized from the person or control of the accused or obtained as a result
of the use of electronic surveillance, undercover investigators, informant information, or
search and seizure is admissible unless obtained by methods so offensive to fundamental
principles of fairness and due process that its admission is antithetical to, and would
seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings.
Id. at 546.
108. Decisions Taken by the Preparatory Committee at its Session Held from 4 to 15 August
1997, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/1997/L.8/Rev.1 (1997) [hereinafter Fernandez Report]. Ms. Silvia
Fernandez de Gurmendi chaired the working group. The working group recommended modifications on
various articles, including articles related to investigation of alleged crimes, functions of the Pre-Trial
Chamber in relation with investigation, commencement of prosecution, notification of the indictment,
trial in the presence of the accused, functions and powers of the Trial Chamber, proceedings on an
admission of guilt, presumption of innocence, and rights of the accused, victims and witnesses. The
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slightly modified, more detailed version of the 1996 Australia/Netherlands
proposal. It provided:
The right of all persons to be secure in their homes and to secure their papers and effects
against entries, searches and seizures shall not be impaired by the Court except upon
warrant issued by the Court [Pre-Trial Chamber], on the request of the Prosecutor, in
accordance with Part 7 or the Rules of the Court, for adequate cause and particularly
describing the place to be searched and things to be seized, or except on such grounds
and in accordance with such procedures as are established by the Rules of the Court.1
0 9
The next major revision, the 1998 Zutphen Draft Statute,'1 0 contained a
version of the search and seizure provision without material change from the
Fernandez Report version.", The Consolidated Final Draft of the Statute
presented to the Rome Conference for consideration contained a search and
seizure provision substantively identical to the one contained in the Zutphen
Draft Statute.112
Despite some countries' insistence on an express search and seizure
privacy provision, such a provision was not included, in part, because it was
thought that such privacy rights were incorporated into Rome Statute, Part IX
provisions related to international cooperation and judicial assistance. While
the drafters might have felt secure in omitting the right in reliance on Part IX,
Part IX does not appear expressly or adequately to protect the search and
seizure privacy right.
C. International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance: Rome Statute, Part
IX-Search for the Right to Privacy
Some Rome Conference delegates contended that Part IX provides for
search and seizure privacy rights.1n  It was suggested that these protections
would lie in Rome Statute, articles 86, 88, 93, 96, and 99 (and perhaps in
article 69(8) from Part VI).1 4 Although those articles draw upon criminal
procedures incorporated into multilateral and bilateral mutual legal assistance
treaties, they fail expressly to cover the promised search and seizure right to
privacy.
working group considered "the text of... articles concerning procedural matters as a first draft for
inclusion in the draft consolidated text of the convention for an international criminal Court." Id. at 13.
109. Id. at 36. A footnote to this iteration provides that the rights addressed in this paragraph
"are of a general nature" and "should perhaps be located in another part of the Statute." Id. However,
these issues are now not addressed expressly in any part of the Rome Statute, in the Draft Rules of
Procedure, or in any other collateral instrument.
110. Zutphen Draft Statute, supra note 68, art. 60[41] (rights of the accused).
111. The Zutphen Draft bracketed "Court" in the phrase "except upon warrant issued by the
[Court]" whereas it was not bracketed in the Fernandez Report. Re-numbering caused by the rolling text
changed the "Rights of the Accused" from article 41 to article 60, and "Part 7" referred to in the
Fernandez Report was changed to "Part 9[7]." Id. The footnote remained.
112. In the Final Consolidated Draft Statute, the only modifications to the search and seizure
article were technical: renumbering of the article from 60 to 67, and deleting the reference to Part 7.
Consolidated Final Draft Statute, supra note 68, art. 67(3). The footnote remained.
113. See supra note 102 (discussing the contention that Part IX and other sections of the Rome
Statute provide for search and seizure and due process rights).
114. See discussion infra Subsection IV.C.3.
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1. The Prosecutor's Need to Acquire Evidence from Abroad 15
The ICC prosecutor's job of investigating and prosecuting crimes within
the Court's jurisdiction116 is especially difficult because the physical evidence
needed by the prosecution to make appropriate showings will typically be
located in either the territory of a State Party or in the territory of a non-party
state. 117 At various stages of an ICC investigation and/or prosecution, the
prosecution must proffer evidence sufficient to sustain charges against
accused persons," to sustain a conviction, tx9 and to sustain Court-ordered
requests for State co-operation,1 20 and summonses and arrest warrants.
121
Under prevailing rules of state sovereignty and under the Rome Statute itself,
the ICC may not unilaterally violate a State's sovereignty to retrieve evidence
for use in an ICC investigation or prosecution without permission. Pursuant to
Rome Statute, Part IX, entitled "International Cooperation and Judicial
Assistance," States Parties agree to cooperate with the Court in gathering and
transferring evidence to further the ICC's investigation and prosecution of
crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC.122
Part IX is ostensibly based on developing principles of transnational
legal assistance in criminal matters. As the world has grown smaller and
criminal enterprises have broadened, domestic crimes increasingly have
become international in scope. As the criminal process has transcended
national boundaries, so too have enforcement and prosecution efforts. In
recent years, various governments, inter-governmental groups and other
international groups (for example, Interpol, the United Nations, the Council of
Europe, and the Schengen countries) have recognized the need for global
cooperation in crime detection and prosecution primarily in such areas as drug
trafficking, money laundering, commercial crimes, and crimes involving use
of the internet, and have entered into multi-lateral and bi-lateral agreements to
achieve that cooperation.
115. This section of the Article is framed in terms of the Prosecutor's need for evidence since
search and seizure privacy right issues will most likely occur when the Prosecutor seeks to discover
evidence to use against an accused at trial, rather than, for example, when a defendant seeks to discover
exculpatory evidence.
116. Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 42(1), 53, 54.
117. The physical evidence could conceivably be in the hands of an inter-governmental
organization ("IGO"), such as NATO or the United Nations. Nevertheless, the IGO would still be
located in either a party or non-party state, and the laws of that State and ICC law related to that State
would likely govem evidence gathering therein.
118. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 61(1) provides for a process whereby "within a reasonable
time after the person's surrender or voluntary appearance before the Court, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall
hold a hearing to confirm the charges on which the prosecutor intends to seek trial." Rome Statute,
article 61(5) spells out the burden of the prosecution regarding confirmation: "At the hearing, the
Prosecutor shall support each charge with sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe
that the person committed the crime charged."
119. For conviction, the prosecutor must prove an accused person's guilt, and the Court must
be convinced of the accused person's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See id., arts. 66(2)-(3).
120. See id., Part IX.
121. The prosecutor must prove reasonable grounds for a summons or arrest warrant. See id.,
arts. 58(7), 58(1).
122. Id., Part IX.
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2. Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters-Multilateral &
Bilateral Legal Assistance Treaties
Part IX of the Rome Statute, which purportedly covers the right to
privacy in the search and seizure context, draws upon principles found in
bilateral and multilateral mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs).
123
However, Part IX arguably offers little if any such coverage. MLATs, which
have increasingly replaced noncompulsory letters rogatory for the seeking of
foreign assistance in criminal matters, 124 are not human rights treaties and
indeed routinely cannot be used by an accused person for the gathering of
evidence.
125
Various MLAT schemes expressly address search and seizure privacy
rights. For example, the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters within the
Commonwealth Scheme of 1996126 outlines search and seizure in the
Commonwealth. The Commonwealth Law Ministers, in a May 1999 meeting,
examined search and seizure issues involving the interception of
telecommunications and other forms of electronic surveillance and the "taking
of personal samples," and the Law Ministers examined the utility of
123. E.g., Bruce Zagaris, Mexico and the U.S. Conclude Narcotics Cooperation Agreement, 5
INT'L L. ENFORCEMENT REP. 87 (1989). For an interesting yet dated general article on judicial assistance
and cooperation in criminal matters in the former Yugoslavia, see D. Krapac, An Outline ofthe Recent
Development of the Yugoslav Law of International Judicial Assistance and Cooperation in Criminal
Matters, 34 NETH. INT'L L. REv. 324, 324-42 (1987).
124. 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 60, at 311 ("Notwithstanding the emergence of
international and regional organizations with competence in a wide range of areas, the international legal
system is still primarily a decentralized system of independent sovereign States, particularly in the field
of criminal law."); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. Rev. 1, 83-84 (1996).
125. Geoffrey R. Watson, Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal
Jurisdiction, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 41, 75-76 (1992). MLATs typically address the following: scope of
application (type of assistance covered); obligations to request assistance; limitations on request
compliance; nature and form of requests and their execution; costs of execution; limitations of use of
fruits of execution; taking of evidence, locating persons, and serving documents; transferring persons in
custody; certification and authentication of documents; transfer of government documents and records;
and proceeds of crime. Furthermore, typical agreements contain a separate search and seizure provision.
E.g., Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, S. TREATY DOc. No. 100-14 (1985).
Article XVI of that treaty provides, for example, that a "a request for search and seizure shall be
executed in accordance with the requirements of the law of the Requested State." For a comprehensive
article on more than one dozen bilateral MLATs entered into by the United States, see generally Alan
Ellis & Robert L. Pisani, The United States Treaties on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, in 2
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURAL AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS 403-55 (M. Cherif
Bassiouni, 2d. ed. 1999).
126. Scheme Relating to Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters within the Commonwealth
Including Amendments Made by Law Ministers in April 1990 (Harare 1986), reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A COLLECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN INSTRUMENTS
(Christine Van Den Wyngaert & Guy Stessens eds., 1996); see also Schengen Convention, Title 11, ch.
2, at 345-55 (June 19, 1990). Title III, ch. 2 of the Schengen Convention is intended to supplement the
European Convention of 20 April 1959 on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, (Benelux Treaty on
Extradition and Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters of 27 June 1962 (as amended by Protocol of
May 11, 1974), and to facilitate implementation of the Agreements. Article 55 of the Schengen
Convention provides: "The Contracting Parties may not make the admissibility of letters rogatory for
search or seizure dependent on conditions other than the following . . . (b) execution of the letters
rogatory is consistent with the law of the requested contracting party." Id.
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developing a uniform Commonwealth approach to various issues, including
search and seizure. 
127
The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 28 met
in 1991 in Moscow to discuss the right to privacy in the search and seizure
context,12 9 and agreed on a scheme of privacy safegaurds. 130 Furthermore, on
January 31, 2000, the European Parliament addressed privacy right issues in
criminal investigations in its report on the draft Council Act Establishing the
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member
States of The European Union.13 ' The report emphasized a need for members
to comply with the European Human Rights Convention 32 and the need to
harmonize discrepancies among Member States' respective legal systems by
bringing all the legal systems into line with those offering the strongest human
rights safeguards for the defense.133 The report suggested amendments to
curtail communication interception, recommended improving safeguards for
individuals' fundamental rights, including the right to privacy, and recognized
the traditional trade-off between law enforcement goals and safeguarding the
rights of all, including the rights of accused persons. 134
127. Meeting of Commonwealth Law Ministers: Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, May 3-7
1999, 28 COMMONWEALTH CRIME WATCH 1, 44 (1999), at http://www.thecommonwealth.org/gender/
htmlinfolinfo/communiques/1999/9931.htm; see 15 INT'L L. ENFORCEMENT REP. 379, 379-80 (1999).
128. The CSCE was created pursuant to the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in
Europe FinalAct, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292.
129. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Document of the Moscow Meeting
on the Human Dimension, Emphasizing Respect for Human Rights, Pluralistic Democracy, the Rule of
Law, and Proceduresfor Fact-Finding, Oct. 3,1991, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1670.
130. The CSCE final document provides:
The [CSCE] participating states reconfirm the right to the protection of private and
family life, domicile, correspondence and electronic communications. In order to avoid
any improper or arbitrary intrusion by the State in the realm of the individual, which
would be harmful to any democratic society, the exercise of this right will be subject only
to such restrictions as are prescribed by law and are consistent with internationally
recognized human rights standards. In particular, the participating States will ensure that
searches and seizures of persons and private premises and property will take place only in
accordance with standards that are judicially enforceable.
Id., available at http:/vwv.osce.orglodihr/docslCompilationlCompilation-1991mos.htm (last
visited Apr. 21, 2001).
131. European Parliament, Committee on Citizens' Freedoms and Rights, Justice and Home
Affairs, Report on the Draft Council Act Establishing the Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters between the Member States of The European Union (9636/1999-C5-0091/1999 and SN
506011999-C5-0331/1999-19990809(CNS), Final A5-0019/2000, RR/403243EN.doc, PE
232.057.fin, cited in 16 INT'L L. ENFORCEMENT REP. 693, 693-96 (2000) [hereinafter European
Parliament Report]).
132. European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213
U.N.T.S. 222, 1953 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention]. The European
Council, since 1996, has attempted to provide EU Member States with a new instrument for judicial
cooperation in criminal matters. The Council is required to consult with the European Parliament,
pursuant to the Rome Treaty on the European Union, arts. 39(1), 34(2)(b), 34(2)(c), 34(2)(d).
133. 16 INT'LL. ENFORCEMENTREP., supra note 131, at 695.
134. For a discussion of the Draft Convention in the context of the United Kingdom, see
CHRISTOPHER MURRAY & LORNA HARRIS, MUTUAL ASSISTANCE IN CRIMINAL MATTERS:
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMES (2000), cited in 16
INT'L L. ENFORCEMENT REP., supra note 131, at 695.
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3. Rome Statute, Part IX-Mimicking the MLATs-ls There a Search
and Seizure Privacy Right in International Cooperation and
Judicial Assistance?
Part IX of the Rome Statute mimics the scores of multilateral and
bilateral MLATs and other international and regional efforts that facilitate
criminal prosecutions transnationally, and it appears to attempt to incorporate
the highlights of those arrangements. 135 Though the typical MLAT modestly
covers search and seizure privacy, some of that coverage is not expressly
incorporated into the Rome Statute and Draft Rules of Procedure.1 36 Thus, like
the typical MLAT, neither Part IX of the Rome Statute nor the corresponding
section of the Draft Rules of Procedure appears to offer adequate safeguards
against privacy invasions.
Under Part IX, the prosecution (or the defense) seeking evidence or
information located in the territory of a State Party (or in the possession of a
non-party state), will request the Court to seek the assistance of that State in
the acquisition of the required evidence. States Parties are obligated to
cooperate fully with the Court regarding such a request,137 whereas non-party
States have no such treaty obligation.
Articles 86, 88, 93, 96, and 99 (which are contained in Part IX of the
Rome Statute), 138 and article 69(8),139 are relevant to the right to privacy in the
135. Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 68, para. 64. Drafters expressed
contradictory views on means for state cooperation. Some delegations supported a cooperation
framework "broadly similar to that existing between States on the basis of extradition and legal
assistance agreements." Other delegations proposed:
that the [Rome] Statute should provide for an entirely new regime which would not draw
upon existing extradition and legal assistance conventions, since the system of
cooperation between the Court and States was fundamentally different from that between
States, and extradition existed only between sovereign States. The obligation to cooperate
imposed by the [Rome] Statute on States parties would not prevent the application of
national laws in implementing such cooperation.
Id. Notably, a principal focus here was on extradition and surrender, and not on general human rights
concerns. Id.
136. A typical MLAT requires that searches and seizures be executed in accordance with the
laws of the Requested State. The Requested States' laws relating to the right to privacy might differ
dramatically from similar laws in the Requesting State. In turn, both sets of laws might run afoul of an
international standard (such as the Court would presumably apply in an ICC prosecution). Thus, the
MLAT search and seizure provisions are helpful only to the extent that safeguards for rights exist in the
laws of the requested state.
Another MLAT protection not provided in the Rome Statute is the requirement that the
Requested State authorities, following execution of a request for search and seizure, certify to the
Requesting State "the circumstances of the seizure, identity of the item seized and integrity of its
condition, and continuity of possession thereof."
Finally, MLATs protect third parties, that appear to be unprotected by the Rome Statute. See,
e.g., U.N. Model Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, G.A. Res. 117, U.N. GAOR,
45th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/117 (1991) (providing for the protection of third party privacy
and other rights in searches and seizures).
137. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 86.
138. Rome Statute, Part IX, consists of articles 86-102. The Part IX articles that are not
discussed in this Article relate to matters other than the right to privacy in the search and seizure context,
and include: article 87 (requests routing to States Parties through diplomatic channels; requests from
non-party States and inter-governmental organizations; failure to comply with requests; articles 94 and
95 (postponement of execution of request regarding an ongoing investigation or prosecution and
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search and seizure context. These articles deal primarily with States Parties'
obligations to cooperate and assist in the Court's investigations and
prosecutions. Though it may appear that these provisions, individually or
variously combined, cover the search and seizure privacy right, and though
the travaux preparatoires suggest that coverage is in place, such coverage
appears to be at best limited and at worst non-existent.
Article 86 is a general call for cooperation by States Parties in all aspects
of the Court's work, particularly as the Court investigates and prosecutes
crimes. 140 It does not prescribe the manner in which that participation is to
occur, except that States Parties are to cooperate "fully" and "in accordance
with the provisions of this Statute." 141 Therefore, article 86 arguably does not
impose upon States Parties human rights compliance obligations imposed on
the ICC under the Rome Statute (for example, the article 21(3) duties imposed
on the ICC with respect to the law applied and interpreted by the Court).
Arguably, article 21(3) would not directly apply to States' obligations to
cooperate under article 86. Though article 86 would require States to ensure
cooperation of all their authorities that could be called upon to assist (for
example, federal police, local police, and the military), it does not expressly
dictate that national authorities must abide by particular human rights
standards. Article 86 contains no prescriptions related to a domestic or
international obligation to safeguard the search and seizure privacy right, to
any right to privacy standard, or indeed to any other right that might be
deemed to be an internationally recognized human right. Furthermore, article
86 does not expressly demand that the law of the requested States Parties be
consistent with internationally recognized human rights.
Article 88, which operates in conjunction with article 86,142 provides
that States Parties shall ensure that national laws are in place to enable
cooperation of the sort required under the Rome Statute as provided for in Part
IX.14 3 No search and seizure privacy right is expressly provided for in article
admissibility challenges); article 97 (State consultations with the Court regarding request compliance);
article 98 (cooperation regarding immunity waiver and consent to surrender); and article 100 (costs of
executing requests); article 101 (rule of speciality) and article 102 (use of terms--"surrender" and
"extradition"). Other Part IX articles not discussed relate to privacy in the context of seizures of persons:
article 89 (surrender of persons to the Court); article 90 (competing requests to extradite and surrender);
article 91 (contents of arrest or surrender request); and article 92 (provisional arrest).
139. Though article 69(8) appears in Part VI of the Rome Statute, it is relevant to Part IX.
140. Rome Statute, art. 86 provides: "States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of
this Statute, cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court."
141. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 86.
142. With regard to article 86, "[t]he simplest way of ensuring fulfillment of the obligation to
cooperate is to provide national laws that allow (with due regard for the [Rome] Statute) requests from
the Court to be passed to national authorities for execution in the same manner as a request from another
country or as an order issued under national law." Bruce Broomhall, The International Criminal Court:
A Checklist for National Implementation in ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL, 13TER
NOUVELLES ETUDES PtNALES (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1999), 113, 117. Id. at 118 (noting that article
88 contains an important corollary to the general obligation to cooperate under article 86).
143. Rome Statute, supra note 3, article 88, provides: "States Parties shall ensure that there are
procedures available under their national law for all of the forms of cooperation which are specified
under [Part IX]." Article 88 requires national law procedures for cooperation only under Part IX, and
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88. Article 88 envisages that the extant domestic laws of States Parties would
be modified in order to comply fully with Part IX. 144 States are obligated to
ensure compatibility of their domestic laws with Part IX, but are not expressly
obliged to adopt any particular form of enactment to fulfill their obligations,
and may legislate based on their legal and constitutional order. 145 Article 88
does not refer to a domestic or international privacy standard, and it does not
expressly call for States to enforce the right to privacy, or to incorporate
substantively that right into their law. Arguably, article 88 can be read to
require States Parties to enact legislation that would call for search warrants or
other procedural mechanisms for helping to ensure that the right to privacy is
not violated. However, such an argument may fail, as the Rome Statute does
not expressly call for search warrants. But if a search warrant or other prior
judicial authorization requirement is a part of customary international law, is a
general principle of law, or is an internationally recognized human right, then
article 88 reasonably could be read to provide that States Parties are obligated
to ensure such procedures are in place domestically.
146
Article 93, which does not expressly address privacy rights issues,
mandates that States Parties, in accordance with Part IX and "under
procedures of national law," must comply with requests to provide certain
assistance. 147 Article 93 does not expressly mandate that States Parties
does not address national law under other parts of the Rome Statute.
Article 88 is both substantive and procedural in operation, but in neither sense expressly relevant
to the search and seizure privacy right. States must enact laws that substantively agree (and that do not
substantively disagree) with the Rome Statute. Procedurally, States must enact laws to facilitate co-
operation with the ICC. Some of these laws enacted may touch on search and seizure/right to privacy
issues (if, for example, the argument is made that article 88 calls for search warrants).
144. An examination of the text suggests that the Rome Statute negotiators were more
concerned about States Parties' extradition or surrender laws that might conflict with the States'
obligations under the Rome Statute. For example, some States' laws prohibit the extradition or surrender
of their own nationals, which would conflict with Rome Statute obligations under articles 89-92. Rome
Statute, supra note 3, arts. 89-92. Such States Parties would be obliged to modify their national laws to
comply with the Rome Statute, since Article 88 necessarily envisages that the extant domestic laws of
States Parties may need to be modified in order to comply with Part IX. Id., art. 88; see also Report of
the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Volume I
(Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee during March-April and August 1996), para. 3 10, G.A.,
51st. Sess., Supp. No. 11, A/51/22 (1996) ("[T]here would be instances in which a State must amend its
national law in order to be able to meet those [state cooperation] obligations.") Indeed, States Parties
may be required to enact new laws and procedures to be in compliance with Rome Statute, article 88.
145. See Broomhall, supra note 142, at 119. Dr. Broomhall notes that States Parties have
several options to ensure that procedures needed under national law for forms of cooperation under Part
IX are available to satisfy article 88. Methods depend on the State Party and its laws, but include:
automatic incorporation of international agreements into domestic law; international agreement; a
systematic review of domestic law for Rome Statute compatibility; adoption of implementing
legislation; and domestic mutual legal assistance legislation.
146. See discussion infra Subsection VI.C.5-6 (discussing whether the search and seizure right
to privacy has risen to customary international law and general principle of law status).
147. Rome Statute, supra note 3, article 93, in relevant part provides:
State Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of [Part 9] and under procedures of national
law, comply with requests by the Court to provide the following assistance in relation to
investigations or prosecutions:
(a) The identification and whereabouts ofpersons or the location of items;
(b) The taking of evidence, including testimony under oath, and the production of
evidence, including expert opinions and reports necessary to the Court;
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conform their substantive domestic law to international standards, but
provides that States, "in accordance with the provisions of [Part IX] and under
procedures of national law" shall comply with requests to provide assistance
in a list of enumerated situations. Article 93 does not explicitly address the
situation where a State Party's domestic law on the right to privacy does not
rise to the level required under the Rome Statute. 1 Although article 93
provides that states "shall . . . under procedures of national law" provide
assistance in "[t]he execution of searches and seizures," 149 there is no express
requirement that international norms be applied. Furthermore, it does not
expressly address a search and seizure privacy standard, either domestic or
international.
Although the Preparatory Committee discussed and subsequently
rejected a mechanism for determining whether evidence transferred to the
Court pursuant to Part IX "had been obtained in accordance with national
rules," 150 the drafters rejected the proposal that the "Court has, in case of
evidence obtained by national authorities, to presume irrebuttably that the
national authorities acted in accordance with the domestic provisions."
151
Even if an express mechanism for evaluating improperly obtained evidence
had been enacted, such a provision may have been limited to the question of
whether evidence was obtained in violation of the national laws, regardless of
whether those laws themselves complied with ICC law or with international
human rights law.
(g) The examination of places or sites, including the exhumation and examination of
grave sites;
(h) The execution of searches and seizures;
(k) The identification, tracing and freezing or seizure of proceeds, property and assets
and instrumentalities of crimes for the purpose of eventual forfeiture, without
prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties; and
(1) Any other type of assistance which is not prohibited by the law of the requested
State, with a view to facilitating the investigation and prosecution of crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Court.
Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 93(1).
148. See discussion infra Subsection VI.C.5.a (discussing international human rights law as a
part of "applicable law" under Rome Statute, article 21). An example of differential standards can be
drawn from bilateral MLATs. For example, under typical MLATs between the United States and
another country ("Country X'), a search or seizure request by Country X to the United States must be
supported by probable cause for the search or seizure. If the United States requests a search or seizure
from Country X, the United States need not necessarily show probable cause, but must show the
requisite level of proof required under the law of Country X for search and seizures there, even though
that level of proof might be greater or less than probable cause. See Ellis & Pisani, supra note 125, at
403-25.
149. Some might argue that other items in the article 93(1) list might present issues related to
the right to privacy. For example, article 93(1)(g) deals with the "examination of places or sites,
including the exhumation and examination of grave sites." Though privacy interests might be implicated
in the carrying out of a request related to such examinations, it seems unlikely that such requests would
implicate privacy interests (as described in this Article) unless the "places or sites" were the home or
business of a suspect or an accused, or the exhumations and grave site investigations were conducted at
a home or business of a suspect or an accused.
150. Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 68, para. 289.
151. Zutphen Draft Statute, supra note 68, art. 62[44][69](6).
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Although article 93(3) limits mandatory cooperation requirements where
the requested assistance "is prohibited in the requested State on the basis of an
existing fundamental legal principle of general application," this limitation
does not explicitly address the right to privacy, which would be implicated in
an "internationally recognized human right" analysis but which may not be
considered in a "fundamental legal principle of general application" analysis.
Finally, article 93 does not expressly require State law consistency with
"internationally recognized human rights."
Article 96 appears to offer limited privacy coverage in the international
cooperation and judicial assistance context. Article 96 provides that all
requests referred to in article 93 shall be in writing, and outlines required
contents of the requests. 152 The writing requirement will help to ensure that
appropriate records are kept, which may lessen the risk of arbitrary, unlawful,
or unreasonable searches and seizures and may encourage authorities to be
more accountable for their practices. However, the requirement regarding the
content of the written request does not expressly address search and seizure
privacy right concems. Although article 93 outlines the type and level of
detail required in a request for assistance-including a statement of purpose,
the whereabouts of sought persons or places to be found or identified, the facts
underlying the request, and such information as may be required under the
requested States Party's national law-article 96(2) fails to classify the right
to privacy as an "internationally recognized human right." Thus, a
requirement exists that the Court provide certain specific information to the
State Parties before States act upon the request. However, article 96 does not
appear to provide adequate safeguards against unreasonable, unlawful or
arbitrary searches and seizures.
Article 99 provides that Court requests for assistance shall be executed
in accordance "with the relevant procedure under the law of the requested
152. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 96, provides:
1) A request for other forms of assistance referred to in article 93 shall be made in
writing. In urgent cases, a request may be made by any medium capable of delivering a
written record, provided that the request shall be confirmed through the channel provided
for in article 87, paragraph 1(a).
2) The request shall, as applicable, contain or be supported by the following:
(a) A concise statement of the purpose of the request and the assistance sought,
including the legal basis and the grounds for the request;
(b) As much detailed information as possible about the location or identification
of any person or place that must be found or identified in order for the assistance
sought to be provided;
(c) A concise statement of the essential facts underlying the request;
(d) The reasons for and details of any procedure or requirement to be followed;
(e) Such information as may be required under the law of the requested State in
order to execute the request; and
(f) Any other information relevant in order for the assistance sought to be
provided.
3) Upon request of the Court, a State Party shall consult with the Court, either generally
or with respect to a specific matter, regarding any requirements under its national law that
may apply under paragraph 2(e). During the consultations, the State Party shall advise the
Court of the specific requirements of its national law.
4) The provisions of this article shall, where applicable, also apply in respect of a request
for assistance made to the Court.
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State and, unless prohibited by such law, in the manner specified in the
request... ,153 Thus, article 99 likewise apparently fails adequately to cover
the search and seizure privacy right because it merely reconfirms the notion
that "national law" is to be followed in the execution of requests by States.
Article 99, like articles 93 and 96, fails expressly to require that States Parties
conform their national law to international standards. Article 99 fails to
illuminate the contours of an appropriate domestic or international right to
privacy in the search and seizure context,154 and does not expressly require
consistency with "internationally recognized human rights." Furthermore, as
is clear from article 69(8), no mechanism exists whereby the ICC can rule on
the validity or application of domestic law. 
155
Article 69(8), which is found in Part VI, offers no express privacy
coverage. Article 69(8) operates in recognition of state sovereignty, and
provides that the Court is not to rule on the "application of the State's national
law" when deciding on the relevance or admissibility of evidence.1 56 Thus,
when determining whether evidence acquired through State cooperation is
admitted against an accused person, the Court arguably may not consider
whether that State, in acquiring the evidence, complied with its own domestic
substantive or procedural law, or indeed whether that national law was in
accord with international human rights law.' 57 A great potential for domestic
abuse arises with little if any ICC recourse unless, as this Article argues, the
Rome Statute incorporates a search and seizure privacy right consistent with
internationally recognized human rights.
The drafters rejected proposals for the Court to be empowered to
determine whether evidence was gathered in accordance with national rules,
153. Rome Statute, supra note 3, article 99(1), provides:
Requests for assistance shall be executed in accordance with the relevant procedure under
the law of the requested State and, unless prohibited by such law, in the manner specified
in the request, including following any procedure outlined therein or permitting persons
specified in the request to be present at and assist in the execution process.
154. Article 99 envisions the Prosecutor executing a request by the Court in a State when "the
successful execution of a request ... can be executed without any compulsory measures, including
specifically the interview of or taking evidence from a person on a voluntary basis .. .[and] the
examination without modification of a public site or other public place," subsequent to "consultations
with the requested State Party." See Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 99(4), 99(4)(a), and 99(4)(b).
155. See infra note 156.
156. Article 69(8), which appears in Part 6 of the Rome Statute, provides: "When deciding on
the relevance or admissibility of evidence collected by a State, the Court shall not rule on the application
of the State's national law." Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 69(8). Furthermore, Draft Rule of
Procedure, rule 63(5), provides: "The Chambers shall not apply national laws governing evidence, other
than in accordance with article 21." Draft Rules of Procedure, supra note 5, rule 63(5). Thus, when the
Court is faced with evidence obtained in violation of national law, the Court is forbidden from
interpreting and applying that national law in determining whether the evidence should be excluded
from trial. Arguably, this provision might suggest that if the evidence is acquired in compliance with
national law, but in contravention of internationally recognized human rights, then the national law is
deemed irrelevant and the Rome Statute safeguards will apply.
157. This is not unlike the rule applied in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia Tribunal case of Prosecutor v. Mucic, Case No. IT-96-21, Decision on the Tendering of
Prosecution Exhibits 104-108 (Trial Chamber, Nov. 16, 1998; Feb. 9, 1998), in which the tribunal ruled
that it was not bound by Austrian law, and would not take the domestic law into consideration when
deciding whether to exclude evidence seized following a search that violated Austrian law.
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in part because of the belief that "the Court should not get involved in intricate
inquiries about domestic laws and procedures and it should rather rely on
ordinary principles of judicial cooperation." 158 The drafters concluded that the
Court "should apply international law and should exclude, for example,
evidence obtained in violation of fundamental human rights, or minimum
internationally acceptable standards (such as the Guidelines of the United
Nations Congress on Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders), or by
methods casting substantive doubts on its reliability."'159 The article 69(7)
exclusionary rule, as crafted, may not adequately cover the search and seizure
right to privacy.
160
Exempting States' laws from ICC review is inconsistent with the Rome
Statute's other rules related to state cooperation. This is particularly so given
that article 88 requires State Parties to ensure that procedures are in place
under national law for all forms of cooperation specified in the Rome
Statute, 161 that article 93 requires states parties "under procedures of national
law [to] comply with requests by the Court to provide ... assistance," 162 and
that article 96 prescribes written contents of requests for cooperation.
163
Furthermore, the exemption of States' laws from ICC review would highlight
a Court weakness in an area fundamental to the preservation of rights of
accused persons. Such an exemption would generally limit the accused's
ability to challenge admissibility of evidence based on violations of national
substantive or procedural law, irrespective of whether that national law is
more or less stringent than international standards that bind the ICC.
164
Finally, article 69(8) does not expressly require that the Court ensure that
cooperation was obtained in a manner consistent with "internationally
recognized human rights."
Articles 86, 88, 93, 96, 99 and 69(8) do not expressly protect the right to
privacy in the context of searches and seizures. Any finding of such coverage
must be inferred or derived from those articles, from other Rome Statute or
collateral instrument provisions, or from a combination thereof. Since Part LX
arguably fails to provide adequate search and seizure safeguards, we now
must turn to "applicable law" in the search for privacy protection in the Rome
Statute and its corollary instruments.
158. Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 68, para. 289. The drafters also
suggested that "the Court, in cases of allegations of evidence obtained by national authorities by illegal
means, could decide on the credibility of the allegations and the seriousness of 'violations'." Id. But,
there was no direct suggestion as to how the Court would respond if the allegations were credible and
the "violations" (which appears in quotation marks in the original) were serious. See id.
159. Id.
160. See generally discussion supra Section IV.C (discussing deficiencies of Rome Statute, art.
69(7) exclusionary rule).
161. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 88
162. Id., art. 93.
163. Id., art. 96.
164. Even though rule 63(5) of the Draft Rules of Evidence directs the Court back to Rome
Statute, article 21(l)(c), that section of article 21 calls for derivation of general principles, and does not
expressly call for an ICC judicial interpretation of whether a particular state's search and seizure laws
have been violated. In fact, the Court is prohibited from ruling on "the application of the State's national
law." Id. note 3, art. 69(8).
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V. TREATY INTERPRETATION UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE
LAW OF TREATIES
The basic rules of treaty interpretation, as contained in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 165 provide a framework for locating the
search and seizure privacy right within the applicable law of Rome Statute,
article 21, or elsewhere within the ICC framework. The Vienna Convention,
which codifies customary international law governing international
agreements,166 comprises a set of authoritative rules of treaty interpretation
that are followed by most States, including States that are not party to the
Vienna Convention.16 7 Since the Rome Statute is a treaty under the Vienna
Convention definition, Vienna Convention rules may be employed to interpret
Rome Statute terms, including those related to the existence and scope of
search and seizure privacy rights.
161
The Vienna Convention incorporates the three principal canons for
treaty term interpretation: (1) the objective approach; (2) the subjective
approach; and (3) the teleological approach. 16 The objective approach
165. Vienna Convention, supra note 16. Pursuant to the Rome Statute, article 21, the ICC shall
apply the Vienna Convention as an "applicable treaty," see discussion infra Subsection VI.C.4, or as
customary international law, see discussion infra Subsection VI.C.5.
166. The Vienna Convention embodies customary international law either because the treaty
itself codified customary international law or because principles contained within the treaty have since
risen to the level of customary international law. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH,
OSCAR SCHACHTER, & HANS SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 416-18 (3d ed. 1993);
John Norton Moore, Enhancing Compliance with International Law: A Neglected Remedy, 39 VA. J.
INT'L L. 881 (1999). For the U.S. position, see generally I RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS 145 (1987) ("This Restatement accepts the Vienna Convention as, in general, constituting a
codification of the customary international law governing international agreements, and therefore as
foreign relations law of the United States even though the United States has not adhered to the
Convention.").
167. The United States is a good example of a Vienna Convention non-party that subscribes to
Vienna Convention principles. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 145 (1987). In June
2000, the United States, in its submission to the ICC Preparatory Commission on a proposed rule to be
incorporated into the Draft Rules of Procedure, noted the relevance of the Vienna Convention rules to
the Rome Statute. See Proposal submitted by the United States of America concerning rules of
procedure and evidence relating to Part 13 of the Statute (Final Clauses), U.N. Doc.
PCNICCI2000AVGRPE(13)/DP.1 (2000) (suggesting that regarding amendments to the Rome Statute, a
particular Vienna Convention rule would not apply if the Rome Statute "otherwise provides").
168. Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. l(a) ("'[T]reaty' means an international agreement
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law."). It should be noted that
non-Vienna Convention rules of interpretation may be used in interpreting portions of the Rome Statute,
for example, criminal culpability provisions, which should be construed narrowly.
169. See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 626-32 (4th ed.
1990) (discussing interpretation of treaties); HENKIN Er AL., supra note 166 at 471-81 (discussing
interpretation of treaties); HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL
LAW §§ 1344, 1344-1389 (3d rev. ed. 1999) (discussing interpretation and settlement of treaty disputes,
and noting that "[w]hoever applies a rule must first also interpret it, which of course requires
ascertaining its meaning."); IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (1973)
(discussing interpretation of treaties). A fourth canon might be called the "quasi-textual approach,"
which is similar to the objective, textual approach, in that they both regard the "text as the essence of an
agreement." However, rather than interpreting words according to their ordinary or plain meaning, "the
quasi-textual approach seeks to interpret them in the manner the parties intended." Kenneth J.
Vandevelde, Treaty Interpretation from a Negotiator's Perspective, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 281,
289 (1988).
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demands that ambiguities be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary, plain
meaning of the words of the treaty. In this approach, the text, including other
"intrinsic" documents, such as the preamble and annexes, maintain primacy
over any subsidiary sources of clarification, 70 since the text represents an
authentic expression of the parties' agreement. The subjective approach looks
to the actual or presumed intent of the drafters, 171 while the teleological
approach requires exploration of the object and purpose of the treaty as a
subsidiary means for interpreting intrinsic and extrinsic materials. 172 The three
approaches are not mutually exclusive and are not meant to be applied in a
hierarchical fashion. 173 Indeed the Vienna Convention integrates their
application and supports a dynamic concurrent examination and review of
intrinsic and extrinsic materials.174 This Article uses these three approaches to
analyze the relevant portions of the Rome Statute.
A. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention: Rules & Application to the Rome
Statute
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention encompasses the objective,
subjective and teleological approaches to treaty interpretation. It employs the
objective approach by directing that a treaty be interpreted in good faith "in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty."' 75 Article 31 applies when an existing treaty term is ambiguous or
170. See SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 169, § 1347 ("Priority is usually given to the
text." (citing, inter alia, Sir Humphrey Waldock, Third Report on the Law of Treaties, Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N. 53, 54 (1964)). This textual approach might direct analysts to dictionaries, in search of the
denotation of terms.
171. This approach would subject to scrutiny ancillary documents, such as a treaty conference's
preparatory work (travaux preparatoires), to help discern the intent of the parties, which will aid in the
treaty term interpretation. Under this approach, the treaty text and the travauxpreparatoires operate on
the same level, in that both are used to help discern the parties' intent. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note
166, at 471-81.
172. Id. at 477; BROWNLIE, supra note 169, at 3.
173. The World Trade Organization recently addressed the rule that "the elements referred to in
Article 31-text, context and object-and-purpose as well as good faith-are to be viewed as one holistic
rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order." World
Trade Organization Panel Report on United States-Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974
(Findings and Conclusions), WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999), 39 I.L.M. 452, § 7.22 (2000) (quoting
Appellate Body Report on Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DSS/AB/R (1996), at 11-12).
174. The International Law Commission, which drafted the original article 31, commented:
The Commission, by heading the article "General Rule of Interpretation" in the singular
and by underlining the connexion between paragraphs I and 2 and again between
paragraph 3 and the two previous paragraphs, intended to indicate that the application of
the means of interpretation in the article would be a single combined operation. All the
various elements, as they were present in any given case, would be thrown into the
crucible and their interaction would give the legally relevant interpretation. Thus [Article
31] is entitled "General rule of interpretation" in the singular, not "General rules" in the
plural, because the Commission desired to emphasize that the process of interpretation is
a unity and that the provisions of the article form a single, closely integrated rule.
2 YEARBOOK OF THE ILC 219,219-20 (1966) (emphasis in original).
175. Vienna Convention, supra note 16, article 31 provides:
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.
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unclear. There would be no reason to look beyond the treaty's words if those
words admit of only one construction. 176 Analyzing the "ordinary meaning" of
a treaty term involves assessing that term in its "context," which, pursuant to
article 31(2)(a), includes intrinsic materials, such as the treaty text, and its
preamble and annexes, along with any treaty-related, collateral ar eement
reached by the parties in connection with the treaty's conclusion. Article
31 (1) authorizes use of the teleological approach to shed light on the ordinary
meaning, which is to be interpreted in accordance with the treaty's "object and
purpose." The object and purpose do not operate as an independent vehicle for
interpretation, but serve in an ancillary capacity. Finally, Article 31(4)
approves of the subjective approach, in providing that a "special meanin
shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
Thus, according to the principles of the Vienna Convention,179 one would look
to the Rome Statute itself (including its Preamble), its Final Act, and
instruments called for in the Final Act, such as the ICC Rules of Procedure
and the ICC Elements of Crimes, in search of ordinary meaning, context,
object, and purpose.
Regarding the ordinary meaning and context of the treaty, none of the
relevant ICC collateral instruments-including the Rome Statute, the Final
Act, the Draft Rules of Procedure, and the Draft Elements of Crimes-directly
and unambiguously provides for the right to privacy in the context of searches
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition
to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related
to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of
the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so
intended.
176. Corollaries are that article 31 may not be used to interpret a non-existent term, may not
apply in attempting to fill in gaps, and may not apply in attempting to determine whether an implied
treaty term exists.
177. Article 31(2)(b) of the Vienna Convention will not be analyzed in this Article in the
context of the Rome Statute.
178. Article 31(4) of the Vienna Convention is pertinent in that various terms of the Rome
Statute might be construed as having been given a special meaning by the drafters. Among those terms
are "internationally recognized human rights" as contained in articles 21(3) and 69(7), and "universally
recognized" as contained in article 7(h). Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 7(h), 21(3), 69(7). A heavy
burden exists to show that any such special meaning was intended by the parties.
179. Some commentators would discourage using the Vienna Convention rules to interpret the
Rome Statute, arguing that those rules are not suited for a treaty of this type. See, e.g., William K.
Lietzau, Checks and Balances and Elements of Proof. Structural Pillars for the International Criminal
Court, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 477, 484 (1999) (recourse to negotiating history 'vill yield little
dispositive guidance appropriate for a criminal courtroom").
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and seizures. 180 Thus, arguably, there is nothing to interpret: the intrinsic
documents would be deemed to speak clearly through their silence. However,
several terms in the Rome Statute can admit of a construction that
encompasses privacy rights, and it is those terms (such as "internationally
recognized human rights," "fundamental rights," and "universally
recognized") that must be analyzed according to their ordinary meaning in
their context in light of the object and purpose of the treaty.'81
Arguably, no express search and seizure privacy right is found within
the object and purpose of the Rome Statute. The objects and purposes of the
Rome Statute, according to its Preamble, 1 2 include:
[1] to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of [the most serious crimes of
concern to the international community] and thus to contribute to the prevention of such
crimes;
[2] for the sake of present and future generations, to establish an independent
permanent International Criminal Court in relationship with the United Nations system,
with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international community;
and
[3] to guarantee lasting respect for the enforcement of international justice.18 3
Though the Preamble reaffirms the principles of the U.N. Charter, which
endorse international human rights, it does not expressly state that human
rights safeguards are an object or purpose of the Rome Statute. To the extent
that the object or purpose of the treaty expressly focuses on rights at all, it can
be argued, the focus appears to be on the rights of society and victims, and not
on the privacy or other rights of suspects or accused persons. U.N. officials,
180. Together with the context, also to be taken into account for treaty interpretation is any
subsequent agreement among the parties regarding interpretation (for example, future decisions of the
Assembly of States Parties, the adoption of the Rules of Procedure) and any subsequent practice which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation. See Vienna Convention, supra note
16, arts. 31(3)(a)-(b). This is particularly important in the context of the ICC and the right to privacy, as
the practice of the Court enforcing the right to privacy may establish agreement (express or implied)
regarding the interpretation of the right under the Rome Statute.
Finally, also relevant is Vienna Convention, article 31(3)(c), which mandates the taking into
account, together with the context, any relevant rules of international law "applicable" in the relations
between the parties. Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 31(3)(c). This is significant because not only
does Rome Statute, article 21 dictate that the Court shall apply certain international law rules, but also
because Vienna Convention, article 31(3)(c) directs the Court in interpreting the Rome Statute to apply
the full corpus of international law, including customary international law, general principles of law,
international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and any other law that falls under the
umbrella of "international law." See discussion infra Part VI.
181. See discussion infra Section VI.C (interpreting and applying "applicable law").
182. The object and purpose of the Rome Statute, as stated in the Preamble, mimic the objects
and purposes of the ICTY and the ICTR, as outlined by the 1953 ILC Draft Statute drafters and
commentators, and as asserted by Professor Bassiouni. Professor Bassiouni, Chairperson of the Rome
Conference Drafting Committee of the Rome Statute, stated the "purposes of the ICC include:
dispensing exemplary and retributive justice; providing victim redress; recording history; reinforcing
social values; strengthening individual rectitude; educating present and future generations; and, more
importantly, deterring and preventing future human depredations." THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, supra, note 60, at 1-2 (citations omitted).
183. Id. Secretary-General Kofi Annan also has stated that the "overriding interest" of the
Rome Statute is that of the victims. UNSecretary-General, supra note 1.
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governmental agents, NGO representatives, and others repeatedly emphasized
that an object and purpose of the Rome Statute was to bring justice to the
perpetrators: For example, Secretary-General Kofi Annan emphasized the
traditional objects and purposes of a court with international criminal
jurisdiction when he stated that people all over "the world want to know that
humanity can strike back-that wherever and whenever genocide, war crimes
or other such violations are committed, there is a court before which the
criminal can be held to account; a court that puts an end to a global culture ofimpunity. ' 184 Mary Robinson, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights (UNHCHR)," s also failed to speak out on behalf of the rights of
suspects or accused persons. Instead, she addressed human rights protections
for victims through her statement: "When I am asked what an International
Criminal Court would do, I have a very simple answer. It would fight
impunity., 18 6 Even the major international human rights non-governmental
organizations that addressed the Rome Conference Plenary did not stress
human rights for suspects or accused persons. Kenneth Roth, the Chairperson
of Human Rights Watch (HRW), did not mention human rights in his opening
statement, though Norman Dorsen, the Chairperson of the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights (LCHR), did list adherence "to the highest
international standards of fair trial and due process" as a priority.
187
Though the objects and purposes of the Rome Statute may appear to ring
clearly,183 the human rights of suspects or accused persons are not ignored. It
could still be argued that the objects and purposes cover human rights for
suspects and the accused, particularly because of the broad-sweeping human
rights announced in Rome Statute, articles 21, 55, 66 and 67.
184. UN Secretary-General Declares, supra note 1.
185. Mrs. Robinson was not a delegate at the Rome Conference, but was an invited speaker at
the Plenary, representing the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Summary Record of
the 2dPlenary Meeting, 98-101, U.N. Doe. A/Conf.183/SR.2 (1998).
186. Mrs. Robinson also said: "These are just a few of my concerns. My Office has prepared a
detailed policy paper for circulation at this conference setting out our considered views on a number of
important human rights issues."
187. Mr. Dorsen's speech, delivered on June 18, 1998, is available at
http:/wvv.un.orgticcindex.htm (last visited May 21, 2001). Mr. Roth's speech is available at that same
site and at Human Rights Watch, June 18, 1998, at http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docslicc-ken.htm
(last visited May 15, 2001). Though Human Rights watch, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
and other NGOs may have vociferously advocated on behalf ofsome rights of suspects and the accused,
the interests of society as a whole, and of victims, were seemingly deemed paramount.
188. Most delegations presented opening remarks during the Plenary. The overwhelming
majority of those remarks did not refer to the rights of suspects or of the accused. See generally
Summary Record of the 2nd Plenary Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/SRI2 (1998); Summary Record of
the 3rd Plenary Meeting, U.N. Doe. A/Conf.183/5R.3 (1998); Summary Record of the 4th Plenary
Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/SR14 (1998); Summary Record of the 5th Plenary Meeting, U.N. Doe.
A/Conf.183/SL5 (1998); Summary Record of the 6th Plenary Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/SR.6
(1998); Summary Record of the 7th Plenary Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/SR.7 (1998); Summary
Record of the 8th Plenary Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/SR.8 (1998).
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B. Article 32 of the Vienna Convention: Rules & Application to the Rome
Statute
Article 32 of the Vienna Convention instructs on the permissibility of
reaching outside the four comers of the treaty for purposes of treaty
interpretation. 189 It provides that when the ordinary meaning of a term leads to
ambiguity or would produce a "manifestly absurd or unreasonable result," one
may look to supplementary means of interpretation, including the travaux
preparatoires, and the circumstances of the treaty's conclusion. Thus, per
article 32, it would be appropriate to examine the travaux preparatoires to
help determine whether the right to privacy in the search and seizure context
is an "internationally recognized human right."
Although undefined in the Vienna Convention, travaux preparatoires
generally refer to documentation of the treaty-drafting process and includes
official negotiations among the participating states.190 It arguably includes
documentation based on observations and participation of delegates. 191 As
several critical terms of the treaty are ambiguous and admit of different
constructions, it is permissible, if not necessary, to seek guidance from the
travaux preparatoires. Among those terms which require interpretation are:
"internationally recognized human rights" and "universally recognized human
rights," which will be examined below in the context of the discussion of
"applicable law" under Rome Statute, article 21 .192
VI. "APPLICABLE LAW": ARTICLE 21
A. Article 21: Drafting History
Article 21 enumerates the sources of all ICC law, including not only
substantive and procedural criminal law, but also all "international law" and
189. Vienna Convention, supra note 16, article 32 provides:
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the
meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when
the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
190. B.N. Mehrish, Travaux Preparatoires as an Element in the Interpretation of Treaties, 11
I.J.I.L. 39-88 (1971); Waldock, supra note 170; Ambatielos (Greece v. U.K.), 1952 I.C.J. 28, 45 (July
1); Rights of Nationals of the United States in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.C.J. 176,209 (Aug. 27).
191. Some would argue that the travaux preparatoires can only consist of official
documentation, as otherwise the door would be open for fraudulent assertions of what transpired during
the negotiations. Like news reports, the unofficial documents are unchecked for accuracy by the
delegates. The Final Act of the Rome Conference identified the recording of the Rome Conference
deliberations as follows: "On the basis of the deliberations recorded in the records of the Conference
(AICONF.183/SR.1 to SR.9) and of the Committee of the Whole (A/CONF.183/C.1/SR.1 to SR.42) and
the reports of the Committee of the Whole (AICONF.183/8) and of the Drafting Committee
(A/CONF.183/C.1/L.64, L.65/Rev.1, L.66 and Add.1, L.67/Rev.l, L.68/Rev.2, L.82-L.88 and 91), the
Conference drew up the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court." Rome Statute, supra note 3,
Final Act. However, it is abundantly clear that voluminous written material, and oral discussions were
not memorialized in the conference records referred to in the Final Act. See id.
192. See discussion infra Subsection VI.C.1.
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any other law to be used by the Court in carrying out its judicial functions. 193
Recognizing that international law is dynamic and always evolving, 194 the
Rome Statute drafters noted the impracticality of precisely delineating within
the Rome Statute or its collateral instruments every principle and rule of law
to be used by the Court. They arguably saw a need for flexibility, while
incorporating precision and certainty in identifying the applicable law to be
used. Therefore, a balance was struck between a full exposition and a flexible
approach, resulting in a list of sources of law, identified in articles 21(1) and
21(2), as constrained by article 21(3) in their interpretation and application. 195
The applicable law list in articles 21(1) and 21(2) was not arrived at
lightly. Multiple iterations of the list appeared in the earliest documents relied
upon by those participating in the ICC negotiating process. 196 Those
documents included, but were not limited to, drafts of the Rome Statute, with
numerous proposals tendered formally and informally at various Pre-Rome
Conference meetings and at Rome Conference sessions of the Committee of
the Whole, Working Groups, informal groups, and "informal informal"
groups.
B. Article 21: As Adopted
Article 21 provides that all law to be applied by the Court to resolve all
issues is to be drawn from seven sources of "applicable law" listed within
article 21.197 The sources are listed hierarchically, in a manner reminiscent of
193. It appears that during article 21's drafting, more debate focused on sources of applicable
law as related to resolving substantive criminal law issues than on the sources of applicable law
generally considered to relate to resolving procedural criminal law issues.
194. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 10 ("Nothing in this Part [of the Rome Statute]
shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international
law for purposes other than [the Rome] Statute.").
195. Rome Statute, supra note 3, arts. 21(1)-(3).
196. For a comprehensive analysis of the drafting history of Rome Statute, article 21, see
George E. Edwards, The Sources of Law of the Rome Statute of the Permanent International Criminal
Court: The Tortured Drafting History (forthcoming Autumn 2001) (tracing Rome Statute, article 21
iterations appearing in the 1951 and 1953 ILC Draft Statutes and the 1994 ILC Draft Statute, and in
official and unofficial Rome Conference documents).
197. Rome Statute, supra note 3, article 21 provides, in full:
I. The Court shall apply:
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and
Evidence;
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules
of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed
conflict;
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal
systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would
normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not
inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally recognized
norms and standards.
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous
decisions.
3. The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent
with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction
founded on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour,
language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin,
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the sources of international law contained in article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.198 Thus, the applicable law is to be consulted in
the following order: (1) the Rome Statute itself;199 (2) the Elements of
Crimes;200 (3) the Rules of Procedure;20 (4) "where appropriate, applicable
treaties; '20 2 (5) "where appropriate... the principles and rules of international
law, including the established principles of the international law of armed
conflict" 203(6) "general principles of law derived by the Court from national
laws of legal systems of the world;1 204 and (7) "principles and rules of law as
interpreted" in previous Court decisions. 0 5 The Court is instructed to begin
with the first-listed source and proceed to a lower-ranked source only if the
first source proves inadequate, until the Court identifies the appropriate law to
resolve the issue at hand.
Pursuant to article 21(3), as the ICC interprets and applies "applicable
law" under articles 2 1(1) and 21(2), it must ensure that the law's application
and interpretation is consistent with "internationally recognized human
rights," with no improper adverse distinction drawn. When the Court resolves
a legal issue, it must identify the "applicable law" from the article 21 sources
list before determining the "consistency question." Defining and examining
each of the prospective sources of applicable law contained in articles 21(1)
and 21(2) will facilitate determining which of the sources will be applied by
the Court when faced with a search and seizure privacy right question.
C. Interpretation & Application of "Applicable Law "-Seeking Search and
Seizure Privacy Rights
When the Rome Statute enters into force, questions will arise regarding
search and seizure privacy rights. If a suspect, an accused, or other person
alleges that his right has been violated in the context of an ICC proceeding,
the Court must determine whether the right is expressly or implicitly provided
for, the scope of the right, whether the right has been violated, and an
appropriate remedy.
wealth, birth or other status.
198. Though similarities exist between article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice and article 21 of the Rome Statute, distinctions have been drawn by commentators, including by
Secretary of the Committee of the Whole, Mahnoush H. Arsanjani: "Even though the three categories
were inspired by Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, they are substantially and
structurally different from that article." Arsanjani, supra note 70, at 28.
199. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 21(1)(a).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id., art. 21(l)(b).
203. Id.
204. Id., art. 21(I)(c). That Article further directs the Court to apply "as appropriate, the
national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those
principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally recognized
norms and standards."
205. Id., art. 21(2). Presumably, the principles and rules applied under article 21(2) in any
given prosecution will be principles and rules that the Court had previously applied per article 21 in
earlier proceedings.
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In resolving legal questions that arise, such as the existence and scope of
a right under the ICC, the Court will turn to article 21 for direction on
identifying the specific rules of law needed to resolve the issue.20 6 If the Rome
Statute, as the first listed source, does not provide an appropriate rule, the
Court will examine, in descending order, the remaining applicable sources of
law under article 21 in search of a governing rule or principle. If the Court
finds the search and seizure right to privacy incorporated into the Rome
Statute itself, as this Article contends it should, the Court would then not need
to examine the remaining six sources of applicable law. However, it is
instructive, particularly should the Court not find the search and seizure
privacy right in the Rome Statute itself, to examine the remaining six sources
of applicable law in search of the right. This Article concludes that the search
and seizure privacy right can and should be found in each of the seven sources
of applicable law: the Rome Statute; the ICC Elements of Crimes; the ICC
Rules of Procedure; applicable treaties; principles and rules of international
law; general principles of law derived from national law of legal systems of
the world; and principles and rules of law as interpreted in prior decisions.
1. Source ofApplicable Law # 1: Rome Statute, Article 21(1)(a)
Those who oppose a finding of the search and seizure right to privacy in
the Rome Statute or collateral instruments may argue (1) that the right does
not exist within the ICC framework since that right is not expressly provided
for in the Rome Statute or other collateral instruments; (2) that a laundry list
of rights is expressly provided for in the Statute, and this right is not included
(the inclusio unius est exclusio alterius argument); and (3) that the express
right was deliberately deleted from the Final Draft Statute during the Rome
Conference.20 7
206. Rome Statute, article 21 does not delineate the actual rules or principles that will serve as
the basis of a substantive judgement or that govern a particular legal dispute. Article 21 merely directs
the Court where to look for the relevant substantive or procedural principle or rule. ASSOCIATION
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT P-NAL, supra note 72, at 36-38.
207. The drafters could have expressly incorporated the search and seizure privacy right either
generally, or in detail, directly into the Rome Statute or any of the collateral instruments. If the drafters'
rationale for excluding the right was the difficulty in defining it, they could have chosen: to define or
elaborate the right in a collateral instrument; to assign the Preparatory Commission the task of defining
the right (as that body was charged with elaborating confidentiality privileges), Rome Statute, supra
note 3, art. 69(5); to attach a qualifier to aid in the definition (as it did with the term "gender"), id., art.
7(3); to relegate defining the term to the treaty States Parties' amendment process or to a Review
Conference (as it did with the crime of aggression), id., arts. 5(2), 121, 123; or to attach a qualifier to
direct the Court as to which body of law to look for a definition (for example, as it did with "applicable
law"), id., art. 21.
The drafters could have appropriately included the search and seizure privacy right in the rights
of the accused section, which is where it rested for years. (E.g., id., art. 67). It could have been
appropriately placed in the section outlining the rights of persons during an investigation, as searches
and seizures are investigative tools used by law enforcement to ferret out crime and to obtain
incriminatory evidence. (E.g., id., art. 55). Search and seizure provisions could have been enumerated to
cover the suspects, non-suspects, the accused and innocent third parties who are implicated through an
objectionable search or seizure. The provision could have been expressly incorporated directly into the
judicial assistance and cooperation section, which already touches on search and seizure. Rome Statute,
supra note 3, Part IX. Indeed, as human rights provisions are scattered throughout the Rome Statute, the
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These arguments are not persuasive. 20 8 First, the absence of an express
reference has been insufficient to prevent other international tribunals from
enforcing the right to privacy in the search and seizure context. For example,
both the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have interpreted and
applied the right in their cases, even though the right is not expressly
mentioned in their respective statutes.20 9 Second, the statutes and rules of the
two ad hoe tribunals cover a laundry list of rights, in the same manner as the
Rome Statute (though the rights may not be co-extensive), and the Court may
follow the lead of the other tribunals in expansively reading the human rights
provisions. 210 The inclusio unius est exclusio alterius argument does not
control. Third, though the privacy rights clause was deleted during the Rome
Statute final negotiations, some delegations articulated support for the deletion
on the grounds that privacy rights were covered elsewhere in the Rome
Statute, including in Rome Statute, Part IX.211 Although this Article
demonstrates that Part IX does not expressly provide for the search and
seizure privacy right, 212 and though it is possible that the ICC will reject the
right under an inclusio unius est exclusio alterius argument, the right can still
be found, implicitly, in the Rome Statute itself and in other collateral
instruments.
Perhaps the most compelling argument favoring the existence of a
search and seizure privacy right under the Rome Statute is that the right is an
"internationally recognized human right," which must be enforced by the
Court because Rome Statute, article 21(3) mandates the Court to apply all law
"consistent with internationally recognized human rights." Thus, all
"internationally recognized human rights" relevant to the Court's functioning
must be enforced.213 Since the search and seizure right to privacy is relevant to
the right to a fair trial, such privacy rights must be enforced.
a. "Applicable Law" and "Consistent with Internationally
Recognized Human Rights"
Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute calls for the Court, as it applies and
interprets all applicable law, to ensure that that law is "consistent with
right to search and seizure privacy could have been expressly included virtually anywhere in the Rome
Statute or its collateral instruments.
208. See Gallant, supra note 7, at 706-10 (comprehensively addressing these and other
arguments).
209. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Mucic, Case No. IT-96-21, Decision on the Tendering of
Prosecution Exhibits 104-108 (Trial Chamber, Nov. 16, 1998; Feb. 9, 1998), 15 (Nov. 16, 1998).
210. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 7 CRIM. L.F. no. 1 (1996);
Prosecutor v. Mucic, Case No. IT-96-21, Decision on the Tendering of Prosecution Exhibits 104-108
(Trial Chamber, Nov. 16, 1998; Feb. 9, 1998).
211. See discussion infra Subsections IV.B.1 (discussing deletion of express search and seizure
privacy right provision from the Rome Statute).
212. See generally supra Section IV.C (discussing Rome Statute, Part IX).
213. See Gallant, supra note 7, at 707.
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internationally recognized human rights." The Rome Statute drafters need not
have expressly required consistency of applicable law with human rights.
Consistency with human rights would have been presumed given the human
rights obligations attached to the Rome Statute's status as a U.N.-sanctioned
international treaty (replete with express general and specific human rights
provisions) and the ICC's status as an inter-governmental organization (with
human rights obligations operating by virtue of that status). However, given
the existence of the consistency requirement, it is necessary to explore what
constitutes "internationally recognized human rights." Given that all aspects
of the Court and its functioning must be consistent with internationally
recognized human rights, all sources of applicable ICC law must likewise be
consistent. As the search and seizure right to privacy is an internationally
recognized human right, each source of applicable law must either implicitly
or expressly provide for the right, or not implicitly or expressly deny the right.
As the right exists in the ICC framework, all ICC law must safeguard it.
b. What Are "Internationally Recognized Human Rights"?
The Rome Statute does not define "internationally recognized human
rights" for purposes of determining whether the applicable law is consistent,
or at all, and does not define "consistent., 214 However, one can still garner the
meaning from (i) the plain meaning of the term; (ii) other Rome Statute terms,
such as those appearing in the definition of "persecution" in the crimes against
humanity context; and (iii) denotation.
(i) Plain Meaning-"Internationally Recognized Human
Rights"
It is significant that the drafters chose "internationally recognized human
rights" with which ICC law must be consistent, rather than any other of the
seemingly limitless options, when it added the express consistency
requirement late in the negotiating stages.215
For example, it would not have been illogical for the drafters to have
selected one of numerous phrases used in other international instruments 216 or
in the jurisprudence of other international tribunals, 217 or used elsewhere
214. In the context of human rights treaties, one would think that the consistency requirement
would call for a generous interpretation of "intemationally recognized human rights."
215. The consistency requirement was motivated in part to limit human rights coverage to those
that are "recognized," in an attempt to exclude safeguarding of certain rights, such as sexuality, gender,
and procreation rights. See discussion supra note 88 (backfiring of crimes against humanity limiting
language).
216. For example, the drafters might have required consistency with human rights (or
international human rights) contained in either "the major" or specifically enumerated international or
regional human rights instruments (for example, the UDHR, the ICCPR, or the European Convention on
Human Rights), or in a list of international instruments similar to that annexed to the 1994 ILC Draft
Statute and that had been proposed to be incorporated into the Rome Statute.
217. For example, the ICTY has used the term "internationally recognized standards of
fundamental human rights." Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 7 CRIM. L.F. 139 (1996), 25
(citing 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 60, at 175) (referring to "international human rights standards"
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within the U.N. System.218 Indeed, they might have chosen phrases used to
express comparable concepts conveyed elsewhere within the Rome Statute
itself.219 The drafters might have required that ICC "applicable law" be
consistent with international human rights; 220 international human rights
law; 221  internationally protected human rights; 222  or, internationally
recognized and protected human rights. 223 Though the phrase as chosen was
providing a "general standard for fair trial and due process" and "international standards of fair trial and
due process" to, inter alia, set a standard for an international criminal court). The tribunal stated that
ICTY Statute, Article 21 "provides minimum judicial guarantees to which all defendants are entitled and
reflects the internationally recognized standard of due process set forth in Article 14 of the [ICCPR]. In
fact, the Statute provides greater rights than the ICCPR by extending judicial guarantees to the pre-trial
stage of the investigation." Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 7 CRIM. L.F. 139, (1996), at para.
25.
218. The term chosen could have been "internationally recognized (and/or protected) human
rights norms (and/or standards)," and would have been consistent with the words of Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who stated the following, regarding the ICTY, in his Report to the U.N. Security
Council appending what would become the ICTY Statute:
It is axiomatic that the [ICTY] must fully respect internationally recognized standards
regarding the rights of the accused at all stages of its proceedings. In the view of the
Secretary-General, such internationally recognized standards are, in particular, contained
in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993),
para. 106, U.N. Doc. S/25704, May 3, 1993, and Corrigendum S/25704/Corr.1, July 30, 1993, reprinted
in 2 MORRIs & SCHARF, supra note 60, at 3, 23 (footnote omitted).
219. The drafters might have called for consistency with: "fundamental rights" in accordance
with (or not contrary to) international law as used in the definition of "persecution" under Rome Statute,
article 7(2)(g). See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 7(2)(g): "Persecution' means the intentional and
severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the
group or collectivity." The drafters used the term "universally recognized as impermissible under
international law" when referring to persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity as an
element of a crime against humanity. Id., art. 7(l)(h); see also Draft Elements of Crimes, supra note 5,
art. 7(1)(h) (discussing persecution under crimes against humanity). See generally Subsection
VI.C.l.b.ii, infra (discussing persecution under crimes against humanity).
220. Human Rights Watch, in referring to the Rome Statute, article 21(l)(c) "general principles
of law" source of applicable law uses the term "international human rights" to refer to the "international
law and recognized norms and standards" with which the "general principles of law derived by the Court
from national law of legal systems of the world" must be consistent. Furthermore, Human Rights Watch
acknowledges that the Rome Statute article 21(3) "law" requires consistency with "internationally
recognized human rights," rather than with "international human rights," the consistency with which is
required for article 21(l)(c) "general principles." This suggests a perceived distinction between
"international human rights" and "internationally recognized human rights," with each term containing a
different set of rights. Human Rights Watch, Summary of the Key Provisions of the ICC Statute (Sept.
1998), at http:/www.hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/icc-statute.htm (last visited May 21, 2001).
221. "International human rights law" is the term used by Human Rights Watch in its comment
on the Consolidated Final Draft Statute. Human Rights Watch, Justice in the Balance, supra note 73.
Human Rights Watch noted the need for the Court to "observe the highest standards of international
human rights law," and it commented on the duty of the Court to operate without adverse distinction on
grounds "as commonly defined by international human rights law." Id. (citing ICCPR, supra note 25,
art. 26, and calling for retention of the consistency clause as the clause, which was added during the
March/April 1998 Preparatory Committee Meeting, "enhances the current draft statute").
222. "Internationally protected human rights" is the term used in ICTY jurisprudence. See
Prosecutor v. Mucic, Case No. IT-96-21, Decision on the Tendering of Prosecution Exhibits 104-108
(Trial Chamber, Nov. 16, 1998; Feb. 9, 1998). This phrase is also used in the title but not the text of
ICTR Rule 95. Professor Gallant uses the two terms interchangeably. See, e.g., Gallant, supra note 7, at
708.
223. This conjunctive version would resolve any disputes regarding the relationship between
the definitions of "protected" versus "recognized."
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carefully crafted,22a in the first instance, we look at its ordinary meaning when
seeking to interpret it,225 even when faced with knowledge that the drafters
may have intended a special meaning, that may or may not be accurately
reflected by other language they might have chosen.
226
The drafters selected "internationally recognized human rights." The
questions one must ask, pursuant to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, include: Objectively, what does the term "internationally recognized
human rights" mean (or, does the term admit of more than one interpretation)?
Subjectively, what did the drafters intend for the term "internationally
recognized human rights" to mean (if the term is ambiguous or unclear on its
face)? Teleologically, how will the Court interpret the term "internationally
recognized human rights" in light of the object and purpose of the Rome
Statute (with an object and purpose being to bring perpetrators to justice)?
Will the Court determine that the right to privacy is an "internationally
recognized human right 227 and fully enforce that right?
In accordance with article 31 of the Vienna Convention, one looks
objectively to the ordinary, plain meaning of "internationally recognized
human rights." The obvious first point of analysis begs the question-can a
reasonable, principled distinction be drawn between "internationally
224. See Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 12th Meeting, 23 June 1998, 52,
U.N. Doc A/Conf.183/C.I/SR.12 (1998) (declaring that article 21(3) "was a consensus text [and]
required that the law applied should be consistent with certain internationally recognized values").
225. Vienna Convention, supra note 16, art. 31. Professors Steiner and Alston offer words of
caution about the international tribunals (such as the Court) that will be faced with interpreting the
ordinary or plain meaning of treaties such as the Rome Statute. They state:
Reliance upon literal construction or "strict" interpretation may however be an attractive
method or technique to an international tribunal that is sensitive to its weak political
foundation. It may be tempted to take refuge in the position that its decision is the
ineluctable outcome of the drafter's intention expressed in clear text, and not a choice
arrived at on the basis of the tribunal's understanding of policy considerations or relevant
principles that may resolve a dispute over interpretation. Reliance on legislative history
or travaux preparatoires can achieve the same result of placing responsibility on the
drafters. The charge of "judicial legislation" evokes strong reactions in the United States;
it inevitably influences judges of international tribunals and heightens the temptation to
take refuge in the dictionary.
HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS,
MORALS 109-10 (2d ed. 2000).
226. The drafters might have required consistency with human rights (or international human
rights) as provided under customary international law or human rights (or international human rights) as
provided under general principles of law, with a reference to Article 38 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice.
Consistency could have been required with human rights (or international human rights) norms
(and/or standards); with "human rights," or, simply with "rights" (as contained in the Rome Statute,
article 54 requirement that the Prosecution must "[flully respect the rights of persons arising under [the
Rome] Statute"). Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 54(l)(c).
Consistency could also have been required with "fundamental human rights, or minimum
internationally acceptable standards" (as suggested during the 1996 Prep Comm regarding exclusionary
rule standards), see 1 Report of the Preparatory Committee, supra, note 68, para. 289, or with "basic
rights." The drafters might have called for consistency with universal human rights; or universally
protected human rights; or a category that is "universally recognized." See Rome Statute, supra note 3,
art. 7(l)(h) (referring to persecution); see also discussion infra at Subsection VI.C.l.b.ii.
227. Irrespective of whether the Rome Statute drafters' word choice was random, the result of
careful and deliberate negotiated compromise, an attempt to obfuscate the meaning, or the product of
word games, the treaty term interpretation rules of the Vienna Convention may apply.
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recognized human rights" and "international human rights" absent the
descriptive "recognized?, 228 The qualifier could easily have been omitted, or
substituted with another term. This leads to dual categorization in the first
instance: (1) international human rights (unqualified); and (2) internationally
recognized human rights (qualified by "recognized"). The issue is the
significance of the descriptive "recognized." Logically, a descriptive term
such as "recognized" would designate "internationally recognized human
rights" as a subset of "international human rights," with the qualifier serving
to narrow the field. This would suggest that not all international human rights
are "recognized," or perhaps that not all human rights are "internationally
recognized," and that in the case of the Rome Statute, consistency would be
required only with those rights falling within the subset of internationally
"recognized" human rights. Thus, the term "recognized" would limit the field
of international human rights relevant to the article 21(3) consistency
finding.229 In any event, the term "internationally recognized human rights"
arguably can admit of more than one interpretation.
However, article 31 of the Vienna Convention further instructs us to
look at the ordinary meaning in the context of the treaty term-
"internationally recognized human rights." In assessing the context, we should
consider the Rome Statute itself, and its collateral instruments (including the
Final Act, the Draft Rules of Procedure, and the Draft Elements of Crimes).
Unfortunately, neither the Rome Statute nor the collateral instruments defines
"internationally recognized human rights," nor speaks directly to the meaning
to be given to "internationally recognized human rights."
(ii) Guidance from Crimes Against Humanity-Persecution
The Rome Statute definition of "persecution" as a "crime against
humanity" illuminates how "internationally recognized human rights" under
article 21(3) should be or should not be properly defined. Article 7(l)(h)
renders as a crime against humanity "[p]ersecution against any identifiable
group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious,
gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally
recognized as impermissible under international law."230 The corresponding
228. As I discern no non-grammatical reason for distinguishing the adverb "internationally"
from the adjective "international," this Article will not explore that distinction further, except to say that
both terms would seem to speak to an identical relationship between a particular right and the global
community.
229. The quantity of "recognized" rights would necessarily be smaller than the quantity of
"international human rights," as otherwise there would be no reason to add the qualifier "recognized."
Similar arguments can be made regarding the adverbial qualifier "internationally," in which case we
would attempt to ascertain a principled distinction between "internationally recognized human rights"
and "recognized human rights" and/or "human rights" without the international qualifier.
230. The chapeau to Article 7 requires that to be actionable, the persecution must be
"committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
knowledge of the attack." Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 7(1); see also Draft Elements of Crimes,
supra note 5, art. 7(1)(h) (discussing persecution under crimes against humanity).
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provision of the Draft Elements of Crimes provides, as an element: "The
perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law, one or more
persons of fundamental rights. 231
Article 7(l)(h) and Draft Elements, article 7(1)(h)(3), in reciting a list of
anti-discrimination groups or collectivities, might easily have described the
groups or collectivities as "internationally recognized" (as in article 21(3))
rather than as "universally recognized.",!32 This suggests that "universally
recognized" differs from "internationally recognized," and that in fact
"universally recognized" reflects a more select group than "internationally
recognized," and that proof of "universally recognized" would have a higher
threshold than proof for "internationally recognized., 233 Though these words
may not shed light on the precise meaning of "internationally recognized" or
"universally recognized," it is appreciated that "internationally recognized" is
perhaps not to be defined as "universally recognized," and that "universally
recognized" is the narrower of the two categories.2 34 Furthermore, as regards
Draft Elements, article 7(l)(h), various delegations supported a U.S. proposal
231. The corresponding Draft Elements of Crimes, supra note 5, article 7(1) (h) ("Crime
against humanity of persecution") provides, in relevant part:
1. The perpetrator severely deprived, contrary to international law, one or more
persons of fimdamental rights.
2. The perpetrator targeted such person or persons by reason of the identity of a
group or collectivity or targeted the group or collectivity as such.
3. Such targeting was based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural,
religious, gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, of the Statute, or other grounds that
are universally recognized as impermissible under international law.
232. The drafters of the Rome Statute resisted an open-ended list of grounds for the definition
of persecution, on the basis that such a list would "be too imprecise and would violate the principle of
legality, since the statute would be an instrument of criminal law and not a declaratory human rights
instrument." Robinson, supra note 6, at 54. Robinson continues:
A compromise was eventually reached by including an open-ended, but very high-
threshold provision, which refers to "other grounds that are universally recognized as
impermissible under international law." Thus, if any other prohibited grounds of
discrimination become clearly established in international law, they can automatically be
incorporated without amending the statute. Universal recognition, however, is a very high
threshold; consequently, amendment of the statute to reflect future developments remains
a possibility.
Id. at 54. An April 2000 circulated draft of the Draft Elements of Crimes provided, as regards article
7(l)(e), a proposed rle: "The gravity of the conduct was such that it was in violation of fundamental
rules of international law and the accused was aware of such conduct." Elements of Crimes (Draft),
Annex 11, Addendum, U.N. Doc. PCNICCI2000IL.I1Rev.l/Add. 2 (2000). A footnote added to that
paragraph provided: "Some delegations want to add the concept of universal recognition to qualify
'fundamental rules of international law."' Id.
During Rome Statute negotiations, the term "customary international law" had been proposed in
lieu of the adopted "universally recognized" in the persecution provision (and in the provision related to
imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty under Rome Statute, supra note 3, article
7(l)(e)), as a way of distinguishing crimes against humanity from "ordinary" human rights violations.
233. Robinson, supra note 6, at 54 (discussing the "high threshold" for "universal").
234. Human Rights Watch notes that "Another controversial inclusion is persecution on 'other
grounds' beyond those specified in the statute, but the confusing limitation to those 'universally
recognized' grounds is regrettable." Human Rights Watch, supra note 220. However, rather than
creating confusion, this is yet another instance in which the drafters unsuccessfully attempted to limit
human rights coverage by including the broad "other grounds" language, which would include, for
example, the right to be free from discrimination based on sexual orientation, which is an
"internationally recognized" ground.
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(which was rejected) to modify "fundamental human rights" with the term
"universally," which would have raised the threshold and decreased the
category of rights that would fall within its ambit,23' and again which would
illustrate the force of the qualifier "universal."
(iii) Denotation- "Internationally Recognized Human
Rights"
Denotation is important in understanding the ordinary meaning of a
treaty term.236 "Universally" pertains to the world and a universal human right
is relevant in all world societies.237 "Internationally" suggests a subset of the
world, and refers to the right vis-i-vis a combination of some but perhaps not
all states. 238 All "universally recognized human rights" would necessarily be
"internationally recognized," whereas the converse may not be true-some
"internationally recognized human rights" may not be "universally
recognized., 239 Thus, "universally recognized human rights" would be a
smaller category of rights than "internationally recognized human rights,"
with the former being a subset of the latter.240
Though the origin of the phrase "internationally recognized human
rights" is unclear from the travaux preparatoires, an early iteration of the
Rome Statute proposed that all laws applied by the ICC be consistent with,,,24124
internationally protected human rights" as used in the ICTY Statute.2 42 Is
235. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch Commentary--Third Preparatory
Commission Meeting on the International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Evidence
and Procedure (Nov. 1999), available at http://www.hrw.org/eampaigns/ice/prepeom-nov99.htm (last
visited May 21, 2001) (noting that the U.S. proposal regarding "Article 7(1)(h)(3) raises the threshold
from 'deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law,' in Article 7(2)(g) to deprivation
of 'fundamental rights universally recognized under international law.' Universal recognition, which
appears in the [Rome] Statute in relation to the grounds for persecution, is an extremely high
threshold.") (emphasis in original).
236. See, e.g., ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PtNAL, supra note 72 (referring to
dictionary meaning to understand ICC Draft Statute treaty terms).
237. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1535 (6th ed. 1990) defines "universal" as: "Having relation
to the whole or an entirety; pertaining to all without exception; a term more extensive than 'general,'
which latter may admit of exceptions."
238. See, e.g., id., at 816.
239. "Internationally recognized human rights" might include rights that are "recognized"
regionally or by another subset of nations, but not recognized by the entire body of nations.
240. Furthermore, considering the nature of the Rome Statute and the collateral instruments, it
is reasonable to conclude that an interpretation of "internationally recognized human rights" would be
broad, rather than narrow, irrespective of whose rights are in question. Or, some would argue that such
an interpretation should be narrow, a position that might be supported by the Rome Conference's
deletion of the express reference to the right to privacy in the Rome Statute. An explanation for this,
going outside the intrinsic instruments, is that the drafters sought to limit the legal significance of the
term "gender." So, in an attempt to limit the category of rights, they insisted on "universally recognized"
versus rights that may be only "internationally recognized."
241. For example, the Zutphen Draft Statute mentioned the term "internationally protected
human rights" among other terms in a compilation of proposals related to the admissibility or the
exclusion of evidence. Zutphen Draft Statute, supra note 68, art. 62[44][69](5). The compilation of
proposed terms was accompanied by a footnote that provided, in part:
It was felt that it would be better to refer to "rules ofinternational law" than to single out
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, although this will of course be
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there a distinction between "internationally recognized human rights" and
"internationally protected human rights?" If the two terms designate different
categories of human rights, what rights fall into each category? Scholars and
jurists oft consider the two phrases and other similar phrases fungible and use
them interchangeably, even within the context a particular writing.
2 4 3
However, if they were to be deemed different, would one be a subset of the
other?
Arguably, "internationally protected human rights" is a subset of
"internationally recognized human rights." All rights that are "recognized"
internationally may not be appropriately or adequately "protected," 2" with
"protected rights" being those that are "enforced," and "recognized rights"
being either merely "enforceable" or possibly "unenforced." If this distinction
holds, along with the distinction represented by adding "recognized" to the
phrase "international human rights," one can see a clear relationship. 45
"International human rights" would represent an exhaustive set of
human rights, including all rights that are recognized and/or protected.
246
"Internationally recognized human rights" would be a subset of "international
human rights" and would consist of all human rights "recognized" by either
the international community as a whole, or by a subset of the international
community (perhaps in the form of the ICC States Parties or signatories.) 247 In
the main focus of this rule. The formula "internationally protected human rights" is
intended to cover non-treaty standards as well and would therefore be broader than
"international law."
Id., at n.214.
242. See ICTY, rule 95, supra note 34.
243. For example, Professor Gallant, in discussing the omission of the express right to privacy
from the Rome Statute and arguments that proponents and opponents would make regarding the implicit
coverage of the right to privacy within the ICC regime, fungibly uses the terms "internationally
recognized human right" and "internationally protected human right," even within the same paragraph.
See, e.g., Gallant, supra note 7, at 708. Not only are those two terms used interchangeably, but also
similar terms are varied. Another commentator, advocating for a "well-defined human right" to a healthy
environment, refers interchangeably to a right to a healthy environment and to other rights he argues are
in the same category in terms of a "recognized international human right," a "universal right," a "human
right," and an "established international human right"--that are "universal and fundamental in nature, as
human rights are understood to be." John Lee, The Underlying Legal Theory to Support a Well-Defined
Human Right to a Healthy Environment as a Principle of Customary International Law, 25 CoLUM. J.
ENvTL. L. 283, 284 (2000). The author also refers to the right to a healthy environment as a "recognized
principle of international human rights law" and as an "internationally-recognized human right." Id. at
284, 2S7. Though the traveaux preparatiores may be construed to suggest that no legally cognizable
distinction exists between the terms, it is necessary to examine the terms pursuant to treaty interpretation
rules.
244. But, the lack of a right's enforcement equals the unrealization and not the non-existence of
that right.
245. Of course there could be different gradations of "recognition."
246. In fact, "international human rights" could conceivably include rights that are neither
recognized nor protected, or that might not even be extant. A right may be non-positive, and hence need
not be declared or written on paper in order for the right to exist.
247. Professor Gallant argues that "The great internationally recognized rights in the ICCPR,
freedom of expression, religion, conscience, assembly and association are at the core of what is to be
protected by the phrase 'internationally recognized human rights."' See Gallant, supra note 7, at 703
(pointing out that "protection from discrimination on the basis of 'religion or belief, political or other
opinion' is expressly included" in the equal protection clause, "and can be read as an exemplification of
the types of substantive rights to be protected." Id). Professor Gallant may be correct. However, simply
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turn, "internationally protected human rights" would be a subset of
"internationally recognized human rights." This would envision that some
rights might be "recognized," but for various reasons (for example, lawful or
unlawful derogations) might not be "protected" (for example, are constantly
violated, or perhaps have no positive laws prohibiting violations of the right).
A schematic could take the form of three circles, one inside the other,
with the largest outermost circle representing "international human rights," the
middle circle representing "internationally recognized human rights," and the
innermost circle representing "internationally protected human rights."
If that is so, into which category would the search and seizure right to
privacy fall? If the right falls into the "internationally recognized human rights
category" or into its subset "internationally protected human rights," then the
right would be deemed covered by the Rome Statute. If the right falls within
the "international human rights" circle, but not within one or both of the two
inner circles, the right may not be covered by the Rome Statute. If the "right"
falls outside all three circles, then it perhaps would not be a right at all, and
would perhaps not be covered by the treaty.
Another possibility is that "protected" equals "recognized," as those
terms are used interchangeably in human rights vernacular, and would apply
equally, irrespective of whether the rights were "enforced" or merely
"enforceable" (or "unenforced"). One would still be faced with a duality, with
those two terms being on one side, and with "international human rights" on
the other, and an analysis would revert to distinguishing between
"international human rights" versus "internationally recognized/protected
human rights." If no such reasonable distinction can be drawn, and if indeed
the full range of human rights in the international arena (including
"internationally recognized human rights," and "internationally protected
human rights") is captured by the phrase "international human rights," then all
human rights, irrespective of moniker, would be covered by the Rome Statute.
What about the Rome Statute's use of the term "universal?" If we
consider that the drafters could have chosen the term "universal" or
"universally" to describe either recognized or protected human rights (as it
chose "universally" regarding persecution and crimes against humanity in
article 7(h), instead of using the term "internationally"), the meaning of article
21(3) might be different. "Universal" human rights would represent a set of
rights less substantial than "international" human rights, and "universal"
would fall on the schematic as a circle within the international human rights
circle, and would necessarily either be greater than or less than the circle(s)
representing "internationally recognized human rights" or "internationally
protected human rights. 248
because expression, religion, conscience, assembly and association are "internationally recognized" in
the ICCPR does not mean that they are necessarily "recognized" in the Rome Statute. One might argue
that there would be no need for the phrase "internationally recognized human rights," as human rights
would be all encompassing, and would include all expressly enumerated rights as well as any that are
not mentioned.
248. "Universal" would not likely be held to be co-extensive with "internationally recognized"
or "internationally protected," unless all three of the terms were deemed co-extensive with "international
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It might be instructive to toss into the mix other points of comparison
that may shed some light on the meaning of "internationally recognized
human rights." For example, are "internationally recognized human rights"
more or less inclusive than rights that are deemed to have risen to the level of
customary international law, or than rights that are considered general
principles of law (as per article 38 of the ICJ Statute)? If the drafters had
intended "internationally recognized human rights" to equal "customary
international law," "customary rights," or "general principles of law derived
from national laws," presumably, the drafters would have used that language
in the Rome Statute. But they did not.249 Where would customary
international human rights law and general principles of human rights law fit
in the schematic?
Perhaps it would be most appropriate to follow the lead of the United
Nations in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, which provides
that "human rights are universal. 250 If the search and seizure privacy right
exists, it is inherently universal. It is necessarily global, international,
regional, recognized, protected, guaranteed, and enforceable. Thus, the
appropriate question is not whether the search and seizure privacy right is
covered by the Rome Statute. The appropriate question is whether the search
and seizure right to privacy is indeed a right, as "rights" fall within the
language of the Rome Statute and are to be enforced via the article 21(3)
consistency clause. To determine whether the search and seizure privacy right
is indeed a right, one must explore the Court's "applicable law," which is
where the Court will look for its rights determinations, and ask whether the
right is found in subsequently listed applicable law sources under Rome
Statute, article 2 1.251
human rights," in which case all circles would collapse (or expand) into one.
249. Professor Bassiouni argues that the right to privacy is a general principle of law and an
"internationally recognized human right." See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of
Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in
National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235 (1993).
250. World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, art
1.5, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.157/23 (1993) [hereinafter Vienna Declaration]. The Vienna
Declaration persuasively declares that "All human rights are universal, indivisible, inter-dependent, and
inter-related." Id. This is so, despite claims that the Vienna Declaration carves out a cultural relativism
exception to universalism, for example, in its following language: "While the significance of national
and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in
mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and
protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms." Id. art. 5. Though a discussion of the human rights
universalism versus relativism debate is beyond the scope of this Article, it is important to note that
consensus does not exist on the scope, content, and reach of human rights around the globe. See, e.g.,
Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 589, 656 (1996) (contending that
"[e]very culture will have its distinctive ways of formulating and supporting human rights," and that
"[e]very society can learn from other societies more effective ways to implement human rights"); see
also Hope Lewis, Between Ima and "Female Genital Mutilation": Feminist Human Rights Discourse
and the Cultural Divide, 8 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 1, 17-20 (1995) (discussing the universalism versus
cultural relativism debate in the human rights field).
251. A similar framework for argument may be used regarding other rights, including
environmental "rights" (for example, when the Court is faced with environmental degradation as an
instrument or tool of genocide, a war crime, or a crime against humanity), or sexuality rights (where
sexual minorities are persecuted, and the issue raised is whether the elements of crimes against humanity
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2. Source of Applicable Law # 2: Elements of Crimes-Rome Statute,
Article 21(1) (a)
The Elements of Crimes are a Rome Statute source of law because
Rome Statute, article 21(l)(a) provides that the Court "shall appy" the
Elements of Crimes. Furthermore, Rome Statute, article 9 provides that the
Elements of Crimes "shall assist the Court in the interpretation and application
of articles 6, 7 and 8," which are the three articles that outline the three
principal crimes for which the Court has jurisdiction: (1) genocide; (2) crimes
against humanity; and (3) war crimes.25 2 The Elements of Crimes, 25 3 as a
source of law and as a means of clarifying the scope of the Rome Statute
crimes, "shall be consistent with [the Rome] Statute., 254 Thus, as part of the
body of law that the Court must interpret and apply, and as a means to assist
the Court, the Elements of Crimes and their application and interpretation
must be consistent with the entire Rome Statute, which includes article 21(3),
requiring consistency with internationally recognized human rights.
255
However, the Elements of Crimes are apposite to a search and seizure right to
privacy for other reasons.
Though the Draft Elements of Crimes may appear to be silent on the
question of the right to privacy in the context of searches and seizures, the
Draft Elements of Crimes contain language that will aid the Court in
interpreting the terms of the Rome Statute, even as regards privacy rights. In
particular, the Court, for aid in determining whether the right to privacy is an
"internationally recognized human right," may interpret the Elements of
Crimes associated with Rome Statute, article 7(1)(h) ("or other grounds that
are universally recognized as impermissible under international law"),
associated with article 7(2)(g) ("fundamental rights contrary to international
are met), considering the definition in Rome Statute, article 7(h). See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art.
7(h).
252. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 5(1)(a)-(c). Rome Statute, supra note 3, article 5(l)(d)
and article 5(2) provide that the Court has jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, but the Court "shall
exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles
121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise
jurisdiction with respect to this crime."
253. The Draft Elements of Crimes was finalized on July 6, 2000. See Draft Elements of
Crimes, supra note 5.
254. Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 9(3).
255. See id., art. 21(3). Tensions exist between the Elements of Crimes as a source of law and
the Elements of Crimes existing to assist the Court in interpreting Rome Statute, articles 6, 7, and 8. If
the Elemenis of Crimes are a source of law, then they would be expected to bind the Court, pursuant to
Article 21, which outlines the Rome Statute's "applicable law." However, if the Elements of Crimes are
merely to "assist" the Court in interpreting and applying articles 6, 7, and 8, then arguably the Elements
of Crimes are merely persuasive authority for the Court, and not binding. This inconsistency, which may
exist because of the piecemeal manner in which the Rome Statute was spliced together, does not
undermine the contention that the Court must enforce the search and seizure right to privacy. Article
9(3) requires that the Elements of Crimes be consistent with the Rome Statute, and the Rome Statute
requires consistency with internationally recognized human rights. Because the search and seizure right
to privacy is an internationally recognized human right, article 9 (and hence the Elements of Crimes)
must not be inconsistent with the search and seizure right to privacy.
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law"), and associated with other similar language in various provisions of the
Rome Statute.256
3. Source of Applicable Law # 3: Rules of Procedure and Evidence-
Rome Statute, Article 21(1)(a)
Though the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Rules of Procedure) are
well-suited for incorporating search and seizure privacy right provisions given
the absence of such express provisions in the Rome Statute, the Draft Rules of
Procedure finalized on June 30, 2000 are silent on such rights, except as
concerns the communication privilege.
257
Since the Rules of Procedure are intended to support and underpin the
Rome Statute,258 they are to be consistent with the treaty. Thus, as part of the
body of law to be interpreted and applied, the Rules of Procedure, and any
amendments thereto or any provisional rules, and their application and
interpretation, must be consistent with the entire Rome Statute, which includes
article 21(3), requiring consistency with internationally recognized human
rights?2 9 However, this is not all that renders the Rules apposite to the search
and seizure right to privacy.
The Rules are relevant because they are still in Draft form, and can be
amended to include an express reference to the search and seizure right to
privacy. Even if such amendments are not made to the Draft Rules during the
remaining Preparatory Commission sessions, once the Preparatory
Commission disbands and the Court comes into being, the Assembly of States
Parties can amend the Draft Rules before adopting them, or adopt different
rules. Just as the communication privilege was expressly provided for in the
Draft Rules of Procedure, the general search and seizure right to privacy can
likewise be expressly safeguarded.260 Even if the search and seizure privacy
256. See generally, discussion, supra Subsection VI.C.l.
257. See supra, note 20 (discussing Draft Rules ofProcedure provision on privilege).
258. The Working Group on Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Preparatory Commission
identified objectives of the Rules of Procedure:
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence are an instrument for the application of the
[Rome] Statute, to which they are subordinate in all cases. In elaborating the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence, care has been taken to avoid rephrasing and, to the extent
possible, repeating the provisions of the [Rome] Statute. Direct references to the [Rome]
Statute have been included in the Rules, where appropriate, in order to emphasize the
relationship between the Rules and the [Rome] Statute, as provided for in article 51, in
particular, paragraphs 4 and 5 [of the Rome Statute].
In all cases, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence should be read in conjunction
with and subject to the provisions of the [Rome] Statute.
Draft Rules of Procedure, supra note 5.
259. See Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 21(3).
260. The Court, before ruling on the exclusion of evidence, should assess whether the search
and seizure privacy right is an internationally recognized human right. The Court may conduct an
analysis not unlike that contained in this Article to determine the right's existence, and then ascertain the
right's scope. The Court could be spared that analysis if the drafters amend the Draft Rules of Procedure
to incorporate the right to privacy expressly. Though the Draft Rules of Procedure have been finalized,
the Preparatory Commission may still amend them, inter alia, to incorporate expressly the right, and/or
to include language to guide the Court on how to interpret and apply the right. Though the Court will
likely find the implicit search and seizure privacy right, the integrity and legitimacy of the Court will be
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right is not expressly reinstated legislatively, the Court in its jurisprudence can
and should declare and re-affirm the existence of the search and seizure right
to privacy.
4. Source of Applicable Law # 4: "Applicable Treaties "--Rome
Statute, Article 21(1)(b)
The travaux preparatoires are unclear on which treaties are "applicable
treaties, 261 but the term might be interpreted as being those treaties with
provisions that address issues that might also be addressed by the ICC. For
example, a mutual legal assistance treaty or an extradition treaty might be in
force that would directly address an issue relevant to the Court but that is not
addressed in the Rome Statute, Rules of Procedure, or Elements of Crimes. If
one concludes that treaties such as the ICCPR, that provide for the right to
privacy, are not directly "applicable" 262 to the ICC and would not be
appropriately applied, because, for example, the ICC is not a state party to that
263treaty, then article 21(l)(b) would arguably be of little guidance in
answering the consistency question with respect to the right to privacy and
searches and seizures.264 The ICCPR and other such treaties will likely be
deemed "applicable treaties" because a substantial number of Rome Statute
signatories and ratifiers have adhered to the ICCPR; the travauxpreparatoires
repeatedly refer to incorporation of ICCPR provisions into the Rome Statute;
ICCPR rights are customary international law, which is an article 21 source of
applicable law; and because the ICC's status as an inter-governmental
organization created under U.N. auspices renders the ICCPR applicable to the
ICC.
enhanced if such an important right is incorporated legislatively, (for example, through drafters'
amendments), rather than judicially. The Assembly of States Parties amendment procedure is more
cumbersome and perhaps less likely to succeed than the Preparatory Commission procedure, which
requires a simple majority vote. The Assembly of States Parties, which consists of all States that have
adhered to the Rome Statute, can approve "[d]ecisions on matters of substance" by a "two-thirds
majority of those present and voting provided that an absolute majority of States Parties constitutes the
quorum for voting .... Id., art. 112(7)(a). However, Assembly of States Parties "[d]ecisions on matters
of procedure shall be taken by a simple majority of States Parties present and voting." Id., art. I 12(7)(b).
If the Assembly of States Parties does not amend, incorporation of the right will ultimately be
left for the Court when it is first faced with an international human rights law challenge by an accused
whose privacy rights have been threatened.
261. See, e.g., Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 12th Meeting, 23 June 1998,
79, A/Conf.183/C.1/SR.12 (1998) (Colombian delegate stating that "it was unclear what was meant by
'applicable treaties"' in article 20(l)(b)[21]).
262. Recently, the International Court of Justice was called upon to give meaning to the term
"applicable" in the context of the United Nations Tready on Diplomatic Immunities. See Difference
Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights,
1999 I.C.J. (Apr. 29), available at http://vww.ij-ji.org.icjwww/idecisions.htm (last visited May 21,
2001).
263. See Gallant, supra note 7, at 707 (presuming application of the ICCPR to the Rome
Statute and to the ICC).
264. The Rome Statute suffers from its use of the unfortunate adjective "appropriate" to
describe the "applicable treaties" as a source of law in article 21(1)(b).
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The Vienna Convention might also be an applicable treaty that addresses
issues not covered by the Rome Statute, such as how to interpret the Rome
Statute itself.
265
5. Source of Applicable Law # 5: "Where Appropriate... Principles
and Rules of International Law (Including the Established
Principles of the International Law of Armed Conflict)" 266-Rome
Statute, Article 21(1)(b)
a. "Principles and Rules of International Law"
The Court, when it reaches this source of applicable law, will ask
whether any meaningful distinction can and should be drawn between a
"principle" of international law on the one hand, and a "rule" of international
law on the other. Some might suggest that the terminology is not redundant-
that a meaningful distinction can be drawn in that "principles" imply a
philosophical base, whereas "rules" are based in positive law and are not
necessarily philosophically-rooted.267 That distinction is immaterial for
present purposes. Irrespective of whether one concludes that "principle" and
"rule" are distinct or identical, one is next faced with identifying precisely to
which principle(s) and/or rule(s) of international law, Rome Statute, article
21(1)(b) refer.
During the Rome Conference, the Working Group on Article 20[21]268
debated the designation of the law to which the Court was instructed to apply
under article 21(1)(b), and queried whether it would be "principles and rules
of general international law" or "principles and rules of international law,"
without the modifier "general., 269 The inquiry focused on which principles
and rules would fall into the category, with an accurate descriptive being
chosen to reflect the substantive content of that applicable source of law.
The Working Group on Article 20 sought to parse through appellation
and substantive content concerns. Underlying the debate was whether the
applicable law sought to be described was equal to, or greater or less than,
customary international law, 27  and indeed what constitutes "international
265. See generally discussion supra Subsection VI.C.4 (discussing "applicable treaties").
266. Again, we have the imprecise and ambiguous "where appropriate" language.
"Appropriate" has been defined as: "suitable or fitting for a particular purpose." This offers little
guidance. See supra note 264.
267. "Principle" and "rule" could easily be construed as redundant, such as other legal phrases,
including "part and parcel" and "to have and to hold."
268. The working group was entitled "Working Group on Article 20," as "20" was the number
assigned to an earlier iteration of the article that turned into Rome Statute, article 21. In this Article, that
working group will be referred to as the "Working Group on Article 20121]."
269. Notes of July 10, 1998 Taken During the working Group on Article 20(21] Session (on
file with the Author).
270. "The substantive content of this source of applicable law was intended to be broad,
sweeping within its ambit customary international law." ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT
PtNAL, supra note 72, at 36. A natural extension of the debate over the scope of "the principles and rules
of general international law" (pursuant to the Consolidated Final Draft Statute, supra note 68, art. 20) is
the query whether that term encompasses "general principles of law derived by the Court from national
legal systems of the world" (pursuant to Rome Statute, article 21(l)(c)). Human Rights Watch argued,
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law." 271 It was suggested that "general international law" meant "customary
international law., 272  Some countries, such as Poland, suggested that
"customary international law" was broader than "general international law,"
while other countries, such as Kenya, contended that "general international
law" was broader and included both public and private international law.
Some delegations, such as Guatemala and Iraq, pushed for precision in
appellation and thus for including the term "customary international law," if
that was indeed what the drafters intended to reflect, while other delegations
found "general international law" or "international law" acceptable. To
resolve the dispute, a footnote was proposed to define "international law" or
"general international law." The agreed footnote was, "the term 'international
law' means public international law," thus resolving the debate as to whether
the phrase "general international law" referred solely to customary
international law, or whether private international law was included.273
The Rome Statute as adopted incorporates the broad term "principles
and rules of international law," without any footnotes and without the word
"general" or any other modifier.274 This adopted phraseology implies more
than its words alone suggest; it represents an expansive corpus of law.
275
regarding the Consolidated Final Draft Statute, article 20:
"General principles of law recognized by civilized nations" is one of the sources of
international law, as established in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice. As such, the reference in [Consolidated Final Draft Statute,] article 20(1)(b) to
"the principles and rules of general international law," already comprises the principles
and rules of law generally recognized in national legal systems. However, in the interest
of clarity, specific reference could be made to these general principles of law as a source
of applicable law." (footnotes omitted).
Human Rights -Watch, supra note 73, § G, art. 20(1).
271. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 816 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted), defines "international
law" as:
Those laws governing the legal relations between nations. Rules and principles of general
application dealing with the conduct of nations and of international organizations and
with their relations inter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether
natural or juridical. Body of consensual principles which have evolved from customs and
practices civilized nations utilize in regulating their relationships and such customs have
great moral force.... International customs and treaties are generally considered to be
the two most important sources of international law.
272. The 1994 ILC Draft, supra note 68, art. 33, proposed "general international law" as a
source of applicable law for the Court. Commentators contended that that general international law
clause "includes the entire corpus of international criminal law, whether derived from the practice of
national or international fora." STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 180 (1997). This comment illustrates to some degree the
drafters' apparent overarching concern with the law to be applied to substantive rather than procedural
criminal law issues. However, this comment also illustrates the contention that "general international
law" is indeed broad, and would subsume customary international law, both in the substantive and
procedural criminal law contexts.
273. Committee of the Whole, Working Group on Applicable Law: Report of the Working
Paper on Applicable Law, art. 20(l)(b)[21] (1998), U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/C.1/WGAL/L.2.
274. It was decided that no footnotes would be incorporated into the Statute. Information that
would have been footnoted is incorporated directly into the text or was deleted. For example, the
"gender" definition began as a footnote, but was ultimately incorporated as a qualifier in the text of the
Rome Statute. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 3, art. 7(3)
275. There was additional controversy over the proposed deletion of the phrase "including the
established principles of the law of armed conflict." Some states favored deletion of the phrase, but
would find it acceptable if "international" were added to "law of armed conflict." See Rome Statute,
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Under Rome Statute, article 21(1)(b), "international law" (or public
international law) includes bodies of law beyond just customary international
law.276 For example, under article 21(1)(b), "international law" also includes
the areas of international human rights law2 77 and international humanitarian
law.
The significance of this is that we have now identified another rule that
can be relied upon to bolster the argument that all principles of international
human rights law, including principles not expressly referred to in the Rome
Statute or its collateral instruments, must be followed by the ICC in its
operations. If higher-ranked sources fail, and the Court reaches the "principles
and rules of international law" analysis under article 21(l)(b), the Court must
analyze whether the questioned right falls within any of the subsumed bodies
of international law referred to in article 21(l)(b).2 78 Thus, the Court must
analyze whether the right to privacy has risen to the level of customary
international law; whether the right to privacy is a principle or rule of
international human rights law; or in case of armed conflict, whether it is
covered by international humanitarian law. 279 This analysis will occur in
addition to the analysis of whether the right in question is an "internationally
supra note 3, art. 21(1)(b). For example, the Israeli delegation, referring to paragraph l(b), suggested
that "including the established principles of the law of armed confliet" was "unnecessary and could be
deleted, since such principles obviously formed part of the principles of general international law."
Committee of the Whole, Summary Record of the 12th Meeting, 23 June 1998, 65, U.N. Doc.
AIConf.183IC.IISR.12 (1998). The Greek delegation suggested that "including the established
principles of the law of armed confliet" was "superfluous, since international law in any case included
the law of armed conflict." Id., 72.
276. See Leila Nadya Sadat, Custom, Codification and Some Thoughts About the Relationship
Between the Two: Article 10 of the ICC Statute, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 909, 918 (2000) ("(T]he Statute
itself contemplates that the Court will use customary international law outside the ICC Statute in its
decisions. Article 21, on applicable law, permits the Court to apply 'where appropriate, applicable
treaties and the principles and rules of international law'...." Furthermore, the "resort to international
law outside the Statute is permitted only to supplement the terms of the Statute itself, not to supplant
them; presumably then, the framers were contemplating the use of international law as a gap filler...
277. The broad terminology may be superfluous because intemationally recognized human
rights are already included by operation of article 21(1), article 21(3), and other provisions. See Rome
Statute, supra note 3, arts. 21(1), 21(3). One could argue that international human rights law as a subset
of international law is broader than the Court's mandate to apply law consistent with internationally
recognized human rights.
This also supports the view that sexual orientation and other not expressly "omitted" rights are
implicitly included, as the Court is directed to consider international human rights law in the application
of all laws. Indeed, "principles and rules of international law" would subsume all the international law
sources contained in article 21, including the treaty sources in 21(l)(a) (the Rome Statute, the Elements
of Crimes and the Rules of Procedure) and 21(l)(b) ("applicable treaties"), and "general principles of
law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world.. ." contained in 21(1)(c), as
those sources are deemed "international law" for article 38 purposes. See Rome Statute, supra note 3,
arts. 21(1)(a)-(c).
278. Keep in mind that the immediate issue relates to ascertaining the existence and scope of
the search and seizure right to privacy. In other cases, the issue might be of a different nature, for
example, in determining the parameters of an issue of substantive criminal law (for example, the
elements of a particular crime).
279. An analysis of international humanitarian law aspects of issues relating to searches and
seizures is beyond the scope of this Article. The international law of armed conflict was listed to settle
any debate about the scope of this source of law, though it could easily have been excluded from express
mention, and still recognized implicitly. It was included in a parenthetical for the avoidance of doubt.
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recognized human right" under article 21(3), an analysis which must be done
with respect to any law interpreted and applied by the Court, regardless of
whether the law in question directly relates to international human rights law,
or to criminal law or procedure. The international law analysis will overlap
with the analysis of whether the right to privacy is an internationally
recognized human right.
Since the right to privacy is found in international human rights law,
which itself is a subset of public international law, or international law, which
is a source of law under article 21(l)(b), the search and seizure privacy right
can be found in article 21(l)(b)(ii), and the Court is obliged to enforce that
right.
b. Search and Seizure Privacy Rights as Customary
International Law-Rome Statute, Article 21(1)(b)
If the right search and seizure right to privacy has risen to the level of
customary international law, the Court would be obligated to enforce the right
pursuant to article 21(l)(b). Customary international law is subsumed under
international law, which is an applicable source of law under Rome Statute,
article 21 (1)(b) that is to be applied by the Court when higher-ranking sources
of law are inadequate to resolve the issue at hand. Thus, it is necessary to
understand what constitutes customary international law in general, and in
particular what constitutes customary international human rights law.
280
Customary international law is based on states' implicit consent to be
bound. Two elements must be present for a principle or rule of customary
international law to exist:281 (1) state practice as proof of custom; and (2)
opinio juris vel necessitatis (opinio juris).212 Satisfaction of the state practice
280. See discussion supra Subsection VI.C.5.a.
281. Proof of customary international law of human rights involves analysis somewhat like that
involved in determining principles of "general" customary international law. However, certain types of
evidence of custom are conmonly asserted to argue that particular rights have risen to the level of
customary international law, that are generally not used to support a general (or traditional) customary
international law argument. To satisfy state practice and opiniojuris elements, when proof is put forth
that a right has risen to the level of customary international law, advocates look not only to the
"traditional" evidence, but also to evidence that does not wholly conform to tradition. Evidence relied
upon to support a finding that a right is a part of customary international law includes: evidence that the
right has been incorporated into numerous national constitutions and general laws; multitudinous United
Nations resolutions and declarations that refer to Member States' duties to enforce rights in the UDHR;
U.N. resolutions that condemn human rights violations; ICJ dicta that erga omnes obligations include
obligations derived from "principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person"; and
domestic court judgments. See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 85-
94 (1991); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 54-82 (4th ed. 1997); STEINER & ALSTON, supra
note 225, at 69-80; MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 3-62 (1985).
282. Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, in 216 COLLECTED
COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL Law, 4 RECEUIL DES COURS 13 (1989). Scholars
and jurists agree generally on the identification of the two elements, and on a definition of "customary
.international law." However, there is disagreement on what constitutes proof of customary international
law, or what appropriately serves as evidence of customary international law. For discussions of
customary international law and its proof, see generally MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 41-54 (3d ed. 1999); STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 225, at 69-80; see also
Jeremy Levitt, Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Cases of
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requirement calls for a threshold showing of, at minimum the (a) duration of
the practice; (b) uniformity and consistency of the practice; (c) generality and
empirical extent of the practice; and (d) conformity of state practice to
international standards.283 For proof of these elements, the Court will look to
various sources, including international, regional, and bilateral treaties;
international tribunal decisions; and the internal law of relevant states.
284
Opinio juris is a psychological element that requires an examination of a
State's motives in engaging in a particular act or practice. For the opiniojuris
requirement to be satisfied, a showing must be made that states engage in the
practice out of a sense of legal obligation, not because engaging in the practice
is convenient or coincidental. 285 The following elements must be satisfied for
the opiniojuris element to be met: (a) the rules protecting the right must be
legal in nature (legality);28 6 (b) the right must relate to international and not
domestic law; and (c) states must be aware of the articulated right.
Generally, customary international human rights law prohibits the most
globally deplored human rights violations, such as genocide, slavery, forced
disappearances, murder, torture, prolonged arbitrary imprisonment, systematic
racial discrimination, and consistent patterns of gross human rights
violations.287 Furthermore, compelling cases have been made for inclusion in
the ranks of customary international law such diverse rights as the right to a
healthy environment,288 the right to education,289 the right to organize and
bargain collectively, 290 the right to freedom from self-incrimination, 2 91 and the
ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 12 TEMP. INT'L & CoMp. L.J. 333, 333 n.1 (1998) (defining
customary international law).
283. ANTHONY D'AMATo, INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1996).
284. See JANis, supra note 282, at 41-54.
285. BROWNLIE, supra note 169, at 3. The Statute of the International Court of Justice, article
38, speaks of"a general practice accepted as law." See id. Opiniojuris can be presumed based on, inter
alia, the basis of evidence of a general practice.
286. This "legality" differs from the general principle of criminal law "legality" discussed infra
at Subsection VI.C.5.
287. This list is drawn from the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS, § 702 (1987)
("The list is not necessarily complete, and is not closed: human rights not listed in this section may have
achieved the status of customary international law, and some rights might achieve that status in the
future.") Id at comment a; see also James D. Wilets, International Human Rights Law and Sexual
Orientation, 18 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 18-19 (1994) (discussing right to be free from
discrimination based on sexual orientation as customary international law). It has been convincingly
argued that other rights which have become a part of "general international law" include: the right to
self-determination of peoples; the right to leave and return to one's country; and the principle of non-
refoulement for refugees threatened by persecution. See, e.g., OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 85 (1991).
288. Lee, supra note 243.
289. Connie de la Vega, The Right to Equal Education: Merely a Guiding Principle or
Customary International Legal Right?, 11 HARV. BLACKLETrER L.J. 37 (1994).
290. Leslie Deak, Customary International Labor Laws and Their Application in Hungary,
Poland, and the Czech Republic, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1 (1994).
291. Diane Marie Amann, A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in an International Context, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1201, 1251-61 (1998) (discussing self-
incrimination rights as customary international law); Daniel J. Steinbock, The Fifth Amendment at Home
and Abroad: A Comment on United States v. Balsys, 31 U. TOL. L. REv. 209, 222-23 (2000); Jeffrey K.
Walker, A Comparative Discussion of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 1, 30 (1993) ("[N]early every major legal system recognizes some form of the privilege.");
see also COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 32-22, 148, 233-34 (John Hatchard et al. eds., 1996)
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right of sexual minorities to be free from discrimination.292 Finally, more
inclusively, many scholars and some jurists have contended that all rights
contained in the UDHR and the ICCPR have become customary international
law.
29 3
A compelling case can be made that the search and seizure right to
privacy has risen to the level of customary international law given that the
elements of state practice and opinio juris have been satisfied. Although the
proof may fail since the standard is high, this analysis is instructive as similar
arguments must be made with respect to any right that may not be expressly
enumerated in the Rome Statute (e.g., other privacy rights, gender and sexual
orientation rights, environmental rights), and because persons whose search
and seizure privacy interests are affected would argue that the right is a part of
the customary international law of human rights, and is thus an
"internationally recognized human right" that the Court must enforce.
c. State Practice as an Element of Customary International Law
(Search and Seizure Privacy Right)
(i) Duration of the Search and Seizure Privacy Right
Though a practice need not have been in place for centuries in order to
satisfy the duration element of a customary international law proof,294 the
search and seizure privacy right easily qualifies as satisfying this element. The
notion of the inviolability of the home is traceable to biblical times, for
example, in the pronouncement that "[t]heir houses are safe from fear., 295 The
right has been entrenched in national law for centuries. In the fourteenth
century, England enacted laws governing searches and forfeiture of
contraband.296 In 1763, the Parliamentarian William Pitt extolled the virtues of
(describing right against compelled self-incrimination in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom).
292. Wilets, supra note 287. One commentator, however, has suggested that non-
discrimination against sexual minorities has not yet risen to customary international law, but is hopeful
of "the eventual development" of such a norm. Id. at 19 ("It is, unfortunately, highly unlikely that a
court would interpret the criminalization of same-gender private sexual behavior, or other discrimination
against sexual minorities, to be a violation of customary international human rights law. However, the
eventual development of such a binding customary norm should not be ruled out, particularly since the
ICCPR has been ruled to provide this kind of protection for sexual minorities.").
293. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International
Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARv. INT'L L.J. 53,
69-70 n.75 (1981) (U.DHR authoritatively interprets the U.N. Charter and is binding as customary
international law); Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals
Rather Than States, 32 Am. U. L. REv. 1, 17 (1982) (arguing that the UDHR is "a basic component of
international customary law, binding on all states, not only on members of the United Nations.").
294. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44
(Feb. 20) (passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily a bar to the formation of a new rule of
customary international law, but the practice must be "both extensive and virtually uniform");
BROWNLIE, supra note 169, at 5 (no particular duration required so long as consistency and generality
present).
295. Job 21:9; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 169, at 3 (discussing the concept of
inviolability).
296. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 23 (1937) (citing 9 EDW. III, ST. II, CH. 11 (1335); see also Global
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the privacy rights and the inviolability of the home.297 In 1765, Lord Camden,
in Entick v. Carrington,298 struck down a warrant that had been issued to seize
papers in a private dwelling.299 The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, passed in 1791, prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures
and called for search warrants based on probable cause.
300
In the twentieth century, numerous international instruments enshrine
the search and seizure privacy right. These instruments include the UDHR, the
ICCPR, the European Convention on Human Rights, and other international
instruments that articulate the right to privacy in family, home and
correspondence. 30 1 Further, some aspect of the right to privacy is incorporated
into virtually every constitution in the world, and into the general laws and
jurisprudence of those countries without written constitutions. 3 2 Both civil
law and common law systems boast incorporation of the right, though the
right may be construed differently in each of the two systems. 0 3
Thus, the search and seizure privacy right meets the duration test
sufficient to qualify as customary international law.
(ii) Unifonnity and Consistency of the Search and Seizure
Privacy Right
A showing of substantial uniformity and consistency must be shown to
meet this prong.304 The search and seizure privacy right has appeared
substantially, uniformly, and consistently in various international instruments
over the last fifty years. 30 The contours of the right can be extracted from the
international instruments and domestic constitutional documents containing
the right, and can be summarized as follows: (1) though a person's home is
Internet Liberty Campaign, supra note 30; HANSARD, PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, supra
note 2 (quoting 18th Century English Parliamentarian's cries for sanctity of the home from invasions by
all, even by the King, as a "man's home is his castle").
297. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
298. 45 All Eng. Rep. 1558-1774 (1765).
299. Lord Camden wrote: "We can safely say there is no law in this country to justify the
defendants in what they have done; if there was, it would destroy all the comforts of society, for papers
are often the dearest property any man can have." Id.
300. U.S. CONST., amend. IV; see also discussion infra Subsection VI.C.5.
301. See generally discussion infra Parts V and VI (right to privacy provided for in UDHR,
ICCPR, ECHR, and other long-standing international and regional human rights instruments and in
jurisprudence of international tribunals).
302. See also discussion infra Subsection VI.C.5 (discussing the right to privacy in relation to
world constitutions).
303. In civil law systems where search and seizure protections are deemed more procedural
than substantive, the concept does not offer the substantive standard (for example, probable cause) that
is applied in common law jurisdictions. However, this interpretation distinction should not detract from
the existence of the right in those two major legal systems.
304. BROWNLIE, supra note 169, at 3.
305. See discussion infra Subsection VI.C.5.
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306inviolable, that inviolability is not absolute; and (2) any interference with
that right must be lawful, reasonable and not arbitrary.
30 7
The search and seizure privacy right easily meets the uniformity and
consistency test to qualify as customary international law.
(iii) Generality and Empirical Extent: Treaties and Other
Instruments as Evidence of State Practice of the Search
and Seizure Privacy Right
Generality complements the uniformity and consistency requirement.
Evidence must be proffered to show that the practice in question is
widespread, with minimal abstention or objection by states.30 8 Evidence of
generality can take the form of the quantum of treaties and other international
instruments that provide for the search and seizure privacy right. The
argument that the search and seizure privacy right has risen to the level of
customary international law is bolstered by the inclusion of the right in
numerous international and regional human rights treaties,30 9 and by the
enforcement of that right by international and domestic tribunals.
Following is proof of generality, in the form of treaties and other
international instruments that provide for search and seizure privacy rights.
This section examines the search and seizure privacy rights in the UDHR, the
ICCPR, and in other international instruments, and in international tribunals
that interpret and apply these instruments.
(a) International Human Rights Instruments:
Interpretations of the Right to Privacy310
(i) Universal Declaration of Human Rights"'
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was
promulgated in 1948 to give meaning to the general human rights provisions
of the 1945 U.N. Charter, applies to all members of the United Nations.31 2 The
306. It is questionable whether the inviolability of the office/work place or the inviolability of
correspondence has risen to the level of customary international law. However, a full discussion of these
issues is beyond the scope of this Article.
307. See also discussion supra Section II.B.
308. See BROWNLIE, supra note 169, at 6.
309. The right is also re-enforced in many multilateral and bilateral non-human rights treaties,
such as the Mulitlateral Legal Assistance Treaties and extradition treaties. For a summary of
international law documentation, see John W. Williams, Research Tips in International Law, 15 J. INT'L
L. &ECON. 1 (1981).
310. The Court may not be bound by the various international human rights law instruments
qua instruments. Though the Court could conceivably adopt wholesale interpretations of the right to
privacy by other international tribunals, the Court will not likely do so, even though the Rome Statute,
like the ICTY and ICTR Statutes, has attempted to incorporate rights contained in the international
instruments. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, 7 CRIM. L.F. 139 (1996), 19, 25 ("In
drafting the [ICTY] Statute and the Rules every attempt was made to comply with internationally
recognized standards of fundamental human rights.").
311. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 24.
312. The 1945 U.N. Charter is a treaty to which all members of the United Nations are a party.
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rights enunciated in the UDHR have been invoked, frequently verbatim, in
many United Nations, regional, and bilateral human rights treaties, and in
national legislation and many world constitutions.
Article 12 of the UDHR provides for privacy rights as follows: "No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has
the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."
313
This provision, which was the first modem international enunciation of the
search and seizure privacy right, is echoed in the ICCPR, and many other
international and regional human rights instruments.
(ii) International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights314
The ICCPR, which was adopted by the United Nations in 1966 to render
UDHR rights enforceable, came into force in 1976, and currently binds 144
States Parties that have adhered to it.315 Furthermore, rights contained in the
ICCPR have risen to the level of customary international law, and thus bind
all States, including those that have not ratified the treaty.
316
Article 55 of the Charter, which contains a general call for the promotion of human rights, provides that
the United Nations shall promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all." Elucidation of the human rights referred to in the U.N. Charter was left
to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 24, which was promulgated three years later,
and other U.N. international instruments such as the ICCPR, supra note 25, and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976),
G.A. Res. 2200A (CCI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967)
[hereinafter ICESCR]. The International Bill of Human Rights-consisting of the UDHR, the ICCPR
and its Optional Protocols, and the ICESCR-are the backbone of the U.N. human rights system.
313. UDHR, supra note 24, art. 12.
314. ICCPR, supra note 25.
315. The following 144 countries have adhered to the ICCPR by ratification or accession:
Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Barbados;
Belars; Belgium; Belize; Benin; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Brazil; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso;
Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Cape Verde; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile;
Colombia; Congo; Costa Rica; C6te d'Ivoire; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Dominica;
Dominican Republic; Ecuador, Egypt; El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea; Estonia; Ethiopia; Finland;
France; Gabon; Gambia; Georgia; Germany; Greece; Grenada; Guatemala; Guinea; Guyana; Haiti;
Honduras; Hungary; Iceland; India; Iran; Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Kenya;
South Korea; Kuwait; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Libya; Liechtenstein; Lithuania;
Luxembourg; Macedonia; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Malta; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova; Monaco;
Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger,
Nigeria; Norway; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Russia; Rwanda;
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines; San Marino; Senegal; Seychelles; Sierra Leone; Slovakia; Slovenia;
Somalia; South Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Suriname; Sweden; Switzerland; Syria; Tajikistan;
Tanzania; Thailand; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; United
Kingdom; USA; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Venezuela; Vietnam; Yemen; Yugoslavia, Zaire; Zambia;
Zimbabwe. See UNITED NATIONS MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY GENERAL,
U.N. Doc. STILEG/SER.E/17 (2001); http://www.unhchr.ch/pdffreport.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2001,
updated Mar. 28, 2001). The following three States have signed but not ratified the ICCPR: China,
Liberia, and Sao Tomas and Principe. Id.
316. See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 249, at 249 ("When a significant number of states
representing the major legal systems of the world have adhered to a given convention, it may become
part of customary international law... and therefore become binding upon nonsignatory states under
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Article 17 of the ICCPR, which echoes the privacy rights provision of
the UDHR, provides:
317
1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondqnce, or to unlawful attacks on his honour and
reputation.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks.
(a) Human Rights Committee General
Comment on Article 17
Pursuant to article 28 of the ICCPR, a committee of independent experts,
318known as the Human Rights Committee, was formed to oversee
implementation of the ICCPR within the States Parties to that treaty.
319
Pursuant to ICCPR article 40(4), the Human Rights Committee may issue
"4general comments," which are distributed to States Parties, 320 and which are
deemed to be "authoritative interpretations" of the relevant part(s) of the
ICCPR that the particular comments address. 321 The Human Rights
Committee issued a General Comment on ICCPR article 17,322 which focuses
on, inter alia, the "right to respect of privacy, family, home and
correspondence. 3 23  The General Comment on Article 17 ("General
Comment") sheds light on how the ICCPR search and seizure privacy right
should be interpreted.
First, the General Comment, in clarifying the meaning of the term
"home" as contained in article 17, provides that "home" is to be given a broad
meaning and includes not only a place where a person resides, but also the
place where the person works.324 The General Comment provides: "The term
'home' in English, 'manzel' in Arabic, 'zh zhdi' in Chinese, 'domicile' in
French, 'zhilishche' in Russian, and 'domicilio' in Spanish, as used in article
17 of the [ICCPR], is to be understood to indicate the place where a person
resides or carries out his usual occupation."
325
Second, though the ICCPR on its face does not expressly place
limitations on the privacy right, as does, for example, the European
Article 38(I)(b) [of the Statute of the International Court of Justice].") (citations omitted).
317. Identical language is found in article 14 of the United Nations Convention on Migrant
Workers, U.N. Doe. A/Res/45/158 (1991).
318. ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 28.
319. See id., art. 40 (calling on ICCPR States Parties to submit periodic reports to the Human
Rights Committee on implementation of ICCPR rights in their territories).
320. Id., art. 40(4).
321. See NOWAK, supra note 30, art. 30 at XXIV (Introduction) (announcing the treatment of
Human Rights Committee General Comments as "authoritative interpretations" of ICCPR provisions).
322. General Comment, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 43rd Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 181, U.N.
Doc. A143/40 (1988) (discussing the meaning and ramifications of certain terms in ICCPR, article 17).
323. Id.
324. General Comment, supra note 322, para. 5.
325. Id., para. 5.
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Convention on Human Rights,326 the General Comment anticipates that
privacy rights are not absolute.327
Third, the General Comment gives meaning to the term "unlawful":328
"The term 'unlawful' means that no interference can take place except in
cases envisaged by the law. Interference authorized by States can only take
place on the basis of law, which itself must comply with the provisions, aims
and objectives of the Covenant." 329
Finally, the General Comment defines "arbitrary interference" as an
expression that can "extend to interference provided for under the law," and
"[t]he introduction of the concept of arbitrariness is intended to guarantee that
even interference provided for by law should be in accordance with the
provisions, aims and objectives of the [ICCPR] and should be, in any event,
reasonable in the particular circumstances."
330
Thus, it can be concluded that according to the Human Rights
Committee, the search and seizure privacy right exists, including as relates to
the home.331 The right requires that States Parties adopt legislative and other
measures to prohibit interference with privacy rights related to the home or
business, that no interference to the privacy of home or business should occur
unless envisaged by law, and that the national law and any interference with
the right must be in accordance with the ICCPR.
(iii) Convention on the Rights of the Child
The Convention on the Rights of the Child,332 which is the most widely
ratified international human rights law treaty in existence, with 192 Parties,3
confirms the expansiveness of state practice regarding the search and seizure
privacy right as a customary international law norm. Article 16 of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child provides: "No child shall be subjected
to arbitrary interference with his or her privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his or her honour and reputation. The
child has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or
attacks." As its terms repeat almost verbatim the corresponding ICCPR
326. European Convention, supra note 132; see also NOWAK, supra note 30, at 290-94
(discussing limitations or restrictions on the ICCPR, article 17 right to privacy).
327. E.g., General Comment, supra note 322, paras. 7-9 ("As all persons live in society, the
protection of privacy is necessarily relative.... Even with regard to interferences that conform to the
[ICCPR], relevant legislation must specify in detail the precise circumstances in which such
interferences may be permitted. . . .States parties are under a duty themselves not to engage in
interferences inconsistent with article 17.").
328. Id., para. 3.
329. Id.
330. Id., para. 4 (noting that "[s]earches ofh person's home should'be restricted").
331. See id., para. 8.
332. Children's Convention, supra note 26. The Convention defines "child" as "every human
being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained
earlier." Id. Even though the ICC has no jurisdiction to try persons who are below the age of eighteen
when they allegedly commit punishable crimes, it is conceivable that a person below the age of majority
would be the target of an unlawful search or seizure, a person under investigation, or a suspect.
333. The only two countries that have not ratified the Children's Convention are the United
States and Somalia. Id.
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provision,334 there is no reason to believe that the intent of the respective
framers materially differed, or that a different meaning would be given by the
U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child or any tribunal charged with
interpreting the privacy right under the two treaties.
(b) Regional International Human Rights Law
Systems and Instruments
Numerous regional international human rights law instruments provide
for the search and seizure privacy right. This fact further bolsters the argument
that the state practice element has been satisfied. Discussed below are two
major regional schemes, which exist in Europe and in the Americas,
respectively.
335
(i) The European Human Rights System
The 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention)336 which has been ratified by
nations throughout Europe, provides for the search and seizure privacy
right. Article 8(1) provides: "Everyone has the right to respect for his private
and family life, his home and his correspondence.
' 338
334. E.g., ICCPR, supra note 25, arts. 17(1)-(2) (containing language virtually identical to
privacy provision of the Children's Convention).
335. In addition to the European and Inter-American schemes for the safeguarding of human
rights, schemes exist in Africa, among the Commonwealth of Independent States, and in the Arab world.
The African system revolves around the Organization of African Unity, which promulgated the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. Adopted June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/31Rev. 5
(1981) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) [hereinafter African Charter].
The African Charter does not expressly provide for the right to privacy in the search and seizure context.
The Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Commonwealth of
Independent States provides, at article 9(1): "Everyone shall have the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence." Article 9(2) contains limitations, similar to those
contained in article 8(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights. These limitations do not detract
from the contribution to the finding of state practice.
The Arab Charter on Human Rights, article 17 provides: "Private life is sacred, and violation of
that sanctity is a crime. Private life includes family privacy, the sanctity of the home, and the secrecy of
correspondence and other forms of private communications."
336. European Convention, supra note 132.
337. The European Convention provides primarily for civil and political rights. Economic,
social and cultural rights in Europe are provided for in the European Social Charter, 529 U.N.T.S. 89,
Europe T.S. 35, 1965 (entered into force Feb. 26, 1965) [hereinafter European Social Charter]. The
European Convention and European Social Charter supplement the human rights safeguards under the
United Nations human rights instruments. Many European states are parties to the various United
Nations human rights treaties, and have also signed the major U.N. human rights non-treaty instruments.
All European States are bound by human rights principles that constitute customary international law.
338. This right is subject to some reasonable exercise of the government's police power, as
noted in Article 8(2) of the European Convention. European Convention, supra note 132, art. 8(2),
provides:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
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The European Court, which is charged with resolving disputes arising
under the European Convention, has ruled that the right to privacy in the home
is inviolable, and has sought to define the parameters of the right.339 In Huvig
v. France,340 the European Court recognized the right to privacy in the
criminal procedure context as it applied article 8 of the European Convention
to a search (telephone tap) and seizure (the tapped conversation) pursuant to a
search warrant in France. Huvig involved a French couple under investigation
for tax evasion. A French judge issued a warrant calling for monitoring and
transcription of the couple's telephone conversations. The monitoring spanned
twenty-eight hours over two days. The couple challenged the telephone taps
before the European Commission, which held that article 8 had been
violated.34'
The Huvig Court applied a two-step process.342 First, the Court asked
whether the alleged interference with article 8 rights was "in accordance with
law," and second, turning to article 8(2), the Court examined the permissible
limitations or restrictions on the right to privacy contained in article 8(1). The
Court found that though the warrant issued was authorized by law, article 8
was violated as the contested French law permitted the police too much
discretion to determine the scope of the interference.343
In Crimieux v. France,344 the European Court again found a breach of
the article 8 search and seizure privacy right. Over three years, pursuant to the
French Customs Code, government officials conducted eighty-three
investigative searches of complainant Mr. Cr~mieux's home, office, and other
locations, and seized papers sought to be used in criminal proceedings against
Mr. Cr~mieux. The court noted the French government's concession "that
there had been an interference with Mr. Cr6mieux's right to respect for his
private life" and acknowledged the European Commission's earlier finding
that "there had been an interference with [Mr. Cr~mieux's] right to respect for
his home." 345 The court then turned to article 8(2), which details limitations on
the rights articulated in article 8(1). Under article 8(2), the court examined
whether the interference under article 8(1) was "in accordance with the law"
as required by article 8(2), and found it unnecessary to answer that question as
339. The European Court has ruled that the right to privacy of the "home" extends to "business
premises." Niemietz v. German, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992) (respect for private life must
encompass the right to develop relationships with others, including relations of a business or
professional nature).
340. Huvig v. France, 176-B Eur. Ct. H.R (ser. A) (1990).
341. The couple was convicted even though the tapped conversations were not offered as
evidence against them at trial. Id.
342. The two-step process had been applied by the Court in a prior article 8 case. Klass and
Others v. Federal Republic of Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R., 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978). Klass involved
a challenge to certain German laws that permitted surveillance without obliging governmental
authorities to notify the persons concerned after the surveillance occurs, and for excluding any remedy
before the Courts against the ordering and execution of such measures. The Court found that there was
an interference with article 8 rights, but that the interference was justified in a democratic society in the
interests of national security and for the prevention of disorder or crime under article 8(2). Id.
343. Huvig v. France, 176-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990).
344. Cr~mieux v. France, 256-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
345. Id., 31.
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the interference complained of was "incompatible with Article 8 in other
respects.,,346 The court found that the interference was in furtherance of
legitimate government interests in "the economic well-being of the country."
However, the court nevertheless found a breach of article 8 because "in the
absence of any requirement of a judicial warrant the restrictions and
conditions provided for in law... appear too lax and full of loopholes for the
interferences with [Mr. Cr~mieux's] rights to have been strictly proportionate
to the legitimate aim pursued." Such searches might be permissible for
prosecutorial purposes, but they could only be conducted in accordance with
the French Constitution. Article 66 of the French Constitution renders the
judiciary responsible for protecting the liberty of the individual regarding the
inviolability of the home. 47 The court went further to add that legislation and
procedures governing searches and seizures must afford "adequate and
effective safeguards against abuse.
348
(ii) The Inter-American Human Rights System
The regional human rights regime in the Americas safeguards privacy as
well. The regional system is based primarily on three instruments: the Charter
of the Organization of American States;34 the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man; 350 and the American Convention on Human Rights
(American Convention). 351 Both the American Declaration and the American
Convention contain provisions protecting the right to privacy. Article IX of
American Declaration provides that 352 "[e]very person has the right to the
inviolability of his home," and article X provides that "[e]very person has the
right to the inviolability and transmission of his correspondence."
The American Convention was promulgated subsequent to the American
Declaration to give binding force to the rights contained in the declaration.
Article 11 of the American Convention 353 provides:
Every person has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized.
346. Id., 34.
347. Id., 4; see also id., 32 (quoting Constitutional Council decision on § 89 of the Budget
Act of 1984). The Court continued: "Provision must be made for judicial participation in order that the
judiciary's responsibility and supervisory power may be maintained in their entirety." Id.
348. Adequate and effective safeguards might include a judicial warrant, non-lax restrictions
and conditions provided by law, and procedures in which interference with individuals' rights are
strictly proportionate to the legitimate governmental aim. See generally id. (citing Klass and Others v.
Federal Republic of Germany, Eur. Ct. H.R., 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978)).
349. Charter of the Organization of American States, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered
into force Dec. 13, 1951) [hereinafter OAS Charter].
350. O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States
(1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System,
OEAISer.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 17 (1992) [hereinafter American Declaration].
351. American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.23 doc. rev.
2, 1978 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter American Convention].
352. Article V of the American Declaration provides: "Every person has the right to the
protection of the law against abusive attacks upon his honor, his reputation, and his private and family
life." American Declaration, supra note 350, art. V.
353. American Convention, supra note 351.
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No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his
family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or
reputation.
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has addressed search
and seizure privacy rights issues. In Garcia v. Peru, it was alleged that on
April 5, 1992, the date on which Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori
announced to the public that he had suspended the constitution,355 soldiers,
with no search warrant, forcibly entered the home of former Peruvian
President Dr. Alan Garcia Perez, held his family under house arrest for several
days, and seized some of his private family papers.356 The Commission
recognized the existence of the right to privacy and the inviolability of the
home, but also acknowledged limitations, in that privacy must "give way" in
the face of a well-substantiated search warrant issued by a competent judicial
authority, specifying the reasons for the measure being adopted, the place to
be searched, and the objects to be seized.3 57 Though the 1979 constitution of
Peru provides that homes and private papers shall be inviolable except "when
an order has been issued by a competent judicial authority authorizing the
search, explaining its reasons and, where appropriate, authorizing the seizure
of private papers, while respecting the guarantees stipulated by law," no such
warrant had been issued in this case. The Commission found a violation of the
right to the inviolability of the home.358
Similarly, the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights found a
violation of the right to privacy in the case of Ms. X and Y v. Argentina,3 5 9 in
which the complainants (mother and daughter) contended that their right to
privacy was violated by body-cavity searches, to which the complainants were
subjected when they visited their husband and father in an Argentine prison.
The Commission ruled that article 11 of the Inter-American Convention
protects the physical and moral integrity of the person and specifically that
article 11(2) prohibits "arbitrary or abusive interference" with a person's
private life.360
354. Report No. 1/95, Case 11.0006, Inter-Amer. Cm.H.R. 71, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.88, Doc. 9 rev.
(1995).
355. On that day, President Fujimori also announced that he had dissolved the Senate and
House of Deputies, and took over legislative powers. He also declared that the judiciary was in recess.
Id.
356. The seized private papers included such items as identification papers, passports, property
deeds, tax declarations and legal documents used in the defense of the former President in the case
brought against him for the crime of unlawful enrichment. Id.
357. Id.
358. The Court found that the exclusionary rule is a natural part of the right to privacy, and the
inviolability of the home is part of the guarantee of a fair hearing under article 8(1). Id.
359. 81st Sess. Annual Report 1996, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Washington, D.C., Mar. 14 1997, Case 10.506, Rep. No. 38/96 (1997).
360. The searches in Ms. X & Y v. Argentina were arguably conducted for crime detection
purposes, as the searches were intended to quash items being smuggled into the prison through bodily
cavities. The Commission ruled: "The notion of 'arbitrary interference' refers to elements of injustice,
unpredictability and unreasonableness," and that an analysis of these factors is appropriate in an analysis
of "the necessity, reasonableness, and the proportionality of the searches and inspections." Id., para. 92.
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(c) International Criminal Statutes
(i) The ICYT Statute
The issue of whether an accused person is to be afforded search and
seizure privacy rights arose before the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the case of Prosecutor v. Mucic.361 In that case,
the accused were charged with perpetrating international crimes in Celebici, in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. One of the accused persons, Mr. Mucic, had
relocated to Austria. ICTY Prosecutors had requested that Austrian authorities
search for evidence related to the alleged crimes. Austrian authorities, upon a
warrant issued by an Austrian court, searched Mr. Mucic's Vienna apartment
and seized incriminating evidence, including various identification and travel
documents, which they sought to use against him at trial. Though conceding
that "a number of irregularities" occurred in the search of Mr. Mucic's
apartment and that "actions were taken" that violated Austrian law,362 the
prosecution contended that the search itself was lawful.
After hearing argument, the ICTY noted that its rules provide a "liberal
and less technical rule relating to the admissibility of evidence," 363 and that
the court would adhere to the general rule contained in the ICTY Rule 89(C) 364
that calls for the admission of any evidence that is relevant and has probative
365value. However, the court stated that it "reserves the right to exercise its
discretion to exclude any evidence admitted if it is satisfied that is was
obtained by means contrary to internationally protected human rights."
366
Though the ICTY admitted at trial the evidence that had been seized contrary
367to Austrian law, the ICTY confirmed that accused persons shall be afforded
the search and seizure right to privacy, and that it is appropriate for the ICTY
to determine whether that right had been violated.3 68
361. Prosecutor v. Mucic, Case No. IT-96-21, Decision on the Tendering of Prosecution
Exhibits 104-108 (Trial Chamber, Nov. 16, 1998).
362. Id., 12 (Feb. 9, 1998).
363. Id., T13.
364. ICTY Rule 89(c) provides "A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it deems
to have probative value."
365. The Trial Chamber noted: "It would be consistent with the Rules that where evidence is
relevant and has probative value, it is immaterial how it has been obtained. Except, that is, if it is
obtained by methods which cast doubts on its reliability, or if its admission would be antithetical to, and
would seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings." Mucic, 19 (Feb. 9, 1998). Further, the court
concluded that it was "not satisfied that the method by which the evidence was obtained amounts to such
conduct as to induce the exercise of our discretion to exclude it." The court noted that it was "of the
opinion that it would constitute a dangerous obstacle to the administration ofjustice if evidence which is
relevant and of probative value could not be admitted merely because of a minor breach of procedural
rules which the [court] is not bound to apply." Id., 20 (Feb. 9, 1998).
366. Prosecutor v. Mucic, Case No. IT-96-21, Decision on the Tendering of Prosecution
Exhibits 104-108 (Trial Chamber, Nov. 16, 1998; Feb. 9, 1998), 23.
367. Id., 20(Feb. 9, 1998).
368. Unfortunately, the ICTY shed little light on the substance or parameters of the search and
seizure privacy right, as the ICTY ruling did not make clear whether (a) the Vienna search conducted
with irregularities did not violate "internationally protected human rights," or (b) the Vienna search
conducted with irregularities violated "internationally protected human rights," but the Court exercised
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(ii) The ICTR Statute
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was recently
faced with a search and seizure privacy issue involving the prosecution of
genocide suspect Mr. Jr6me Bicamumpaka, who had been the Rwandan
Minister of Foreign Affairs.369 In April 1999, he was arrested in Cameroon on
charges that he used his position to organize and perpetrate massacres against
the Tutsi minority in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. During the arrest,
certain documents belonging to him were seized by Cameroonian authorities.
Though the documents were not turned over to the prosecution and were not
sought to be used against him in his ICTR prosecution, the existence of search
and seizure privacy rights was arguably reaffirmed. In March 2000, the ICTR
ruled, inter alia, that the accused person had waived his search and seizure
rights during the seizure.370
(d) States' Internal Law as Evidence of State Practice:
Constitutions of the World
Safeguarding the search and seizure right to privacy is not a Western
concept, but a concept that reflects laws in place in countries in every comer
of the globe, regardless of the countries' respective regions or political or
economic systems. 371 Without exception, there is some form of safeguard for
the right to privacy in every jurisdiction surveyed. Virtually every country of
the world that has a written constitution, including nations that participated in
the Rome Conference and that signed and/or ratified the Rome Statute,372 and
its discretion in the interests of justice and admitted the unlawfully obtained evidence. Thus, it can be
argued that it is unclear whether the ICTY ruled that the right to privacy in the context of searches and
seizures is an "internationally protected human right." For a discussion of the relationship between the
ICTY use of the term "internationally protected human rights" and the Rome Statute use of the term
"internationally recognized human rights," see supra note 242 and accompanying text.
369. Prosecutor v. JKrme Bicamumpaka, Case Nos. ICTR-99-49-DP, ICTR-99-50-I (1999).
370. See Africa News Service, Tribunal Judge Orders Restitution of Suspect's Personal
Effects, 2000 WL 15974542; Mary Kimani, Tribunal Judge Orders Restitution of Suspect's Personal
Effects, at http:/vww.intemews.org/projects/ICTRnewsMar00.htmlgmarl0 (Judge Guney) (Mar. 6,
2000).
371. This Part of the Article examines the law of countries throughout the world that provide
for the search and seizure right to privacy. These countries represent all inhabited continents, and all
social, political, ethnic, cultural, and economic groups in existence. See, e.g., infra notes 372-86 and
accompanying text (citing constitutional provisions for search and seizure right to privacy in almost 190
different countries).
372. Of the approximately 190 countries (including 188 Member States of the United Nations
and several non-Member States, such as Switzerland) that were eligible to participate in the Rome
Conference, 160 States participated. Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, at
http:l/Avv.un.orgllaw/icclstatute/finalfra.htm. As of May 2001, 139 States have signed and 32 States
have adhered to the Rome Statute by ratification or accession. Id. Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas,
Gambia, Guyana, Mongolia, Nauru, Saint Lucia, and Yugoslavia signed the Rome Statute but did not
participate in the Rome Conference. Belize and Fiji signed and ratified the Rome Statute but did not
participate in the Rome Conference. Dominica did not sign the Rome Statute but adhered by accession.
Following is a list of all States that participated in the Rome Conference, with an asterisk (*)
indicating that the State has signed the Rome Statute, and with a notation if the State has adhered to the
Rome Statute: Afghanistan; *Albania; *Algeria; *Andorra (ratified); *Angola; *Argentina (ratified);
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that have adhered to the ICCPR,373 expressly offers constitutional privacy
safeguards at least as relates to the inviolability of the home.374 In many cases,
*Armenia; *Australia; *Austria (ratified); Azerbaijan; *Bahrain; *Bangladesh; *Barbados; Belarus;
*Belgium (ratified); *Benin; *Bolivia; *Bosnia and Herzegovina; *Botswana (ratified); *Brazil; Brunei;
*Bulgaria; *Burkina Faso; *Burundi; *Cambodia; *Cameroon; *Canada (ratified); Cape Verde;
*Central African Republic; *Chad; *Chile; China; *Colombia; *Comoros; *Congo (Brazzaville);
*Congo (Kinshasa); *Costa Rica; *C6te d'Ivoire; *Croatia (ratified); Cuba; *Cyprus; *Czech Republic;
*Denmark; *Djibouti; Dominica (acceded); *Dominican Republic; *Ecuador, *Egypt; El Salvador;
*Eritrea; *Estonia; Ethiopia; *Finland (ratified); *France (ratified); *Gabon (ratified); *Georgia;
*Germany (ratified); *Ghana (ratified); *Greece; Guatemala; *Guinea; *Guinea-Bissau; *Haiti; Holy
See; *Honduras; *Hungary; *Iceland (ratified); India; Indonesia; *Iran; Iraq; *Ireland; *Israel; *Italy
(ratified); *Jamaica; Japan; *Jordan; Kazakhstan; *Kenya; Korea, North; Korea, South; *Kuwait;
*Kyrgyzstan; Laos; *Latvia; Lebanon; *Lesotho (ratified); *Liberia; Libya; *Liechtenstein; *Lithuania;
*Luxembourg (ratified); *Macedonia; *Madagascar, *Malawi; Malaysia; *Mali (ratified); *Malta;
*Marshall Islands (ratified); Mauritania; *Mauritius; *Mexico; *Moldova; *Monaco; *Morocco;
*Mozambique; *Namibia; Nepal; *Netherlands ; *New Zealand (ratified); Nicaragua; *Niger, *Nigeria;
*Norway (ratified); *Oman; Pakistan; *Panama; *Paraguay (ratified); *Peru; *Philippines; *Poland;
*Portugal; Qatar; *Romania; *Russian Federation; Rwanda; *Samoa; *San Marino (ratified); *Sao
Tome and Principe; Saudi Arabia; *Senegal (ratified); *Sierra Leone (ratified); Singapore; *Slovakia;
*Slovenia; *Solomon Islands; *South Africa (ratified); *Spain (ratified); Sri Lanka; *Sudan; Swaziland;
*Sweden; *Switzerland; *Syria; *Tajikistan (ratified); *Tanzania; *Thailand; Togo; *Trinidad and
Tobago (ratified); Tunisia; Turkey; *Uganda; *Ukraine; *United Arab Emirates; *United Kingdom;
*USA; *Uruguay; *Uzbekistan; *Venezuela (ratified); Vietnam; Yemen; *Zambia; *Zimbabwe. See
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Ratification Status (last visited May 19, 2001), at
http://www.un.org/ law/icc/statute/status.htm.
373. For a list of all countries that have adhered to the ICCPR, see supra note 315.
374. See, e.g., AFG. CONST. ch. 3, art. 44; ALB. CONST. pt. 2, ch. I, art. 37; ALG. CONST. ch. 4,
art. 40; ANDORRA CONST. tit. II, ch. III., art. 15; ANGL. CONST. pt. II, art. 24; ANT. & BARB. CONST. ch.
II, art. 10; ARG. CONST., 1st pt., ch. I, art. 18; ARM. CONST. ch. 2, art. 21; Aus. CONST. (1988 Prot. of
Pers. Freedom) art. I(1); AZER. CONST. pt. II, ch. II1, art. 33); BAH. CONST. ch. III, art. 21; BAHR.
CONST. pt. 3, art. 25; BANGL. CONsT. pt. III, art. 43(a); BARB. CONST. ch. III, §11(b); BELR. CONST. §11,
art. 29; BELG. CONST. tit. II, art. 15; BELIZE CONST. pt. II, art. 9(1); BENIN CONST. tit. II, art. 20; BOL.
CONST. pt. 1, tit. 2, art. 21; BOSN. & HERZ CONST. art. II, 3(f); BOTS. CONST. ch. II, art. 9(1); BRAz.
CONST. tit. II, ch. I, art. 5, § XI; BULG. CONST. ch. II, art. 33(l) & ch. I, 17(1); BURK. FASO CoNsT. tit. I,
art. 6; BURUNDI CONST. tit. III, art. 23; CAMBODIA CONST. ch. III, art. 40; CAMEROON CONST., Preamble;
CAN. CONST. pt. 1, art. 8; CAPE VERDE CONST. pt. II, tit. II, ch. I, art. 40(1); CENT. AFR. REP. CONST. tit.
I, art. 14; CHAD CONST. tit. II, ch. I, art. 42; CHILE CONST. ch. III, art. 19(5); COLOM. CONST. tit. II, ch. I,
art. 28; COMOROS CONST., Preamble; CONGO (BRAZAVILLE) CONST. tit. II, art. 24; CONGO (KINSHASA)
CONST. tit. 11, art. 24; COSTA RICA CONST. tit. IV, art. 23; CROAT. CONST. 111(2), art. 34; CUBA CONST.
ch. VII, art. 56; CYPRUS CONST. prop. I(B)(8); CZECH REP. CONST. (1992), art. 3; DEN. CONST. pt. VIII,
art. 72; DjIB. CONST. tit. II, art. 12; DOMINICA CONST. ch. I, art. 7(1); DOm. REP. CONST. tit. II, §1, art.
8(3); ECUADOR CONST., tit. III, ch. 2, art. 23(12); EGYPT CONST. pt. 3, art. 44; EL SAL. CONST. tit. II, ch.
1, §1, art. 20; EQ. GUINEA CONST. tit. I, art. 13(g); ERI. CONST. ch. II, art. 18(2)(a); EST. CONST. ch. II,
art. 33; ETH. CONST. ch. 3, pt. 1, art. 26(1); F.R.G. CONST. ch. I, art. 13(1); FiUi CONST. ch. 4, art. 26(1);
FIN. CONST. art. II, § 8; GABON CONST. art. 1(12); GAM. CONST. ch. IV, art. 23(1); GEOR. CONST. ch. 2,
art. 20(2); GHANA CONST. ch. 5, art. 18(2); GREECE CONST. pt. II, art. 9(1); GREN. CONST. ch. I, art.
7(1); GUAT. CONST. tit. II, ch. I, art. 23; GUINEA CONST. tit. II, art. 12; GUINEA-BISSAU CONST. TIT. II,
art. 38; GuY. CONST. pt. 1, tit. 1, ch. 3, art. 40(1); HAITI CONST. tit. III, ch. II, §J, art. 43; HOND. CONST.
tit. III, ch. II, art. 99; HUNG. CONST. ch. XII, art. 59(1); ICE. CONST. 1944/95 VI, art. 71; IRAN CONST.
ch. III, art. 22; IRAQ CONsT. ch. III, art. 22(c); IR. CONST. art. 40(5); ISRAEL CONST. art. 20(a)-(b); ITALY
CONST. pt. 1, tit. 1, art. 14; JAM. CONST. ch. III, art. 19; JAPAN CONST. ch. III, art. 35; JORDAN CONST.
ch. 2, art. 10; KAz. CONST. §11, art. 25(1); KENYA CONST. ch. 5, § 76(1); KIRIBATI CONST. ch. II, art. §
9(1); KUWAIT CONST. pt. III, art. 38; KYRG. CONST. ch. II, §2, art. 16(2); LAOS CONST. ch. III, art. 29;
LAT. CONST. §8, art. 96; LED. CONST. pt. I, ch. 2, art. 14; LESOTHO CONST. ch. II, art. 10(1); LIBER.
CONST. ch. III, art. 16; LIBYA CONST., ch. 1, art. 12; LIECH. CONsT. ch. IV, art. 32; LITH. CONST. ch. 2,
art. 24; LUx. CONST. ch. II, art. 15; MACED. CONST. 1991 §II(1), art. 26; MADAG. CONST. tit. II, art. 13;
MALAWI CONST. ch. IV, art. 21(1)(a); MALAY. CONST. pt. II, art. 13; MALI CONST. tit. I, art. 6; MALTA
CONST. ch. IV, art. 38(1); MARSH. IS. CONST. art. II, §3(1); MAURITANIA CONST. (tit. I, art. 13;
MAURITIUS CONST. ch. II, art. 9(1); MEX. CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 16; MICR. CONST. art. IV § 5; MOLD.
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the coverage is offered even more broadly.375 Even countries that have no
written constitution offer privacy right coverage through their general laws,
substantive or procedural criminal laws, or evidence laws.376
CONT. ch. II, art. 29(1); MONACO CONST. tit I, art. 21; MONG. CONST. ch. 2, art. 16(13); MOROCCO
CONST. tit. I, art. 10; MOZAM. CONST. ch. IV, art. 104; MYAN. CONST. ch. II, art. 160; NAMIB. CONST.
ch. III, art. 13(1); NAURU CONST. pt. I, art. 9(1); NEPAL CONST. pt. 3, art. 22; NETH. CONST. ch. I, art.
12(1); NICAR. CONST. tit. IV, ch. I, art. 26(2); NIGER CONST. tit. II, art. 20; NIG. CONST. ch. IV, art. 37;
NOR. CONST. §B, art. 102; N. KOREA CONST. ch. 5, art 79; N.Z. CONST. (1990 Bill of Rights Act) pt. HI,
art. 21; OMAN CONST. ch. 3, art. 27; PAK. CONST. pt. II, ch. I, art. 14(1); PALAU CONST. art. IV § 4; PAN.
CONST. tit. I, ch. 1, art. 26; PAPUA N.G. CONST. pt. I, div. I, subdiv. C, art. 44; PARA. CONST. tit. II,
art. 34; P.R.C. CONST. ch. 2, art. 39; PERU CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 2(9); PHIL. CONST. art. m, §2; POL.
CONST. (1997) ch. II, art. 50; PORT. CONST. pt. I, tit. II, ch. I, art. 34(1); QATAR CONST. (1973) pt. 3, art.
12; ROM. CONST. tit. II, ch. II, art. 27(1); Russ. CONsT. §1, ch. 2, art. 25; RWANDA CONsT. tit. II, art. 22;
ST. KITrS & NEVIS CONST. ch. II, art. 9(l); ST. LUCIA CONST. ch. I § 7(l); ST. VINCENT Ch. 1 § 7(1);
SAO TOMt & PRINCIP- CONST. pt. II, tit. II, art. 24; SAUDI ARABIA CONST. (1992) ch. 5, art. 37; SEN.
CONST. tit. II, art. 13; SEY. CONST. ch. III, pt. I, art. 20(1)(a); SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. IfI, art. 22(1);
SLOVK. CONST. ch. 2, §1, art. 21(1); SLOVN. CONST. §11, art 36; SOLOM. IS. CONST. ch. II, art. 9(1);
SOMAL. CONST. ch. II, art 29; S. AR. CONST. ch. 2, art. 14(a); S. KOREA CONST. ch. II, art. 16; SPAIN
CONST. ch. II, §1, art. 18(2); SUDAN CONST. pt. I, ch. I, art. 29(2); SURiN. CONST. ch. V, art. 17(2);
SWAZ. CONST. ch. II, art 9(1); SWED. CONST. ch. 2, art. 6; SwITz. CONST. tit. II, art. 13(1); SYRIA
CONST. ch. 1, pt. IV, art. 31; TAJ. CONST. ch. 2, art. 22; TANZ. CONST. pt. 3, art. 13; THAIL. CONST.
(1991) ch. I, § 35; TOGO CONST. tit. H(1), art. 28; TONGA CONST. ch. 2, pt. 1, cl. 16; TRiN. & TOBAGO
CONST. ch. 1, pt. 1, art. 4(a); TUNIS. CONST. ch. 1, art. 9; TURK. CONST. pt. II, ch. II, §IV, art. 21;
TuRXM. CONST. §2, art. 22; TUVALU CONST. pt. II, div. 3, subdiv. A, § 21(1)(g),(h); UGANDA CONST. ch.
4, art. 27(1)(a),(b); UKR. CONST. ch. II, art. 30; U.A.E. CONST. ch. 3, art. 36; U.S. CONST. amend. IV;
URU. CONST. §2, ch. I, art. 11; UZB. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 7, art. 27; VANUATU CONST. ch. 2, pt. 1, art.
5(1)(j); VENEZ. CONST. tit. III, ch. m, art 47; VIETNAM CONST. ch. V, art. 73; YEMEN CONST. pt. II, art.
51; YUGOSLAVIA CONST. § 2, art 31; ZAIRE, CONST. tit. II, art. 22; ZAMBIA CONST. pt. III, arts. 11(d) &
17(1); ZIMB. CONST. ch. Ill, arts. 11(c) & 17(1).
375. In addition to protecting the inviolability of the home, many constitutions safeguard other
privacy rights, including the right to privacy in family life, communications, or correspondence. See,
e.g., AFG. CONST. ch. 3, art. 45; ARG. CONST., 1st pt., ch. I, art. 18; BOSN. & HERz CONST. art. H, 3(f);
BURK. FAso CONST. tit. I, art. 6; BURUNDI CONST. tit. III, art. 23; CAMBODIA CONST. ch. I, art. 40;
CHILE CONST. ch. I, art. 19(5); COSTA RICA CONST. tit. IV, art. 24; DEN. CONST. pt. VIII, art. 72; EL
SAL. CONST. tit. II, ch. I, §1, art. 24; GHANA CONsT. ch. 5, art. 18(2); GUINEA CONST. tit. I, art. 12;
HUNG. CONST. ch. XI, art. 59(1); ICE. CONST. 1944195 VI, art. 71; KUWAIT CONST. pt. III, art. 38;
LIBER. CONST. Ch. III, art. 16; MADAG. CONST. tit. II, art. 13; MALAWI CONT. ch. IV, art. 21(1)(b)-(c);
MALDIVES CONST. ch. 11, art. 20; MALI CONST. tit. I, art. 6; MEX. CONST. tit. I, ch. I, art. 16; MONG.
CONST. ch. 2, art. 16(13); MOZAM. CONST. ch. IV, art. 104; NAMIB. CONST. ch. III, art. 13(1); NEPAL
CONST. pt. 3, art. 22; N.Z. CONST. (1990 Bill of Rights Act) pt. II, art. 21; NICAR. CONST. tit. IV, ch. I,
art. 26(2); NIGER CONST. tit. II, art. 22; NIG. CONST. ch. IV, art. 37; OMAN CONST. ch. 3, art. 30; ; PAPUA
N.G. CONST. pt. Ill, div. III, subdiv. C, art. 49; PARA. CONST. tit. 1I, art. 36; P.R.C. CoNsT. ch. 2, art. 40;
PORT. CONST. pt. I, tit. H, ch. I, art. 36(I); RWANDA CONST. tit. II, art. 22; ; S.O TOMt & PRINCIPt
CONST. pt. II, tit. II, art. 24(1); ); SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. Ill, art. 22(1); SOMAL. CONST. Ch. 11, art. 30;
SUDAN CONST. pt. II, ch. I, art. 29(); ); SURIN. CONST. ch. V, art. 17(2); SWED. CONST. ch. 2, art. 6;
SWTZ. CONST. tit. II, art. 13(1); TAJ. CONST. cl. 2, art. 23; TOGO CONST. tit. II(1), art. 29; TUNIS.
CONST. ch. 1, art. 9; UGANDA CONST. ch. 4, art. 27(2)(a),(b); UzB. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 7, art. 27; VIETNAM
CONST. ch. V, art. 73; ZAIRE, CONST. tit. II, art. 23.
376. For example, although the United Kingdom lacks a written constitution, its statutory laws
offer safeguards to homes. See Krotoszynski, supra note 29. The United Kingdom Police and Criminal
Evidence Act (1984), in Part II entitled "Powers of Entry, Search and Seizure," provides rules for
constables to apply for a warrant from a justice of the peace, who will issue the warrant only if a series
of conditions is satisfied, including that the justice of the peace "is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing" that a serious arrestable offence has been committed, that material on the
specified premises "is likely to be of substantial value" to the investigation of the offence, that the
material "is likely to be relevant evidence," and that the evidence does not consist of or include
protected or privileged items. 12 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES (4th ed., 1997
Reissue) (Criminal Law), s. 8.
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Virtually all constitutions of the world safeguard the right to privacy in
the home. Some constitutions generally forbid arbitrary or unlawful entries,
377
while others have adopted an "unreasonableness" model based on the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.378 Some constitutions require a warrant
or other court order or specification for a search.379 Some constitutions spell
out procedural requirements for the lawful invasions of privacy, which might
be permitted in circumstances and under procedures prescribed by law;380 in
the manner, forms, conditions or cases provided or specified by law;381 in
accordance with law;382 in due course of law;38 3 and by virtue of law. 3 4 Some
provide for limitations in certain circumstances.38 5 Some constitutions have
Reissue) (Criminal Law), s. 8.
377. For example, article 29 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China provides: "The homes and other premises of Hong Kong residents shall be
inviolable. Arbitrary or unlawful search of, or intrusion into, a resident's home or other premises shall
be prohibited." Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the Peoples' Republic of
China, Apr. 4, 1990,29 I.L.M. 1511, 1529.
378. National Constitutions that contain a search and seizure provision modeled on the U.S.
Constitution's Fourth Amendment, see supra note 106, include the constitutions of Fiji (FIJI CONsT. ch.
4, art. 26(1)); Japan (JAPAN CONST. ch. m, art. 35); The Marshall Islands (MARSH. Is. CONST. art. II,
§3(1)); and the Philippines (PHIL. CoNsT. art. 111, §2).
379. See, e.g., CAN. CONST. pt. 1, art. 8; CAPE VERDE CONST. pt. II, tit. II, ch. I, art. 40(2)-(3);
COSTA RICA CONST. tit. IV, art. 23; CROAT. CONST. 111(2), art. 34; CZECH REP. CONST. (1992) ch. 2, pt.
1, art. 12(2); DEN. CONST. pt. VIII, art. 72; ECUADOR CONST., tit. III, ch. 2, art. 23(12); EGYPT CONST.
pt. 3, art. 44; EL SAL. CONST. tit. II, ch. I, §1, art. 20; ERI. CONST. ch. II, art. 18(2)(a)-(b); Fij CONST. ch.
4, art. 26(1); GABON CONST. art. 1(12); GAM. CONsT. ch. IV, art. 23(2); GEOR. CONST. ch. 2, art. 20(2);
F.R.G. CONST. ch. I, art. 13(2); ICE. CONST. 1944/95 VI, art. 71; JAPAN CONST. ch. I, art. 35; KAz.
CONST. §II, art. 25(1); N. KOREA CONST. ch. 5, art. 79; LAOS CONST. ch. III, art. 29; LIBER. CONST. ch.
III, art. 16; LITH. CONST. ch. 2, art. 24; MADAG. CONST. tit. II, art. 13; MARSH. IS. CONST. art. II, §3(1);
SPAIN CONST. ch. II, §1, art. 18(2); U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
380. See, e.g., AFG. CONST. ch. 3, art. 44; BAHR. CONST. pt. 3, art. 25; CHILE CONST. ch. Inl,
art. 19(5); CONGO (KINSHASA) CONST. tit. II, art. 24; DJIB. CONST. tit. H, art. 12; ECUADOR CONST., tit.
III, ch. 2, art. 23(12); HAITI CONST. tit. III, Ch. II, §J, art. 43; LAOS CONST. ch. III, art. 29; LEB. CONST.
pt. I, ch. 2, art. 14; OMAN CONST. ch. 3, art. 27; QATAR CONST. (1973) pt. 3, art. 12; RWANDA CONST. tit.
II, art. 22; UZB. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 7, art. 27.
381. See, e.g., ALB. CONST. pt. 2, ch. I, art. 37; BENIN CONST. tit. II, art. 20; BURK. FASO
CONST. tit. I, art. 6; BURUNDI CONST. tit. III, art. 23; CHAD CONST. tit. II, ch. I, art. 42; COSTA RICA
CONsT. tit. IV, art. 23; DOm. REP. CONST. tit. II, §1, art. 8(3); GUINEA-BISSAU CONST. TIT. II, art. 38;
KAz. CONST. §II, art. 25(1); MALDIVES CONST. ch. II, art. 18; MALI CONST. tit. I, art. 6; NEPAL CONST.
pt. 3, art. 22; NIGER CONST. tit. 11, art. 20; SUDAN CONST. pt. II, ch. I, art. 29(2); TOGO CONST. tit. 11(1),
art. 28; YEMEN CONST. pt. 11, art. 51.
382. See, e.g., CAMBODIA CONST. ch. III, art. 40; IRAQ CONST. ch. III, art. 22(c); IR. CONST. art.
40(5).
383. See, e.g., BELR. CONST. §II, art. 29.
384. See, e.g., CAMEROON CONST., Preamble; THAIL. CONST. (1991) ch. III, § 35.
385. For example, some countries expressly provide for limitations of the right to privacy in
certain circumstances or for certain purposes, including: defense; public safety; "cases offlagrante
delicto"; "disaster or rescue"; or for limitations based on public order, public morality and/or public
health. E.g., ANT. & BARB. CONST. ch. II, art. 10; BELIZE CONST. pt. II, art. 9(2); BRAz. CONST. tit. II,
ch. I, art. XI; CAPE VERDE CONST. pt. II, tit. II, ch. I, art. 40(2); CENT. AFR. REP. CONST. tit. I, art. 14;
DOMINICA CONST. ch. I, art. 7(1); GABON CONST. art. 1(12); F.R.G. CONST. ch. I, art. 13(1); GREN.
CONST. ch. I, art. 7(1); ITALY CONST. pt. 1, tit. 1, art. 14; LESOTHO CONST. ch. II, art. 10(1); MACED.
CONST. 1991 §11(1), art. 26; MADAG. CONST. tit. II, art. 13; MAURITIUS CONST. ch. II, art. 9(2); NOR.
CONST. §B, art. 102; ROm. CONST. tit. II, ch. II, art. 27(2); ST. KITrS & NEvIS CONST. ch. II, art. 9(2);
ST. VINCENT CONST. Ch. 1 § 7(2); SEY. CONST. ch. III, pt. I, art. 20(2)(a); SIERRA LEONE CONST. ch. III,
art. 22(2); SOLOM. IS. CONST. ch. II, art. 9(2); SPAIN CONST. ch. II, §1, art. 18(2); TUNIS. CONsT. ch. 1,
art. 9; ZAMBIA CONST. pt. III, arts. 1 (d) & 17(2); ZIMB. CONST. ch. III, arts. 1 l(c) & 17(2).
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adopted provisions that mimic the iteration in the European Convention,
which permits limitations or restrictions so long as they are justified "in a free
and democratic society."
386
From these can be drawn the following general principles in the context
of searches and seizures: a respect for the sanctity and inviolability of the
home; acceptable limitations on the right, rendering the right not absolute;
recognition that any interference with the right must be reasonable and limited
to the scope necessary to satisfy a legal purpose; rejection of arbitrary and
unlawful interference with privacy and unfettered discretion to search or seize;
effective external supervision of law enforcement authorities; balance of
prevention and detection of crime versus the right to privacy; call for
supervision by judicially independent persons before a search or seizure, and
not after; and legally enforceable safeguards regulating use of police
powers.387 Unfortunately, a wide gap exists between law and practice with
respect to many rights in many countries.
(e) Conformity of State Practice with International
Standards
Many states that incorporate the right to privacy in their domestic
constitutions, general law, or judicial decisions have identified an
international standard for the right and attempt to incorporate that into their
domestic jurisdictions.
Search and seizure privacy rights can be found in countries of the East,
West, North and South, in countries with varying political, economic, and
social systems, in countries with widely diverse cultures, and in countries that
represent all the major legal systems of the world. Disagreement as to the
precise definition of the right does not detract from the argument that the right
rises to customary international law.
d. Opinio Juris
The second prong of the customary international law test is opiniojuris,
which requires a finding that States that honor the search and seizure privacy
right primarily do so out of a sense of legal obligation, and not out of a sense
of convenience or coincidence. In determining whether States honor the right
due to legal obligation, we consider several factors, including: (a) legality; (b)
international versus domestic law; and (c) states' awareness of the articulation
of the legal right. 38
"Legality," as proof of opiniojuris, requires a finding that the domestic
rules protecting the search and seizure privacy right are legal in nature. As the
386. See, e.g., GAM. CONST. ch. IV, art. 23(1); GHANA CONST. ch. 5, art. 18(2); NAMIB. CONsT.
ch. HI, art. 13(1).
387. See generally discussion supra at Parts V and VI.
388. See, e.g., JANIS, supra note 282, at 55-59.
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privacy safeguards are contained in national constitutions, legislation, and
judicial opinions, the legality prong is satisfied.
For the "international versus domestic law" prong to be satisfied, the
norm in question must concern international rather than domestic law.
International human rights law is a subset of international law, and it governs
not only the relationship between a state and its citizens, but also it governs
the relationship between and among states that are parties to international
human rights law treaties. The search and seizure right to privacy is
incorporated into both domestic law and international law. Thus, this prong
has been satisfied.
The "States' awareness of the articulation of the legal rule" prong is
easily satisfied, as every country in the world is a party to at least one
international treaty that safeguards the right to privacy. The express consent of
those States to be bound by international instruments that contain the right to
privacy reflects their awareness of the rules contained therein, including rules
regarding the search and seizure right to privacy.
6. Source of Applicable Law # 6: "General Principles of Law
Derived by the Court from National Laws of Legal Systems of the
World Including, as Appropriate, the National Laws of States that
Would Normally Exercise Jurisdiction over the Crime, Provided
that Those Principles Are Not Inconsistent with [the Rome] Statute
and with International Law and Internationally Recognized Norms
and Standards "--Rome Statute, Article 21(1)(c)
a. "General Principles of Law" under Rome Statute, Article
21(1)(c)
The Rome Statute drafters were concerned about the appropriateness of
the treaty mandating that the Court directly apply national law, a topic that
was debated during the pre-Rome Preparatory Committee sessions 38 9 and
flatly rejected during the Rome Conference itself.390 However, it was evident
to the drafters that the lacuna might need to be filled, as it was impractical, if
not impossible, for each applicable rule or principle of law to be enumerated
389. Even in 1995, Ad Hoc Committee delegates had suggested that the 1994 ILC Draft, sub-
paragraph c "should be amended to make it clear that national law was a subsidiary means for
determining general principles of law common to the major legal systems or, alternatively, should
clearly indicate the relevant national law, the State whose law would apply and the circumstances in
which such law would apply, particularly as national law was far from uniform." 1995 Ad Hoc
Committee Report, supra note 74, T 53 ("It was also suggested that a new provision should be added
concerning customary law, bearing in mind article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice." d.)
390. The Court is prohibited from ruling on or applying national law. For example, Rome
Statute, supra note 3, art. 69(8) provides that the Court "shall not rule on the application of the State's
national law" when deciding on the relevance or admissibility of evidence collected by a State.
However, national law is to be applied, in conjunction with the law of the Rome Statute, in situations
involving State compliance for assistance in arrest, extradition or surrender (arts. 89(3)(a) and 107),
other forms of State cooperation (arts. 93 and 96), and fines and forfeiture (art. 109). Id., arts. 89(3)(a),
93(1), 96(3), 107(3), 109(1).
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in the Rome Statute. Instances would undoubtedly arise in which superior
sources of international law contained in the hierarchy would either be silent
or would fail to provide a relevant, appropriate law to apply.391 The drafters
concluded that the Court would turn to national law, but would only glean
principles from it without adopting it wholesale. Thus, in Rome Statute, article
21(1)(c), the Court is directed to apply:
[G]eneral principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of
the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally
exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent
with [the Rome] Statute and with international law and internationally recognized norms
and standards.
General principles of law are substantially non-treaty, non-customary,
and non-consensual sources of international law.392 If conventional and
customary international law fails to provide an appropriate rule or principle of
international law, general principles of law derived from national laws3 V can
be used to fill in lacunae. The rationale is that if a common principle exists
within the domestic laws of nations, such a principle ought to be attributable
to international law to fill in the gap.
394
Before canvassing the national legal systems of the world in order to
derive an appropriate general principle of law, the Court must parse through
the language of the article 21(l)(c) phrase "national laws of legal systems of
the world" to determine whether the language is superfluous and inelegant,
395
or whether it raises legally cognizable internal distinctions. "Law" (or
"national law") and "legal" (or "legal systems") are redundant, given that
national law or any other sort of law would be associated with a legal system.
"National law" and "legal system of the world" are also redundant because
any national law or indeed any legal system referred to would necessarily be
"of the world." A streamlined version of this passage that reads "general
principles derived from national law" would suggest just that the applicable
law is to be derived from national legal systems.396 There would have been no
391. Human Rights Watch has pointed out, as regards international criminal law, that
"customary international and treaty law may not be sufficiently developed at the present time to provide
legal guidance on all possible matters concerning the application of the [Rome Statute]. General
principles, derived from practice in a range of national legal systems, should be drawn upon to fill any
potential lacuna." HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 73.
392. JANIS, supra note 282, at 55.
393. General principles of law are rooted in national law, and determined by conducting a
comparative analysis. However, some general principles are rooted in "unperfected" international law
sources, including treaties and customary international law. An unperfected source of international law
would include one that never entered into force, and an unperfected custom might be one in which the
state practice element is satisfied but the opinio juris element is not. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, A
Functional Approach to "General Principles of International Law", 11 MICH J. INT'L L. 768, 768-769
(1990).
394. JANIS, supra note 282, at 55-56; see Bassiouni, supra note 393, at 774.
395. ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PENAL, supra note 72, at 36-37.
396. Id. It might be argued that "national law" would refer only to the law of States Party to the
Rome Statute, and "legal systems of the world" would refer to laws of non-Party States. If that is the
meaning intended by the drafters, the inelegant ambiguity is unfortunate.
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need to include the term "legal systems" along with the modifier "of the
world."
However, another credible denotation exists. "Legal systems" may refer
to the five major world systems of law: the French Romanist-Civilist; the
Germanic; the Common Law; the Marxist-Socialist; and the Islamic legal
systems. 397 If so, then the Court would identify which States fit into each of
the five world legal systems and canvass national laws from States in those
systems. 398 The Rome Statute is silent on which nations' laws or how many
legal systems the Court shall canvass. An earlier iteration of article 21
suggested that canvassing "the national laws of States representing the major
legal systems of the world" was appropriate.399 Even if this language had been
adopted it would not have announced precisely which national laws, from
which States, representing which legal systems, should be canvassed.400
Although the Court must also consider "as appropriate, the national laws
of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime," the Rome
Statute does not define these States. However, the ordinary meaning of that
phrase suggests the following possibilities: the State of the nationality of
accused persons; the State on whose territory the alleged crime took place; the
State where the accused person is present; or any State injured by the alleged
crime. Furthermore, if the crime is such that universal jurisdiction attaches, all
States in the world "would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime," and
thus the States whose laws are canvassed need not be parties to the Rome
Statute.
As the Rome Statute is silent on precisely which national laws should be
canvassed, the Court itself when faced with a general principle of law
determination must ascertain which national laws to canvass. In theory, article
21(l)(c) could require the Court to canvass any one of the following: (i) the
national laws of all nations in all legal systems of the world (which would
necessarily include the national laws of all the States that "would normally
exercise jurisdiction over the crime"). This would be tantamount to requiring
the canvassing of the national laws of all nations because all nations belong to
at least one of the major legal systems; (ii) the national laws of only some
nations in all legal systems of the world (which might, or might not, include
the national laws of some States that "would normally exercise jurisdiction
397. See DAVID & BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAW 21-29 (1985). Note that different scholars
categorize the systems differently. See also Bassiouni, supra note 249, at 244. Professor Bassiouni
comments: "The three primary families are the Romano-Germanic, the Common Law, and the Socialist
families.... In addition, there is a Muslim, Hindu, and Jewish legal family, a Far Eastern legal family,
and a Black African and Malagasy Republic legal family." Id. at 244 n.41 (citations omitted).
398. That still would not explain the word "world."
399. See Zutphen Draft Statute, supra note 68, art. 14[33][21], proposal 2, para. 2. This
provision as proposed in the Zutphen Draft had previously appeared in the Report of the Preparatory
Committee-Proposals, supra note 68, at 106, reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, supra note 60, at 497.
400. See id., art. 14133][21] (containing proposals elements of which are incorporated into
Rome Statute, art. 21). Arguably, the modifier "major" was omitted so that traditional dispute resolution
systems, such as the Rwandan gachacha system, could also be used.
The ICC and the Search and Seizure Right to Privacy
over the crime"); (iii) the national laws of only some nations in only some of
the legal systems of the world (which might, or might not, include the national
laws of some States that "would normally exercise jurisdiction over the
crime"); or (iv) the national laws of some States without regard as to whether
those States qualify as States that "would normally exercise jurisdiction over
the crime." Since that requirement is precatory, the Court is obliged to
consider such states only "as appropriate. 4 °1
It is unreasonable for the Court to be required to canvass the laws of
each of the approximately 190 States of the world. Thus, the Court may
consider "as appropriate" a subset, which might consist of the national laws of
states that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime. The term "as
appropriate" is unclear in that no helpful denotation exists.
It may not be unreasonable to require the Court to canvass the national
laws of at least one State out of each of the five major legal systems of the
world. However, article 21(l)(c) does not call for such quantification. Perhaps
the Court, in determining which national laws to consult, will canvass the laws
of States that have signed the Rome Statute, or perhaps the laws of States that
have adhered to the treaty by ratification or otherwise.
As the appropriate national law to be canvassed will not be known until
a particular case arises,402 one cannot now know what particular nations' laws
might be canvassed and which "general principles" will be derived in any
403particular case. However, it is clear that since the national laws of states
differ, conflicts will arise as to which principle will ultimately be derived and,
applied. This may become particularly important in debates about the right to
privacy in the context of searches and seizures because the definition or scope
of the right may differ among nations.
404
Again, the only express constraint to the derivation of applicable law
under article 21(l)(c) is that the law derived must not be inconsistent with
"international law and recognized norms and standards." Article 21(1)(3) does
not expressly require the derived general principles of law to be consistent
with "internationally recognized human rights" even though the
internationally recognized human rights standard applies by operation of
401. It is unclear how large of a subset is mandated-whether, for example, it would suffice if
only one set of national laws were canvassed from each major legal system grouping in the world (for a
total of about five sets of national laws consulted to determine whether a general principle of law exists).
Or, perhaps 10, 20, 50, or 100 sets of nationals laws must be consulted.
402. The concept of "normally" as regards national laws is necessarily tied to the facts of a
particular case. For example, until a case arises, it will not be known the nation of which the accused is a
citizen or the nation on whose territory the alleged crimes were committed.
403. The drafters were concerned about uncertainty regarding national laws. For example,
"some delegations expressed concern regarding the direct applicability of national law envisaged [in the
1994 ILC Draft Statute] in view of the uncertainty as to which national law should be applied and
bearing in mind the divergences in national criminal laws." Note was taken of the "differences in the
criminal law and procedures of common-law and civil-law countries," and with different delegations
choosing one or the other. It was suggested that an attempt be made "to find a generally acceptable and
balanced approach, taking into account both types of legal systems." 1995 Ad Hoc Committee Report,
supra note 74, 88.
404. This is so even though we can arrive at a consistent international theory for the right to
privacy in the search and seizure context. See discussion supra Parts V and VI.
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article 21(3).405 However, article 21(1)(c) does require consistency with
"international law" (that was defined in article 21(1)(b) as "public
international law," which subsumes international human rights law).
406
Furthermore, the general principles must not be inconsistent with "recognized
norms and standards," which arguably is an obtuse phrase, as it does not
identify the body of law from which "norms and standards" are to be derived.
Nonetheless, it is clear that if the search and seizure privacy right has risen to
a general principle of law, then the Court must enforce that right pursuant to
article 21(1)(c).
b. Search and Seizure Privacy Rights as a General Principle of
Law under Rome Statute, Article 21(1)(c) 40 7
The search and seizure privacy right may be considered a general
principle of law, and if it is, it must be enforced by the Court. Though there is
no direct counterpart in the Rome Statute to article 38 of the ICJ Statute, the
method for determining general principles under the Rome Statute mimics that
employed under the ICJ Statute. Determining the existence of general
principles of law involves canvassing the laws of nations, in a comparative
law tradition, in a search for common principles. This search is an inductive,
empirical analysis that seeks to find repetition of principles as they exist in
various states.403
For a rule to be recognized as a general principle of law, it must exist "in
a number of states," but it need not be universal, exist in all states, or even
exist in a majority of states.409 No sum certain has been required of any
international or national tribunal seeking to identify a general principle of law.
To determine whether a general principle exists in a state, it is appropriate to
examine the constitutions of relevant states, as well as other aspects of states'
internal law. 410 One way to do this is through the inductive method used by
Professor Bassiouni in 1993 to confirm the existence of certain international
405. It is curious that the drafters selected the inverse structure of the "consistent with
internationally recognized human rights" language, in that the drafters did not require the derived
national law to be "consistent with human rights," but required that the law be "not inconsistent" with
"international law and recognized norms and standards." It is also interesting that no non-discrimination
clause was attached.
406. See supra Subsection VI.C.I (discussion of applicable law).
407. Customary international law and general principles of law, per article 38 of the ICJ
Statute, do not have precise counterparts in the Rome Statute. See Arsanjani, supra note 70, at 2S (article
38 sources of international law differ from Rome Statute sources of law).
408. See Bassiouni, supra note 249, at 239-40.
409. See Bassiouni, supra note 393, at 788.
410. Professor Bassiouni states:
"General Principles" have been identified by examining State conduct, policies, practices,
and pronouncements at the international level, which may be different from domestic
legal principles. Thus, States' foreign policies, bilateral and multilateral treaties,
international pronouncements, collective declarations, writings of scholars, international
case law, and international customs, even when unperfected, are valid areas of inquiry
from which to determine the existence of "principles" within the international context.
Id.. at 789.
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and domestic human rights norms as "general principles. 411 Professor
Bassiouni demonstrated the existence of a wide range of general principles of
international human rights through an empirical model of searching for
repetition and similarity among various rights. However, his survey did not
analyze fully the search and seizure privacy right.4 2
Though a full methodological comparative law analysis is beyond the
scope of this Article, the outcome of the above analysis regarding the search
and seizure privacy rights as customary international law is probably adequate
to show that the right has risen to a general principle.41 3 The existence of the
right in the overwhelming majority of States' constitutions and general laws
tends to prove the existence of the right to privacy as a general principle of
law.
7. Source of Applicable Law # 7: "Principles and Rules of Law as
Interpreted in Prior Decisions "--Rome Statute, Article 21(2)
This source of applicable law will perhaps become the easiest source of
law to apply as the Court develops a body of jurisprudence. The Court will
operate in a manner that blends common law precedent and civil law, as do
the ICTY and the ICTR. Because the Court is likely to find the search and
seizure right to privacy under the first six sources of applicable law, the right
-will be incorporated into the Court's jurisprudence and enforced by the Court
pursuant to Rome Statute, article 21(2).
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article calls upon the Preparatory Commission and/or the
Assembly of States Parties to reinstate the express search and seizure privacy
right and to ensure that the right is safeguarded. Even if those two bodies do
not reinstate the express search and seizure privacy right, the right is still
likely to be enforced by the Court. Though the drafters excised express
reference to the search and seizure privacy right from the Rome Statute, the
right is implicit within the Rome Statute and collateral instruments. The right
is an "internationally recognized human right," which the Court, pursuant to
article 21(3), must enforce in all its proceedings. All law applied and
411. See generally Bassiouni, supra note 249, at 239-40. Professor Bassiouni notes:
The rights found in the instruments evidence their international recognition, while their
counterparts in the national constitutions evidence national legal recognition. The
congruence of both indicate the existence of a "general principle".... This study uses a
purely empirical model of searching for repetition and similarity among the various rights
to prove that similar rights evidence the existence of principles common to international
law and national law, and that they are binding "general principles of law."
412. The general principles that Professor Bassiouni proved that are most relevant to the right
to privacy include the right to a fair trial generally, and in particular the right to the inadmissibility of
evidence obtained in violation of a person's right. Only a passing reference is made to the
inadmissibility of evidence obtained in violation of a person's right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. E.g., id. at 269-70.
413. See infra Subsection VI.C.5.
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interpreted by the Court must be consistent with the search and seizure right to
privacy.
The mere existence of the search and seizure right to privacy is
insufficient to ensure realization. The Court must enforce the right, as it is
required to enforce all internationally recognized human rights. Moreover, the
Court is obligated to consider the article 69(7) exclusionary remedy as a
means of helping to ensure that the search and seizure right to privacy is
safeguarded.
Enforcement of the search and seizure privacy right will encourage fair
police practices, and further the notion that human rights are shared by all,
even those suspected of perpetrating heinous crimes. Though the Court will
likely find the existence of the search and seizure right to privacy implicit
within the Rome Statute and its collateral instruments, the scope of coverage
is uncertain, and will be developed by the Court taking into account various
factors, possibly including shifting expectations of privacy. The Court might
face human rights challenges by those who argue that certain rights, which are
not expressly mentioned in the Rome Statute or ancillary instruments, are
covered by the treaty. These areas include rights related to the environment,
sexuality, gender, and bona fide third parties. These "missing" rights also
include certain fair trial rights, and certain rights of suspects, arrestees, and
detainees. The Court, in analyzing these challenges, will likely undertake an
analysis not unlike that developed in this Article. This Article presents a
framework for the Court to use to resolve pressing issues related to missing
rights, and a framework for analyzing human rights challenges to the
interpretation and application of ICC law.
